ISSN 1452-9335
Revija za bezbednost
The Security Review
Godina VI
Izdavački savet
Dobrivoje Radovanović, Univerzitet u Beogradu
Pino Arlaki, Univerzitet u Sazariju
Klaus Bahman, Univerzitet u Vroclavu
Bojan Dobovšek, Univerzitet u Mariboru
Jorgos Leventis, Internacionalni forum za bezbednost
Marina Mališ-Sazdovska, Univerzitet „Sveti Kliment Ohridski”, Skoplje
Džon Slejter, savetnik za policiju i bivši načelnik Skotland Jarda
Rodoljub Šabić, poverenik za informacije od javnog značaja i zaštitu podataka
o ličnosti Republike Srbije
Jovanka Šaranović, Institut za strategijska istraživanja Ministarstva odbrane Vlade
Republike Srbije
Aleksandar Trešnjev, Viši sud u Beogradu
Jasmina Kiurski, Apelaciono javno tužilaštvo u Beogradu
Aleksandar Fatić, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd
Glavni i odgovorni urednik
Srđan Korać, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd
Božidar Banović, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Kragujevcu
Aleksandra Bulatović, Institut za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja, Beograd
Miodrag A. Jovanović, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu
Želimir Kešetović, Fakultet za bezbednost Univerziteta u Beogradu
Dragan Manojlović, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Novom Pazaru
Mijodrag Radojević, Institut za političke studije, Beograd
Milan Škulić, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu
Milan Žarković, Kriminalističko-policijska akademija, Beograd
Centar za bezbednosne studije
11000 Beograd
Za izdavača
Prof. dr Aleksandar Fatić
offi[email protected]
Prelom i kompjuterska obrada:
Snežana Vojković
Interprint, Beograd
Časopis je 2007. godine osnovao Centar za bezbednosne studije iz Beograda
uz podršku Švedske agencije za inostrani razvoj i saradnju (SIDA), koja je
finansirala objavljivanje publikacije u razdoblju od 2007. do 2011. godine.
Klaus Bachmann
Oscar Edoror Ubhenin
Jelena Matijašević
Marija Đorić
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović
Katja Eman and Bojan Dobovšek
UDK: 341.645.5(675.98)
Godina VI, 2012, str. 7–21
Izvorni naučni rad
The InTernaTIonal CrImInal TrIbunal for rwanda
as an aCTor of InTernaTIonal relaTIons
Klaus Bachmann1
International criminal tribunals are hardly ever considered as actors of
International relations, able to change states’ and other actors’ preferences and
to trigger domestic policy changes in states which are under their jurisdiction.
this article examines the extent to which the International criminal tribunal for
rwanda (Ictr) can be considered as such an actor. Based on interviews with key
stakeholders at the Ictr and in Kigali, the author concludes, that there can be
no doubt that Ictr’s decisions have caused domestic change in rwanda’s
transitional Justice and Human rights policy and in the country’s judiciary.
According to the existing literature on actorness (which concentrates on the
European Union), the Ictr should be seen as a hybrid actor, which possesses
many features of an independent actor of International relations, but lacks some
of the most important characteristics of a supranational institution, such as the
ability to overcome delegation problems and collective action dilemmas.
Keywords: Ictr, transitional Justice, International relations, actorness,
international criminal law, rwanda.
For many decades, the discussion in International relations theory has gone on
about the role of international organizations, corporations, non-governmental
organizations and other none-state actors in international politics. can they shape,
reshape, or alter state preferences; are they able to act autonomously among states, or
are they mere agents the state — principals, doomed to follow every policy change which
emerges from the international balance of power? Here is not the place to embark on
such a theoretical discussion. Many of the debates in International relations have been
dedicated to this issue. the purpose of this article is to trace whether a very specific
kind of institution which acts on the international scene and clearly has the ambition to
Klaus Bachmann is Professor of Political Science at the Warsaw School for Social Sciences and the
Humanities and Head of the Foundation for European Policy (FEPS) in Wroclaw. E-mail:
[email protected]
Klaus Bachmann
exercise influence on states and their behaviour, can be regarded as an independent
actor. these institutions are quite new and hardly get a role in international politics
before the end of the cold war. International criminal tribunals, or war crimes, as they
are sometimes imprecisely labelled in the literature, tribunals, were created as ‘norm –
entrepreneurs’, triggers of normative change, which incline and sometimes even coerce
states, into compliance with rules established by other states, the ‘international
community’. As such, they are mostly formal agents of a bigger principal. In the case of
international criminal tribunals ad hoc, this principal is the United Nations.2 Both IctY
and Ictr differ considerably from traditional international courts, like the European
court of Human rights (EcHr) in Strasburg, the International court of Justice in the
Hague (IcJ) or the Inter-American court of Human rights (IAHr). Icts are traditional
Human rights institutions, and they do not decide neither of the legal conflicts between
states. they were created to prosecute serious Human rights violations; however their
targets are not states or organisations, but individuals. Based on what has often been
called the Nuremberg legacy, they attempt to bring justice to countries which have
undergone mass atrocities, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
Opposite to the EcHr and the IcJ, which can issue verdicts against states, but neither
have legal or material means to enforce their decisions, the IctY and the Ictr were
given at least the legal means to enforce their decisions on states. According to their
statutes, they enjoy the privilege of priority over state law, which means, in practice, that
they are entitled to demand the surrender of any suspect under the jurisdiction any UN
member state. Both tribunals have used this right successfully in the past. In order to
fulfil the tasks given to them by their creator, the UN Security council (UNSc), both
tribunals have engaged in politics, taking political decisions, making political choices
(for example whom to prosecute, when and why) and their chief prosecutors — and to
a lesser extent their judges — have become embroiled in the domestic politics of some
of their tribunal’s countries of reference.3 this alone would hardly make them fullfledged actors of International relations. However, as several authors have shown, by
using a specific ‘conditionality game’ in interaction with the European Union (EU), the
IctY has managed to obtain agenda- setting power in the EU enlargement process,
has taken on certain features that are otherwise characteristic of supranational
institutions. However, it would be exaggerated to regard the IctY or the Ictr as
supranational institutions per se, as they were not created to solve delegation and
We are talking here about the International criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (IctY), and the
International criminal tribunal for rwanda (Ictr), whereas the permanent International criminal court
(Icc) was created and is supported and overseen by a large coalition of contracting states.
As a ‘country of reference’ we define the countries, who are affected by the material jurisdiction of a tribunal
and the countries from which a tribunal seeks a suspect’s transfer. In the case of Ictr this is rwanda, but
also other countries, which at a certain point in time hosted (or hid) suspects, these include tanzania,
Kenya, the Democratic republic of congo, or even Belgium, Germany and the US. In the case of IctY,
the countries of reference are the successor republics of the former Yugoslavia, but also other countries,
from which the IctY has sought evidence, witnesses and the transfer of suspects, such as Germany, the
US or Austria.
Klaus Bachmann
compliance problems (the so called ‘free rider issue’) of their founders, but to influence
on countries, that are reluctant to comply with the international community’s norms.
From this perspective, Icts are actors of international relations sui generis — they
enjoy a considerable amount of independence and autonomy from their creators and
from their countries of reference, but at the same time lack certain features that are
constitutive of traditional actors in international relations (like international
organizations) and supranational entrepreneurs. We trace these differences in the
following paragraph in order to then ask the question, whether actorness can be
attributed to one of these Icts, the International criminal tribunal for rwanda, and
whether this actorness can be adequatly empirically supported.
1. actorness and supranationality
In recent years, the question of whether a polity can be regarded as an actor in
international relations was raised almost entirely in respect to the European Union
and its foreign policy. It is unsurprising that most definitions of actorness were
therefore tailored in a way that makes them applicable to the EU, but not necessarily
to other entities. the older literature about International relations, which is
dominated by realist and neorealist approaches, attributes actorness only to states and
defines it in a way which again makes the definition applicable to a state-centric
environment, but does not allow us to identify whether a polity is an international
actor or not. Institutionalist and neoliberal research focuses on the mediating and
preference-changing mechanisms of international institutions, treating them as de
facto actors, but also leaves the question unanswered whether an organ created by an
international organisation (here: the UN) can acquire enough attributes of actorness
to be regarded as a fully-fledged actor on the international scene.
Most authors dealing with the EU’s alleged or postulated actorness apply Jupille and
caporaso’s definition, according to which actor capacity consists of ‘cohesion, authority,
autonomy and recognition.’ coherence describes the ability of a polity to formulate
internally consistent policy preferences. Authority means that, it has a legal basis to act,
whereas autonomy encompasses an entity’s distinctiveness and independence from other
actors. recognition refers to the perception of a polity’s by others: one who wants to be
an actor, has to be regarded as one by others. this concept, though widely used,
obfuscates more than it explains, because it leaves open, what exactly is meant by such
crucial attributes as ‘independence’ and ‘autonomy’. Nevertheless, the concept is useful,
not because it provides a precise definition, but because it formulates certain
preconditions without which a polity cannot be regarded as an actor. Sjöstedt and Smith
have added some elements which help us to decide, whether a polity which fulfils Jupille
and caporaso’s requirements really gets as an actor. According to them, actorness is the
ability to function actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international
system. this, however, does not yet allow us to assess whether an entity is able to achieve
at least some of its goals with respect to other actors. David Allen and Michael Smith
associate actorness with the ability to exert influence, to shape the perceptions and
expectations of others. this assumption which would make even Hollywood an actor
Klaus Bachmann
of international relations. But the two authors add that actorness (‘true actorness’, as they
call it), also requires ‘a clear identity and a self-contained decision making system’, as well
as ‘practical capabilities to affect policy’. Once again, the concepts here are fuzzy rather
than precise: what exactly is meant by ‘affecting policy’ and ‘clear identity’? We propose
to use a simple model, which is often used in empirical studies of International relations
in order to assess the degree of influence one actor exercises over another one. We define
‘influence’ (or ‘affecting policy’) as the ability to intentionally bring about a change in
the law, preferences, institutions or the allocation of scarce resources. If, for example, an
actor is able to incline another actor, such as a state or an international corporation, to
change its strategy, amend its rules (laws, regulations, statutes), to allocate a part of its
budget in a different way than before, or to create or abolish institutions, we are satisfied
that our polity has been able to exercise an influence on another. If such a polity fulfills
Sjösted’s, Smith’, Jupille’s and caporaso’s requirements, we regard it as an actor.
As Andrew Moravcsik (Moravcsik 2000: 217–252) has pointed out, states may agree
to sign and ratify treaties and adhere to institutions without exactly knowing how these
institutions will affect their preferences at a later stage. Governments may sign human
rights treaties and ratify court statutes, and in the long run this can force them into
compliance with these statutes’ provisions. this can be perfectly rational, since it reduces
the likelihood of ‘free riding’ by other contracting states and, by imposing legal regimes
onto these governments, increases the credibility of these governments’ human rights
commitments. Furthermore: by signing and ratifying treaties which constrain
government action a government may seek to limit the scope of retaliation by a future
government with respect to its predecessor. the latter aspect is the more relevant the
more likely violent regime change is in a country. By adopting binding and enforceable
human rights provisions which involve independent external actors, governments may
accept a trade-off between their own autonomy (which will be restricted by these
provisions) and the future security of their members and followers. From this
perspective, binding and enforceable human rights regimes with supranational features
provide a solution for overcoming the ‘hostage dilemma’ in (actual or expected)
transition settings (Nalepa 2010: 42–44). Introducing ‘third party enforcement’ as such
is always a rational way of reducing transaction costs, irrespective of whether such an
agreement involves commodities between traders or rights between political actors.
the basic requirement for ‘third party enforcement’ is the independence of such an
institution. this is true for human rights regimes and international courts, whose
jurisdiction reaches out to the contracting states. the IctY and the Ictr can only very
partially be regarded as fitting into these criteria, since both were created by an
international organisation (the United Nations’ Security council) and were accepted
very reluctantly by the countries which were affected by their jurisdiction. Both tribunals
can therefore not be put on an equal footing with the European court of Human rights
in Strasbourg, which resolves conflicts between states and their citizens on behalf of
these states. It can also not be compared to the International court of Justice in the
Hague, which decides on conflicts between states that have previously accepted its
jurisdiction. the IctY jurisdiction was accepted by the state parties to the Dayton Peace
treaty, but as soon as IctY’s actions started to interfere with Serbia’s and croatia’s state
Klaus Bachmann
preferences, both countries did their best to sideline the tribunal, circumvent or openly
ignore its orders, and prevent domestic change, which the tribunal attempted to trigger.
the case of Ictr is even more complicated, since its jurisdiction was extended to
rwanda by the Security council, with the rwandan (rPF) government, a nonpermanent UNSc member, first agreeing to the creation of the tribunal, but later
dissenting on the details (Peskin 2008: 161–2). Whereas it would be possible to discuss
the International criminal court, which was set up by an assembly of states, in terms
of a ‘supranational’ actor for ‘third party enforcement’, the IctY and the Ictr escape
from such classifications. Both tribunals may eventually lower transaction costs and
help solve coordination problems for the UN and — in the case of IctY — for the EU,
but they certainly increase rather than lower the transaction costs for the relevant
successor countries of the former Yugoslavia and for rwanda. the EU managed to
increase its bargaining power with respect to Serbia and croatia and raised the stakes
for both countries — a contradiction the argument related to ‘third party enforcement’.
It would be a mistake to treat IctY as a classical ‘human rights regime’ or international
court. It makes the relationship between the EU and IctY so interesting from an
International relations perspective that IctY enjoys a total statutory independence
from the EU. the tribunal was neither created nor run by the EU, the EU’s organs have
no formal say over IctY’s activities, and neither member states no the central EU
institutions (such as the European commission, the European Parliament, the European
court of Justice or the council of the EU) have any legally-enshrined leverage over
prosecutors and judges. Legally and institutionally, IctY is a separate, independent
institution and there is nothing in European treaties or IctY’s statute that would entitle
an EU organ to issue any orders or even make recommendations to the IctY. In 1993,
IctY was created as a subsidiary organ of the Security council. IctY’s power with
respect to the successor countries of the former Yugoslavia was not only enhanced by
the institutional interplay between the EU and IctY, but also by the policies of some
member states, which conferred a part of their sovereign rights upon IctY prosecutor.
At different points in time, the government of the Netherlands used its veto power in
the EU council in order to block progress in trade liberalization and EU accession with
Serbia and croatia, and then empowered the IctY chief prosecutor to decide, whether
both countries had sufficiently cooperated to lift the Dutch veto.4 the Netherlands, as
an example, used their veto power, conferring it de facto to the IctY chief prosecutor,
in order to coerce Serbia into surrendering Mladić and Hadžić. this must be regarded
as an outstanding case, in which a state transfers a part of its sovereign right to an
external actor whom it cannot entirely control. the risk of deceit or surprise was
relatively low, nevertheless even traditional theories of delegation and supranational
decision making do not explain this case, since the IctY prosecutor cannot be regarded
as a supranational institution, and there was no collective delegation. the free riding
Author’s interviews with Serge Brammertz and an anonymous high ranking official of the Dutch Foreign
Ministry, both in the Hague, May 2012.
this was also confirmed during interviews by the author with chief prosecutor Serge Brammertz in April
2012 in the Hague, and with a high official of the Dutch Foreign Ministry, who required anonymity.
Klaus Bachmann
issue does not occur here and the same affect could have been achieved by the
Netherlands, if the government had used its veto power without delegation.5 All in all,
the combination of conditionality, support by the EU institutions and specific member
states, empowered the IctY in an extraordinary way, which enabled it to achieve the
apprehension of all the suspects it had put on its list.
At Ictr, no similar relationship with the African Union existed. Its absence
deprived Ictr of much of the power and influence, the IctY could exercise over
state politics in the former Yugoslavia. the United Nations proved unable in this case
to merge power, pool influence and create the same kind of synergy as the EU and
2. ICTs as actors of International relations
It is almost undisputed that international criminal tribunals ad hoc enjoy authority,
as well as cohesion and recognition. they were created by UNSc resolutions and given
a statute which is formally (though not always de facto) recognized by all UN member
states and — in the case of IctY — was subject to ratification in the framework of the
Dayton agreements. In the case of Ictr, rwanda even agreed to its creation as a nonpermanent member of the UNSc, although it later voted against the subsequent
resolution which dealt with the details of the Ictr’s functioning. Both tribunals enjoy
authority and recognition, but the issue of autonomy is a trickier one. the tribunals are
clearly distinct from other entities, even within the institutional architecture of the UN,
but their independence from the main UN bodies (the General Assembly and the
UNSc) and the member states is questionable. Each tribunal is divided into four distinct
pillars. the first one consists of the judges, comprises the trial and appeals chambers
and the judges’ plenary, deals with judging and sentencing and is extremely independent
even from the UN’s institutional architecture. Judges are either appointed as permanent
judges or as so called ad litem judges, who are not part of the plenary and serve for a
limited time. All are paid out of the general UN budget and therefore independent even
from changes in budget allocations or member states’ ad hoc contributions. they cannot
be revoked and can only be held accountable by their peers and the (elected) president
of the tribunal, who also assigns judges to the chambers. Judges are elected through an
opaque bargaining process of UN member states in the General Assembly. Usually, they
serve at the tribunals at the end of their career, which additionally increases their
Some theorists of International Organizations reduce the impact of supranational organizations to the
enforcement of decisions taken collectively by states. According to this concept, such organizations do not
shape or alter states’ preferences, but only enforce their collective will by preventing potential defectors
from an agreement from free-riding (using a collective good — like a common market — without sharing
the cost of it). IctY could be regarded as a supranational organization for Serbia and croatia, but not with
respect to the EU. It had no comparable leverage over EU members, because they had not delegated powers
to IctY which could be used in order to prevent them from free-riding. the only exception is the case of
the Netherlands, but even here this was not a collective delegation, and there was no public good of several
or all member states involved which IctY could have guarded.
Klaus Bachmann
the registrar, the head of the administration, is appointed by the Secretary
General, but his influence on judicial outcomes is minimal. It has often been a matter
of criticism that the fourth pillar of any trial procedure, the defence, is no formal part
of the Icts; defence attorneys have created their own association and are subject to
rules made by the judges’ plenary, included in the rules of procedure and evidence.
However, they remain outside the tribunals’ institutional framework. the cohesion
within the tribunals, and the fact that the judges, prosecutors and registrars share
norms and values, even goals, as enshrined in the statute, is mainly due to the facts,
that the defence is not included in the institutional framework. this becomes very
clear at Ictr, where ideological differences between some defence attorneys on one
hand, and prosecutors and judges on the other, and often contribute to clashes over
fundamental questions, whereas at the IctY judicial defence strategies dominate over
political or ideological strategies.6
the chief prosecutor is appointed by the UN Secretary General and in accordance
with a UNSc decision, to which both the chief prosecutor and the tribunal’s president
report once a year. Within the legal and institutional framework of an Ict ad hoc, the
chief OtP is the agenda-setter of the decision making process. It is him who decides
whether to indict, whom to indict and when and for what reason. Judges exercise a veto
power over the chief prosecutor’s decision, either as individual judges (when confirming
an indictment), or collectively as trial chambers and appeals chambers. they can reject
indictments, terminate procedures and acquit defendants. Except for cases of contempt
of court and perjury, the judges can not force the chief prosecutor to initiate an
indictment or accuse a specific person.7 For the purpose of this article, it is unnecessary
to analyze, in how far prosecutors and judges are individually independent of (or
immune against) external influence and to what extent far their individual and collective
behaviour is shaped by factors like religion, ideology, education, socialisation, incentives,
political pressure or pragmatic assumptions. there is already a considerable amount of
literature about this, but it does not help us to assess the actorness of the Icts as such.
the question which is relevant here, is rather the opposite one: to what extent do the
Icts shape the behaviour of external actors?
At the Ictr, ideological defense strategies, aiming at a political, rather than legal defense, and involving
denial genocide, negationism or historical revisionism (i.e. by claiming that crimes mentioned in the
indictment did not happen at all or were smaller in scope than the crimes committed by another conflict
party) were more frequent than at the IctY, where they were mostly conducted not by official defense
attorneys, but by the accused themselves. this mainly happened in cases where the accused refused a
defense attorney and insisted to conduct his own defense (like in the pros. v. Slobodan Milošević or the pros.
v. Vojislav Šešelj).
In cases of contempt of court and perjury committed by a prosecution witness, an amicus curiae is
appointed who fulfils the task of public prosecutor. this mechanism was created in order to avoid conflicts
of interest of the prosecution with respect (f.e.) to a witness lied or committed perjury in a way,
advantageous for the prosecution’s case. In cases where defense witnesses are suspected of perjury the case
is taken over by the prosecution and no amicus curiae needs to be appointed. So far the IctY had no cases
of perjury prosecuted, whereas at the Ictr there was one case and two were subject to sealed indictments.
Interview with Anees Ahmed, chief of chambers at Ictr in Arusha, in July 2012.
Klaus Bachmann
3. ICTr as an agent of institutional reform
the question of whether and to what extent the IctY has been an agent of reform
in some of the countries of the former Yugoslavia has already been dealt with by an
impressive amount of literature. Much of IctY’s success in shaping policy outcomes,
securing arrests and transfers of suspects, and initiating war crimes trials in the respective
countries is due to interplay between the chief prosecutor and the ‘conditionality game’
of the EU’s accession negotiations. the success of IctY, which mainly consists in the fact
that it was able to apprehend all its suspects before the expiration of its mandate, is to a
large extent also the success of the EU. In the case of Ictr, this looks very different. there
was no ‘conditionality game’ which could have strengthened the Ictr in its fight with
reluctant states and in its competition with rwanda.
Neither IctY nor the Ictr have managed to alter the geopolitical orientation of
the countries that were under their jurisdiction or any other country of reference.
this had never been the task of the tribunals. the EU used the IctY as a vehicle to
decrease transaction costs and increase its bargaining power over the Balkan accession
countries; the IctY used EU conditionality and the fragmentation of member states’
preferences in order to coerce some countries of reference into compliance, but a
general shift in geopolitics in the region was never an issue for IctY. the same is
true for Ictr: rwanda’s geopolitical shift from a Francophonie-member to an ally of
Great Britain and the United States and, at the same time, from a weak and conflictridden state to an affluent regional power, was due to the dramatic regime change in
1994, and not to the influence of the UN or Ictr’s. Nevertheless, Ictr’s influence
on rwandan politics can be traced at a lower level.
With respect to the above mentioned definition of actorness, the priority issue
must be regarded as one of the crucial aspects of Ictr’s initial activity. According to
the relevant UNSc resolutions and the Ictr statute, Ictr held priority over the
personal jurisdiction of suspects. this meant, that the Ictr could demand the
transfer of any suspect who lived in another country. rwanda, which was also
interested in apprehending, prosecuting and judging genocide suspects, did not enjoy
the same privilege, but attempted at various occasions to anticipate Ictr and to use
political tools to incline other states to send their suspects to Kigali instead of Arusha.
this competition was an important source of conflict between the government of
rwanda and the chief prosecutor. Nevertheless, as the years went by, Ictr managed
to obtain every suspect it had indicted who had been located.8 In no case was rwanda
able to interfere successfully with Ictr’s priority.
At the time of writing there are still three suspects at large, who will be tried by the so called ‘residual
mechanism’ of both tribunals, which was established by the UNSc in order to finish ongoing trials and
deal with appeals and motions for retrial after the phasing out of Ictr and IctY. the cases of all other
remaining fugitives (6) will be transferred to rwanda according to the so-called ‘completion strategy’,
which was imposed on both tribunals by the UNSc.
See: Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (report from the Ictr president
and the chief prosecutor to the UNSc), 22.5.2012, p. 9.
Klaus Bachmann
For the purpose of this article, there is no need to analyze whether and, to what
degree rwanda was able to influence outcomes at the Ictr. Suffice to say that it was
not able to prevent Ictr from exercising its actorness with respect to other states.
Other authors have pointed to the pressure that the rwandan government
exercised on Ictr, including the case of the pros. vs. Jean-BoscoBarayagwiza et al.,
where pressure from Kigali was the cause of the reversal of an appeals chamber
decision to release an accused in order to repair the human rights violations to which
he had been subjected whole awaiting trial. Barayagwiza was finally sentenced to a
lifelong sentence instead of being set free. there is a consensus in the literature about
Ictr being dependent on rwanda’s cooperation for fulfilling its task to ‘prosecute
the perpetrators of the rwandan genocide.’ (Peskin 2008) However, this assessment
needs to be nuanced. During its early years, between 1996, when the tribunal became
operational, and 2000, the main problem for Ictr was to locate suspects and to
overcome obstacles to their transfer from other countries, since almost no high-level
suspect had stayed in rwanda after the rwandan Patriotic Front had conquered the
country. During these days Ictr managed to apprehend suspects despite competing
claims and diplomatic efforts by rwanda, and despite its very limited agenda setting
power with respect to international media (which had helped the IctY to overcome
obstacles in states’ cooperation). Once the detention facility in Arusha was filled with
fugitives, the tribunal needed rwandan cooperation for two reasons: in order to get
access to evidence, that is documents of the former interim government and the
military, and to witnesses. contrary to claims by some authors Ictr was never totally
dependent on rwanda’s cooperation. this impression arose, because the chief
prosecutors and the tribunal presidents never resorted to brinkmanship with rwanda
and — as far as we know — never even discussed such a move. Brinkmanship in case
of a rwandan boycott of the Ictr would have caused an outcome which would have
been extremely unpleasant for both sides. Due to the lack of evidence for the
prosecution, the trial chambers, and subsequently the appeals chambers, would have
had to acquit the accused, which, according to the principle of ne bis et idem, which
was also recognized by rwanda, could no more be punished for the charges brought
against them Ictr. Such a step would have discredited Ictr, but it would also have
severely backlashed against the rwandan government and the victims’ organisations,
which were at the fore of the boycott; it is therefore rather unlikely that, for example,
in the case of non-reversal of the pros. vs. Jean-BoscoBarayagwiza et al. rwanda would
have actually and durably suspended all cooperation with Ictr. Paraphrasing toje,
one could say, that ‘all actors of international relations — great and small — operate
in a strategic environment inhabited by the power of other actors that they do not
control.’ In other words — the dependence was mutual and Ictr depended on
rwanda as much as rwanda on Ictr.
rwanda managed to influence Ictr to a large extent — and long after the pros.
vs. Jean-BoscoBarayagwiza et al. had been finalized. the proofs of this influence have
already been discussed extensively in the literature: After chief prosecutor carla Del
Ponte had started her ‘special investigation’ into crimes committed by the rPF in
1994, the rwandan government managed — through intense lobbying in the UN,
Klaus Bachmann
and support by Great Britain and the US — to incline the Secretary General to split
the position of chief prosecutor into one for Ictr and one for IctY (Del Ponte 2008:
223–241; Moghaly 2005: 125–152). Until then, carla Del Ponte had carried out both
functions.9 Her successor, Hassan B. Jallow, withdrew from the ‘special investigations’
and established a friendly and cooperative relationship with rwanda. For many, this
rapprochement came with a price too high. In exchange for limiting himself to what
they regarded as ‘victor’s justice’, the OtP gained wider access to evidence and
witnesses, and Ictr as such even obtained more influence on rwandan society and
state institutions.
4. e policy shi of 2003
During the initial years, relations between Ictr and rwanda had been tense.
this changed after an important policy shift, which was mainly initiated by the US
government. After the 9/11, attacks, the Bush government withdrew from its
predecessors’ commitments to international justice, refused to submit the Icc treaty
for ratification in the congress, and increased the pressure on IctY and Ictr to
come ‘to an end’. this policy shift coincided with increasing criticism against Ictr
and its prosecutor from the side of the rwandan government, which was well
informed about carla Del Ponte’s attempts to investigate crimes committed by
members of the rwandan Patriotic Army after the latter’s invasion of Northern
rwanda in 1994. the media disappointment with the handling of the Milošević trial
was another element which contributed to her loss of influence within the UN. In
August 2003, the UNSc decided to split the mandate of the chief prosecutor into one
for IctY, and one for the Ictr. this move deprived Del Ponte of any possibility to
further investigate rPF crimes. In 2004, the UNSc passed the so called ‘completion
strategy’ for both tribunals, which forced them to scale down their activities, complete
all investigations until the end of 2004 and all first instance trials until 2008, so that
the tribunals could be closed down by 2010. the prosecutors had to limit new
indictments to only the most important, i.e. high ranking suspects, and the tribunals
had to choose cases which could be referred to national jurisdictions.10
For Ictr this meant to transfer cases to national judiciaries, instead of prosecuting
and judging them in Arusha. In November 2007, the tribunal transferred two cases to
France: the former prefect of Gikongoro, Laurent Bucyibaruta and Wenceslas
Munyeshyaka, a clergyman from Ngoma, Butare province, who, as the head of the St.
Famille Parish in Kigali during the genocide, had allegedly helped the Interahamwe to
divide tutsi from Hutu, had shot at least two of the tutsi pupils there, and raped others.
Both had been arrested in France and previously transferred to Ictr.
From the beginning, both tribunals had a joint chief prosecutor and joint trial chambers, which usually
were sitting in the Hague and travelled to Arusha to issue their judgments.
Author’s Interview with Judge VagnJoensen, President of Ictr, in Arusha in July 2012.
Klaus Bachmann
A few months before the first two referrals to France, the rwandan parliament
had passed Organic Law No. 31/2007, which abolished the death penalty. Previously,
the rwandan penal code had still comprised two regulations which were incompatible
with the UN system: the death penalty, which had frequently been meted out to
perpetrators convicted for genocide in 1994, and solitary confinement, which many
lawyers at the UN regarded as a contravention to the UN convention against torture
and other cruel, Inhuman or Degrading treatments or Punishments. Now the
parliament passed a new law, which only addressed cases transferred by other
countries and Ictr, and therefore did not apply to accused who had been
apprehended by the rwandan authorities or had been extradited to rwanda before.
the consequence of this law was the emergence of a ‘two track justice’ — with one
track for ‘old’ cases and suspects apprehend in rwanda, and another track for transfer
cases from abroad. Whereas in both cases, death penalty could no longer be carried
out, solitary confinement was excluded only for transfer cases.11
In light of the theoretical discussion above, the Ictr initiative to transfer suspects
to rwanda did not incline the rwandan state to change its penal system as a whole.
It did incline rwanda to abolish the death penalty, but all other reforms, carried out
according to the Organic Law No. 11/2007, remained applicable solely to transferred
suspects. the situation of all other suspects would not change. Nevertheless, the
rwandan response to Ictr’s move consisted in a change in law and caused small,
but evident reallocations in rwandan public spending, among others for duty counsels
for accused and security provisions for attorneys defending in transferred cases.12
three years later, the OtP filed an application to transfer two cases to rwanda.
those were Jean-BoscoUwinkindi, a Pentecostal pastor from Nyamata, who had been
arrested in 2010 in Uganda, and was accused of participating in the killing of tutsi
church members who had fled to his church for shelter from Interahamwe attacks.
the second was a local Interahamwe leader from Gisenyi. Before deciding on the
Uwinkindi case, which came first, the referral chamber of Ictr invited an impressive
number of stakeholders as amici curiae, such as Human rights Watch, the rwandan
government, the Kigali Bar Association, the International Association of Democratic
Lawyers and the International Defence Attorneys Association. After the hearings,
during which Human rights Watch and the two international defence associations
opposed the referral motion by the OtP, whereas the rwandan government, the OtP
and the Kigali Bar Association were in favour of it, the chamber issued a decision,
which comprised a very detailed discussion of both sides’ arguments and ended with
a positive conclusion.13 More than a year later, Ictr President VagnJoensen issued
Author’s Interview with Innocent Kamenzi, officer of the Ictr’s Kigali outreach office, Kigali, July 2012.
At the time of writing, there still was no state fund for duty counsels and duty counseling was still carried
out by ‘lawyers without borders’ before rwandan courts. Information obtained during interview with
outreach officer Innocent Kamenzi at the Ictr outreach office in Kigali in July 2012.
Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for referral to the republic of rwanda, referral chamber designated
under rule 11 bis, the pros. v. Jean Uwinkindi and Order on the Ictr Monitoring Arrangements (issued
by the office of the President) 29.6.2012 (author’s personal archive).
Klaus Bachmann
an order, describing the rules that Ictr monitors had to apply while observing trials
in rwandan, which were carried out by the rwandan High court according to the
rules contained in Organic Law No. 11/2007 and the agreement with the Ictr.
rwanda had previously agreed to grant Ictr observers full access to all proceedings
(including in camera sessions) which dealt with transfer cases. rwanda had also
accepted the obligation to visit convicts after their judgment and to provide the Ictr
with complete information about proceedings connected to the death of a convict.
the trial monitoring was to be carried out by the African commission of Human
and Peoples’ rights. As a ‘remedy of last resort’, the Ictr kept the right to revoke a
case and Organic Law 21/2007 obliged the rwandan authorities to surrender a
defendant back to Arusha, along with all the case files and evidence.
the agreement could only work if there was a huge amount of trust between the
two partners. During the deliberations about the possible consequences of transfers
to rwanda, the judges could only rely on rwandan legislation. they had to trust that
legislation would be enforced in the spirit in which the laws had been passed by the
Parliament, and they had to be confident, that the rwandan administration and the
judiciary would not only be eager, but also capable of enforcing the law in a
constructive way. In their deliberations, which followed the amici hearings in the pros.
vs. Uwinkindi, they only dedicated a minor part of their findings to the practice in
rwanda. two out of 59 pages of their decision dealt with the practice of the rwandan
judiciary. they came to the conclusion, not really surprising in view of the overall
circumstances, that Uwinkindi should be transferred to rwanda and tried there.
5. e ICTr as a norm-entrepreneur
two years after the shift of 2003, Ictr put in place a comprehensive outreach
program similar to the one created earlier by Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and her
entourage at the IctY.14 Until that time, the Kigali office of Ictr had already sent
journalists and Human rights activists from the region to Arusha in order to promote
the trials and the way justice was done there. In the strained circumstances of the late
1990s, more extensive Public relations initiatives in rwanda were unlikely to succeed,
but this changed after the shift from Del Ponte to Jallow and after the Ictr had been
forced to scale down its activities step by step. Officers of the Kigali branch were well
aware of the bad image the Ictr had among the rwandan public. the policy shift of
2003 enabled them to do something about it. Now, they started a two-track initiative
to reach out to the population and the judiciary. In the framework of the first one
they offered legal and human rights education. With respect to the second, they
offered capacity building. the outreach office, whose activities, just like at the IctY,
were supported by external funding from Ictr signatory states and the EU, started
to organize international conferences for judges and prosecutors through which
human rights regulations and Ictr jurisprudence were promoted to the rwandan
Author’s phone interview with refikHodžić, former head of the ICTY outreach program, in New York,
April 2012, and with Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, former ICTY president, at The Hague, in July 2012.
Klaus Bachmann
judiciary. the outreach office opened to outsiders who could then use the Ictr’s
online access to international databases and the literature of the Ictr library. In the
framework of the outreach program, partnership agreements with victims’
organizations and the Ministry of Justice were established, which enabled the Ictr
to open small outreach centers in every province, where the basic information about
the Ictr, its trials and verdicts were made available. Officers could even conduct
discussions in jails and show films stadiums in the countryside.15 Every year, a student
program made it possible for 10 students of international law from rwanda National
University in Butare to spend two months at Ictr in Arusha. Additionally, every two
months a group of rwandan journalists (sometimes accompanied by prosecutors and
judges) was sent to Arusha, too. the Ictr produced a comic book for children, which
contained a simplified version of the genocide, which was totally in line with the
official interpretation of events by the rPF and ended with a promotion of Ictr as
the main instrument ‘to end impunity.’16 Most of the Ictr outreach activities fit
perfectly into the fight to end impunity for perpetrators of mass crimes and promote
the jurisprudence of Ictr as crucial for achieving peace, stability and reconciliation,
although the link between these (often contradictory) aims remains obscure.17
Over the years, and especially after 2003, Ictr has managed to appear as a distinct
actor, able to influence domestic politics in rwanda, reinforce and promote its own
identity. this achievement has been paid for by a loss of independency of Ictr and
by concessions to rwandan state interests, many of which have been criticized as
compromising Ictr’s impartiality. By increasing its capacity to influence public
opinion, the reform of the judiciary, and to bring about legal changes in rwanda,
Ictr has at the same time opened itself to influence from rwanda and has become
more vulnerable to interference by the rwandan government. the price for more
efficiency in carrying out its mandate in rwanda, for more access to the rwandan
public administration, civil society and the media, was the withdrawal from carla
Del Ponte’s special investigations into rPF crimes in 1994, and from investigating the
downing of president Habyarimana’s airplane.
this may be controversial from a normative point of view, and it has often been
contested by the public, experts and in the legal literature. However, Ictr acted like
any other subject of international relations. It embarked on diplomacy, agreed on
compromises, developed its own politics in order to achieve specific outcomes, and
Usually the film displayed was Ictr’c ‘Justice today, peace tomorrow’, followed by discussion.
the comic book keeps silent about the perpetrators of the air crash on April 6th, 1994, about rPF war
crimes and Hutu victims of the genocide, and promotes the official line of ‘no Hutu, no tutsi, all rwandans’.
See: United Nations International criminal tribunal for rwanda (Ictr), Arusha-tanzania: 100 days in
the Land of the thousand Hills. Illustrated by Mark NjorogeKinuthia. Nairobi 2011.
On reconciliation at the Ictr see Peter Lambertz’s contribution in: Bachmann, Botero, Lambertz (eds),
When Justice Meets Politics, part III, chapter 2.
Klaus Bachmann
last but not least, influenced other actors (like rwanda), prompting domestic change,
legal reform, changes in law and political practice, and causing small but important
financial reallocations. the same arguments, which are often brought forward by the
Ictr’s critics, tend to prove the Ictr’s actorness: that the Ictr deliberately neglected
the interest of international criminal justice in order to satisfy its institutional interest.
this, however, can only be undertaken by an entity, that possesses capacity to make
choices (including the capacity to take the wrong choice) and follow its own path, an
entity which as an actor is recognized by others, has its own distinct identity, and thus
itself and is regarded by others as a full-fledged actor its own right. the often uttered
criticism according to which the Ictr is a political rather than legal instrument, only
strengthens the argument of the Ictr being an actor. Despite some supranational
elements of its actorness, it seems exaggerated to regard the Ictr as a supranational
entrepreneur in the sense of European Integration theory. Institutions like the Ictr
and the IctY merit recognition as actors sui generis ( hybrid actors of international
relations), which can carry out some (but not all) supranational tasks with regard to
some, but not all countries.
bibliographic references
Baldwin, David Allen (1993), Neorealizm and neoliberalizm, The contemporary debate,
columbia University Press.
Bahmann, Klaus (2012), Interview with Anees Ahmed, senior legal officer of
chambers, Ictr, Arusha in July.
Baldwin, David Allen (1993), Neorealizm and neoliberalizm, the contemporary
debate, columbia University Press.
completion Strategy of the International criminal tribunal for rwanda (report from
the Ictr president and the chief prosecutor to the UNSc), 22. 5. 2012, p. 9.
Del Ponte, carla (2008), Madame Prosecutor, Confrontations with Humanity’s worst
criminals and the culture of impunity, (In collaboration with chuck Sudetic), New
York,Other Press.
Lapid, Yosef (1989), ‘the third debate, On the prospects of International theory in a
post-positivist era’, International Studies Quarterly 33: 235–254.
Moghalu, Kingsley (2005), Rwanda’s Genocide,The Politics of Global Justice, Palgrave,
Moravcsik, Andrew (1999), A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and
International cooperation, International Organization 53(2): 267–306.
Moravcsik, Andrew (2000), ‘the Origins of Human rights regimes: Democratic
Delegation in Postwar Europe’, International Organization 2: 217–252.
Nalepa, Monika (2010), Skeletons in the Closet, Transitional Justice in Post-Communist
Europe, cambridge University Press.
Klaus Bachmann
Peskin, Victor (2008), International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials
and the Struggle for State Cooperation, cambridge University Press.
Wendt, Alexander (1998), ‘On constitution and causation in International relations’,
Review of International Studies 24: 101–118.
Young, Oran P. (1991), Political Leadership and regime Formation: On the
Development of Institutions in International Society, International Organization 45
(3): 281–308.
Oscar Edoror Ubhenin
UDK: 321.011.5+323.28(669)
Godina VI, 2012, str. 22–34
Izvorni naučni rad
ConsTruCTInG The boKo haram uPrIsInG In nIGerIa:
a CIVIl soCIeTY PersPeCTIVe1
Oscar Edoror Ubhenin2
Since the advent of civilian regime in Nigeria in 1999, the prevailing economic
dislocation in the country, the conflicting views of some vocal Islamic leaders and
the budding Islamic fundamentalism around the globe have combined to provide
a fertile ground for the Boko Haram sect to flourish. By default, the changing
phases and motives induced debates on how the civil society can serve as
platforms for socio-political discourse, and inter-group cum inter-ethnic
harmony in the country. However, in-depth knowledge of the role of civil society
in conflict analysis is lacking. this article fills the gap in ‘local’ conflict knowledge
Key words: Boko Haram, civil society, conflict construction, insecurity, terrorism
For more than three decades, Nigeria has been challenged by ethno-religious
conflicts, which are attributable to a multiplicity of factors, including the ruling elite’s
manipulation of ethnicity, the characteristic mismanagement of ethnic grievances by
the state and its agents, and the prolonged militarization of the Nigerian society. Other
factors are the general discontentment of the component units of the federation
arising from resource and power allocation, the alarming level of poverty and
unemployment, the collapsed state welfare programs and the growing ineptitude of
state apparatus (Babawale 2003: ix–xx). Ethno-religious conflicts have led to
devastating human and material losses. During the past decade, ethno-religious
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ‘Interdisciplinary and comparative approaches to
ethnic conflict: An international symposium’, Sabanci University Karakoy Istanbul, 5-6 May 2012. the
author is grateful to the EU’s 7th Framework Programme/Marie curie Action ‘Sustainable Peace Building’
and Sabanci University for the travel grant that enabled him to attend the conference.
Oscar Edoror Ubhenin, Lecturer, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Nigeria. E-mail: oscarubhenin
Oscar Edoror Ubhenin
violence claimed the lives of more than 12,000 Nigerians (Ogundele 2009: 3). Key
among these conflicts is the Boko Haram uprising that emerged in the northern parts
of the country, bordering on the Sahel zone. Precisely on 26 July 2009, the
fundamentalist group urged its followers to attack police stations, prisons and
churches, and burn down schools, in an attempt to enforce an extreme sharia and rid
the country of western education. the 2009 Boko Haram uprising and subsequent
attacks further increase the number of persons who have lost their lives to sectarian
clashes since the Nigerian state, in an attempt to appease the growing current of
Islamic extremism after years of military dictatorship, allowed 12 of the northern
states to proclaim the sharia (The Nation: 9).
current literature suggests that the Boko Haram uprising ‘not only set a precedent,
but also reinforced the attempts by Islamic conservative elements at imposing a variant
of Islamic religious ideology on a secular state’ (Adesoji 2010: 95–108), such as Nigeria.
Abimbola Adesoji also observed that the prevailing economic dislocation in the
country, the advent of party politics [including the desperation of politicians for
political power], the ambivalence of some vocal Islamic leaders, and the growing
Islamic fundamentalism around the globe aid religious sensitivity of Nigerians to
provide fertile ground for the breeding of the Boko Haram sect. the continued loss
of lives and property, the growing fear and animosities among Nigerians, the
threatened secularity of the Nigerian state, the gallantry of the Boko Haram militants,
the spread and swiftness of its military organization, the belief of its leadership, and
the continued recurrence of the uprising are enough justification for a careful
consideration and documentation of the phenomenon. (Adesoji, 2010)
Succinctly, efforts to mitigate and/or abate the violent effects of these conflicts
often result in ‘over-reliance on government agencies and the use of coercive and
judicial methods’, (Imobighe 2003: 53–56). these interventions, including the creation
of states and local governments, use of soldiers and mobile police to quell violent
clashes, and convening of peace and reconciliatory meetings (Ubhenin 2011: 53–67),
summarily dubbed as ‘a heavy hand’ (Shwartz 2010), have yielded little dividends.
In Nigeria’s, as elsewhere Africa’s early 1990s, the civil society was a platform for
advocacy, protest and resistance against excesses and abuse of state power. After the
country’s democratization in 1999, the civil society became platforms for ethnic
militancy against marginalization. thereafter, the changing phases and motives
induced policy and academic debates to focus on how civil society can serve as
instruments for common ‘socio-political’ platforms, and inter-group cum inter-ethnic
harmony in the country (Imobighe 2003).
Available literature notwithstanding, in-depth analysis of how the civil society can
reasonably function as platforms for analysis and representation of conflicts, and
perhaps shape the construction[s] of conflict and peace is lacking. Based on
assessment of published literature and other media sources, this article seeks to fill
the gap by exploring the construction of Boko Haram uprising in Nigeria. It builds
upon recent discourse on the production of ‘local’ conflict knowledge ‘that is not
always and only inspired by the dictate of money and donors, but by a sincere wish,
Oscar Edoror Ubhenin
energy and need to attain a just society’ (Smidling, rill, 2007). the article reviews the
concept of civil society, and it is situated within debates on contention for power and
civil strife. It traces ethno-religious conflict in the historical north, and tries to proffer
an understanding of Boko Haram uprising, including an insightful account of the
attacks. thereafter, efforts are made to draw a linkage between Boko Haram, civil
society and conflict construction. the article recommends amongst others, the
mobilization of internal funds to enable the civil society to overcome the donors’
priorities in ‘local’ conflict knowledge production.
1. e civil society
the concept of civil society, loosely described to encompass the academia, ethnic
militia, labour, youths and women’s organizations, mass media, and nongovernmental organizations, ‘is ideologically laden with western liberalism’ (Ikelegbe,
2003: 36–77). For more than two decades, the concept has experienced an era of
uncritical usage. Issues like virtuous, progressive, democratic, and just are taken as
synonyms with civil society. the ‘magical’ claims for civil society as a panacea, the
‘critical globalization movement’, and the eventual claim for a ‘global civil society’, and
the tokenistic consultations with so-called ‘civil society stakeholders’, all account for
the uncritical usage of the concept (Stubbs, 2007: 215–228). Paul Stubbs reminds us
that the British political philosopher John Keane is recorded as one of the principal
advocates of the relevance of the concept of ‘civil society’. In his Global Civil Society?,
Keane traced the resurgence of the concept from the late 1980s amongst public
intellectuals, stemming from seven overlapping concerns, events or processes (Keane,
2003). Michael Edwards’ identification of three different theoretical positions of civil
society is useful and legitimate but also incomplete. these include the associational
life, the good society and the public sphere (Edwards, 2004). the associational model
conceives of the civil society as an integral part of society different from the state and
market, and formed for the purposes of advancing common interests and facilitating
collective action. the good society is at the realm of service rather than self-interest,
and a breeding ground for attitudes and values, such as cooperation, trust, tolerance
and non-violence. the public sphere interprets the civil society as a platform
deliberation, dialogue and citizenship activism for the pursuit of common interest.
In application to the African continent, the concept of civil society has been
presented as a significant milestone in restructuring the continent’s political life
(Ikelegbe, 2003). the concept of civil society is not recent to Nigeria, but it began to
flourish with increasing decline in the legitimacy of government from the mid-1980s.
the country’s democratization process in May 1999 induced the civil society to
become platforms for ethnic militancy against marginalization. Partly because the
citizens could not obtain their fair share of the country’s wealth, the Nigerian civil
society developed from ‘fatalistic resignation of greater identification with alternative
hierarchies based on ethnicity, religion or other factional identities.’ Of relevance to
us in this article is how the civil society can reasonably factor into conflict construction
for recovery and reconciliation.
Oscar Edoror Ubhenin
2. analytical framework
An analysis such as this one may be a huge puzzle when it is not situated within
current and relevant debates in development and social science literature. to avoid
such a methodological confusion, this article is framed by the debates on contention
for power and civil strife. the contention for power theory does not lay claim to
comprehensiveness, regarding large scale collective violence. the core idea is ‘a
collective political claim that impedes on the interest of rivals and adversaries’, and
the fundamental question is ‘how and why do people who interact without outright
damage to each other shift rapidly into collective violence and then … back into
peaceful relations?’ (Oberchall, 2010: 181) Another argument emanating from the
contention for power theory is that groups contend for power, equality, dignity, and
religious freedom. they oppose corruption, exclusion, unfair practices and oppressive
governments. the Boko Haram sect denounces corruption, and taxation, feeding into
the fundamentalist Muslim denomination’s presentation of the rest of the country as
the land of al-fasad [corruption]. A third tenet of this theory is that the challengers
seize opportunities and exploit the regime weaknesses and other adversaries. the
Boko Haram sect exploits the characteristic weaknesses of the Nigerian state, lacking
commitment or capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies. In fragile and
collapsing states there are indications of poor governance and the citizens are bound
to retreat into ethnic shelters for succour and their solidarity and sense of patriotism
deplete. (Gray and rose, 2006: 14–15) Perhaps the country faces the risk of
classification as a ‘chronically deprived country.’ (Nuade, 2012)
civil strife, such as the Boko Haram uprising, leads to poverty, but ‘poverty and
economic stagnation are a major cause of civil strife.’ (Stiglitz, 2006: 6–9) can the
Boko Haram uprising be categorized as a strife, ‘an extreme breakdown of society
and its economy’? (Stiglitz, 2006) Nigeria’s economy is rent-based, not engaged in
productive activity. It is not based on manufacturing, it is not based on investment. It
is based on what Joseph Stiglitz calls ‘a growing pie’, ‘a zero-sum game: the more I get
the less you get.’ (Stiglitz, 2006) conflict occurs from an imperfect mechanism of
sharing the pie. Second, income and mobility are key factors in strife. the Boko Haram
sect comprises low-income people who are already at the subsistence level. they have
relatively little to lose to the conflict because the engagement is cheap. While this feeds
into the relative deprivation theory, it is sad to note that ‘grenades and other small
and light arms are becoming cheaper than bread on the streets.’ (chizea and Lyare,
2006: 71–100) Yet, the grievance thesis is being over - whelmed by argument in the
popular media that the Boko Haram sect members carry sophisticated weapons and
their operations are effectively organized, thereby suggesting that ‘members of the
group were neither ordinary people nor novices.’ (Onafuye, 2012) Finally, voice and
disenchantment also factor into civil strife. the Boko Haram sect is the reflection of
a group within the Nigerian society that believes its voice may not be heard, despite
the emergence of the ‘ballot box’ in the country’s political landscape since 1999. the
group appears not to be losing anything to conflict because there is no ‘guarantee that
all groups can be heard.’ (Stiglitz, 2006)
Oscar Edoror Ubhenin
3. from Maitatsine to Boko Haram
A recent work of Kano-based human rights activist Shehu Sani is apt in tracing
ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria. (Sani, 2011: 17–41) In 1980, the north,
a heterogeneous ethnic composition with over 70 percent Hausa-Fulani stock,
witnessed the Maitatsine riot. Ignited by violent confrontation between the authority
and the Al-Masifu sect, led by Alhaji Muhammed Marwa Maitatsine, the uprising
was the outcome of the sect members’ desire to achieve conformity to purification of
Islamic practice with Maitatsine’s teachings. to forestall the perceived security
implications of Maitatsine’s doctrine and disruptive behaviour, the Kano state
government deported him and a few of his lieutenants back to cameroon. He,
however, returned to Nigeria before the end of 1978, to continue the intimidation of
citizens who lived close to their commune in Kano. this behaviour, and the killing of
a policeman by the sect members prompted the then Kano State governor,
Mohammed Abubakar rimi to order Maitatsine and his followers out of Kano. On
18 December 1980, the Al-Musifu sect members allegedly attacked orthodox Muslims
who were praying outside Kano city grand mosque. the Nigerian Army and Air Force
were called in to dislodge the group from its enclave, after about 10 days of initial
resistance. the costs of the confrontation between the Maitatsine-led Al-Masifu sect
and orthodox Muslims, on one hand, and the military campaign against the sect on
the other hand are well captured in the literature. (Sani 20011: 17–41) 4,177 people,
including Maitatsine, some policemen and a reporter with Nigeria’s Daily times
Newspaper were killed. Another 8,712 sustained different levels of injuries. Property
worth several millions of naira was also lost to the conflict.
the Maitatsine riot has since been followed by other civil unrest in the north, which
Emmanuel Osewe Akubor has documented for reference purposes. (Akubor, 2011: 71–
93) reference is also made to the linkage between the Maitatsine uprising and the
taliban, inspired by the Pakistani government to protect a convoy that tried to open a
trade route between Pakistan and central Asia. ‘Between 1979 and 1989, there were
visible armed taliban uprisings against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.’ reports
also link several students of Qur’anic schools in Nigeria to a terrorist training in
Mauritania, purportedly done by a faceless Islamic group, under the cover of Islamic
training. In June 2001, the state security service arrested and interrogated one media
mogul, Alhaji Bello Damagun, along with Mallam Muhammed Nazifi Inuwa and
Mallam Mu’awuya Babayo, for alleged illegal sponsorship of some students to
Mauritania on Islamic studies. the trio was detained till 7 July 2004, when they were
eventually released. Within the fold is the Yobe talibans who were Nigerian university
graduates, ex-military personnel and professionals, ‘easily identified by their Spartan
dress code and long beard, reminiscent of Osama bin Laden.’ (Sani, 2011: 22) On
emergence in 2002, the group called itself Al Sunna Wal Jamma. In Arabic language,
this translates to ‘followers of Prophet Muhammed’s teaching.’ (Sani, 2011: 22) to
immune themselves of the ‘corrupt Nigerian society’, the sect deliberately withdrew to
the desert settlement. this was also to enable their dedication to prayer and the study
of the Qur’an in preparation for a revolution to overthrow corrupt administrations. the
Oscar Edoror Ubhenin
group also reportedly engaged in what Shehu Sani calls ‘covert military training and
warfare.’ (Sani, 2011: 22) Yet their true identity remains a mystery, despite linkages with
the reformed Maitatsine sect of the 1980s, and alleged sympathy with the al-Qaeda cabal
of Osama bin Laden.
4. understanding the Boko Haram uprising
Boko Haram emerged as Sahaba group in 1995. Its main leader Abubakar Lawan
later left for studies at the University of Medina. Lawan was succeeded by Mallam
Mohammmed Yusuf as the group’s leader. Yusuf changed the sect’s doctrine,
abandoned the older clerics, and came up with Boko Haram, literally meaning
‘western education is forbidden’. Initially, the sect was entrenched in Bauchi, Borno,
Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina and Yobe states but later spread to virtually all parts
of the north. One Mohammed Ali [now late] approached Yusuf and advised him to
boycott democracy, civil service and western education. this motivated Yusuf to
disengage his service with Yobe State government. Yusuf and his followers believed
that the Nigerian systems, structures and institutions contain elements that are
contradictory to core Islamic principles and beliefs. the Boko Haram uprising began
on 26 July 2009, in the north, bordering on the sahel zone, and deeply rooted in
religious extremism of the past, as briefly captured above. It was led by Yusuf, until
he was killed under questionable circumstances.
Media reports say that members of the religious sect used unlawful methods to
recruit followers, including abduction, kidnapping or other tactics that violated the
rights of other people. they were also accused of inducing and hypnotizing some
women and their children to abandon their families to join them. (Alli, 2009: 1, 8)
Yusuf was prevented from preaching in mosques, but the demand for his tapes
increased by the day and proceeds from the sale increased tremendously. Because of
his provocative messages, Yusuf was reportedly arrested on several occasions by the
Nigerian Police, but he was always out from the cells before long. As at 2009, each of
the 540,000 Boko Haram’s members contributed NGN daily to achieve their goal.
(the Nation). A foreign commentator, Morten Bøås, recently described Boko Haram
as an off-shoot of ‘the ashes of the death of its original leader as an avant-garde
organization embracing the strategy of hyper-violent, spectacular and deadly terrorist
attacks.’ (Boas, 2012) Boko Haram’s teaching has a slight resemblance with that of the
Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, considering anything western as an aberration.
It denounces the mixing of boys and girls under the same umbrella. It denounces the
propagation of the theory that man evolved from the family of monkey, anchored in
Darwinism. Boko Haram believes that the sun, earth and the moon each move on
their own axes. It holds that banking, taxation and jurisprudence in the country are
completely infidel, and the banking system is shylock
In understanding the motivating factors of the Boko Haram uprising, the twin
issues of poverty and relative deprivation stand out. For example, the northern Arewa
consultative Forum believes the Boko Haram uprising ‘is aggravated by the widening
gap between our affluent and ostentatious leaders and the broad masses of the poverty
Oscar Edoror Ubhenin
stricken and deprived people.’ (Akowe, 2009: 2) Another issue is that of the country’s
porous borders. For example, Niger republic, one of the poorest countries in the
world, ranks close to the bottom of the Human Development Index, and ‘vulnerability
to climate shocks in Niger is linked to several factors, including widespread poverty,
high levels of malnutrition, precarious food security in ‘normal’ years, limited health
coverage and agricultural production systems that have to cope with uncertain
rainfall.’ (UNDP, 2007: 85) In the years 2004 and 2005, severe human costs, including
migration to neighbouring countries and less critically affected zones such as Nigeria
were the outcomes of climate-induced crisis in agriculture. Media and intelligence
reports had also buttressed the impact of porous borders on Boko Haram’s emergence.
An Islamic sect, Duru-salam, whose members [numbering over 2,000] are nationals
of Niger republic and chad, reportedly emerged in Niger state. It was discovered that
the sect had been camping since 1994 in a village near Mokwa, about 300 kilometers
from Minna, the state capital. the group allegedly shared some similar beliefs and
practices with the Boko Haram sect. (Orintunsin, 2009: 6)
the Nigerian government’s attitude of attempting to please every group that takes
up arms against the state has also been blamed for the Boko Haram’s emergence. For
‘the government had made militancy and terrorism attractive since it budgeted a large
sum of money for the repentant militants of the Niger delta in the name of amnesty.’
(Ogbodo, Ogiji, Akpan and Fagbemi, 2011: 2) there is a sense in this argument. the
Nigerian government had proclaimed amnesty on 25 June 2009 to encourage nonstate combatants in the Niger delta region to abandon violence. Hostage taking,
vandalism, kidnapping, and sometimes outright murder had become the order of the
day in the region. Barely a month after the presidential proclamation of amnesty, the
fundamentalist group called Boko Haram staged a raid on a police station in an effort
to establish a taliban-style regime based on strict observance of sharia law. Yet, there
is a difference between the militants in the Niger delta and the Boko Haram sect
members. the militants in the Niger delta cried against marginalization in the nation’s
wealth and resource distribution, but the Boko Haram sect members are reportedly
‘killing people without any identified cause.’ (Wantu, Abuh, Udeajah, 2012: 3)
the Boko Haram uprising has also been described as a manifestation of the
Nigerian variant of terrorism that emerged in the country since the end of the civil
war [1967–1970]. In developing this argument, the renowned Nigerian scholaractivist Edwin Madunagu referred to ‘terrorism whose seeds were sown in Nigeria
and which germinated and is now flourishing in Nigeria.’ (Madunagu: 1–6) Just as
the oil sector attracts, Nigerian business community now invest in Nigerian terrorism.
the people who actually throw the bombs or pull the trigger are the ‘foot soldiers’,
just like the poorly remunerated and easily dispensable casual workers in the oil sector.
He alluded to the Shakespearean maxim, ‘that distribution unto excess’, adding that
‘some others are now an integral part of the political economy and new fronts of
political struggle.’ He argues that apart from the ‘homogenous’ terrorism, some are
partly foreign inspired. He concedes to the reality of ‘globalized world’ or ‘global
village’ as an account of the foreign-inspired terrorism. Media reports have also linked
the current spate of Boko Haram attacks to the alleged second term campaign for
Oscar Edoror Ubhenin
President Goodluck Jonathan against the ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party [PDP]
zoning formula, an informal principle that has worked well for the country’s unity,
regarding ‘zoning’ and distribution of party offices, government appointments, and
location of projects and institutions. (Adeyemi, 2012: 7)
Since the Boko Haram uprising of July 2009 that led to the killing of its leader,
Sheikh Muhammed Yusuf, the print and electronic media, including the internet has
been dominated by daily reportage of other serial attacks. However, the space
provided for this article cannot cover the illustration of the recorded attacks in terms
of date, location, target and casualties. It suffices to mention that apart from attacks
on the state establishments, the Boko Haram sect also has a penchant for targeting
christian faithfuls at churches, especially on religious holidays. (roggio, 2012) One
aggregate report on Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe states says between 26 and 29 July
2009 alone, over 700 persons were killed, 3,500 internally displaced, 1,264 children
orphaned, over 392 women widowed, and several valuables destroyed. (Onuoha,
2011: 8–35)
5. Boko Haram, civil society and conflict construction
One discovery from the literature is that conflict construction as part of ‘complex
humanitarian emergencies’ efforts, reduces either suffering or fighting. (Anderson,
2004: 194–206) It entails securing lives, establishing ‘zones of civility’, developing
indigenous support, mediating encounters in peace education, and documenting
human rights violations and abuses. It also includes humanitarian relief service
provision, particularly where the state is weak and citizens do not trust government.
However, the dominant use of the terms, ‘reconstruction’ and ‘rehabilitation’ to
summarize conflict construction enterprises, has been criticized in the literature
because ‘they focus primarily on repairing physical damage and suggest that the
primary objective is to restore pre-war conditions. Instead it would be necessary to
deal with the causes of the conflict.’ (Fischer, 2004: 374–402) Sometimes, what is often
seen as ‘ethnic wars’ or ‘ethnic hatred’ are not a fait accompli, rather it shows that the
hatreds ‘were just a construction designed to hide more basic, down-to-earth,
interests.’ (Naidoo, 2010: 136) this underscores the need for a ‘local’ civil society
perspective in constructing the Boko Haram uprising, reinforced by the intense
dismay over the way in which the international media, such as BBc, cNN and VOA,
distort news reports, particularly of recent episodes of violence. (cox thomas, 2009)
One important element in conflict construction is the ‘hypothetical neutrality’. the
civil society can be instrumental in field-based analysis and local level advocacy to
prevent and resolve conflict. research, policy and practice anchored on multidisciplinary approaches can draw on policy-research work of academic institutions
and development agencies. In between these practices, the civil society can develop a
better understanding of the Boko Haram uprising, with contributions from theory,
research and practical field-based examples of conflict resolution and post-conflict
reconstruction. (Johnson and Kalmthout, 2006: 3)
Oscar Edoror Ubhenin
Another important element in constructing the Boko Haram uprising is securitizing
the media segment of the civil society. A recent media report says a group of local
journalists in northern Nigeria currently facilitates the communication between the
militant Islamist terror group Boko Haram and the rest of the world. Usually after an
attack, the Boko Haram makes its intention to communicate known to one of the
journalists. that journalist then spreads the news, and at a stipulated time the reporters
huddle around a cell phone on speaker, waiting for a call [i.e. Boko Haram’s version of
a press conference]. But having access to the group comes with a heavy burden. One of
the journalists in Maiduguri reportedly said that ‘they know our names and where we
live, but to us, they remain faceless’, and ‘you live in constant fear knowing that they can
take you out anytime you write something they find offensive.’ (Forum citizens, 2012)
the fears expressed by these local journalists point to the issue of safeguarding the lives
of actors in conflict construction. In 2012, the Boko Haram attacked the media houses
in Abuja and Kaduna, alleging that their target, thisday Newspaper has been involved
in negative media campaign, including fictional stories and continual promotion of
‘fake stories’ by the Nigerian Joint Military task Force to give an impression that the
Nigerian state was making progress against the group.
Another element in ‘local’ conflict knowledge production is the systematization
of local people’s experiences. As observed by Kumi Naidoo, cross-cultural dialogue
can help in challenging the structural factors that fuel the building of exclusive
identities. (Naidoo, 2010: 136) the most capable actors in promoting social justice:
local political leaders, workers, small business owners, academics, journalists, artists,
and trade union leaders should be involved in the process. It is therefore the
responsibility of the civil society actors, knowledge producer to set up a framework
for the enterprise, regarding the sharing of lessons, dilemmas and thoughts.
From the reviewed literature, it can be deciphered that the Islamist fundamentalist
group called Boko Haram pre-dates the fourth republic. therefore, the argument in
certain quarters that it is intended to destabilize the current administration of
President Goodluck Jonathan, though necessary may not sufficiently explain the Boko
Haram uprising. Perhaps ‘there is a faceless cabal using the sect as a front.’ (Onafuye,
2012) But it still does not suffice, it is ineffective, pedestrian and unjustifiable because
the uprising is only a manifestation of the sect’s maturity and metamorphosis over
the years. Second, the civil society is a social basis for weakening differences and
conflict. It mediates and monitors conflict actors. It raises awareness on
reconstruction, rehabilitation, resettlement and reintegration of conflict victims. It
goes to the extent of assisting victims of conflict. But the ‘uncivil civil society’, rooted
in apathy, atomistic individualism or isolationism, poses dangers to peace. It will
advocate exclusionary practices, hate and bigotry, (Naidoo, 2010: 136).
It is, therefore, recommended that the civil society actors should understand the
complexity in conflict construction. regarding the research component in
intervention, the recruitment of data collection teams, training on local capacity, and
Oscar Edoror Ubhenin
data analysis, seeking approval from relevant bodies, and resource commitments are
important. Sometimes, civil society actors are invited to serve on panels of inquiry
into conflicts. In the case of Boko Haram uprising, the civil society actors can help in
identifying the immediate and remote causes of the conflict, with a view to finding a
lasting solution to it. In constructing the Boko Haram uprising, the civil society actors
need to apply caution. there are reported cases of how civil society actors had
encountered problems with the state and its agencies. caution is also needed from
the side of the Boko Haram militants. the civil society needs to mobilize for local,
national and international colloquia, to explore the Boko Haram uprising. It can also
adopt the oral history methodology, wherein they can listen to individual stories and
elicit oral testimonies, and deal with painful emotions and memories of traumatic
events (Field, 2007).
Finally, in constructing the Boko Haram uprising from the civil society
perspective, it is vitally important to address the challenges involved in donor’s priority
in local knowledge production? Perhaps, the civil society can unravel donor’s prioritypuzzle by mobilizing funds internally, through members’ contributions. this would
go a long to beat the donors’ priorities in ‘local’ conflict knowledge production.
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Jelena Matijašević
UDK: 343.3/.7:504.9(497.11)
Godina VI, 2012, str. 35–44
Izvorni naučni rad
sTanje u srbIjI u oblasTI borbe ProTIV
eKološKoG KrImInala uz osVrT
na eKološKu PolITIKu eVroPsKe unIje
Doc. dr Jelena Matijašević1
countries that have managed to reconcile environmental protection, economic
growth and regular supply of energy, can be considered as energy safe countries.
Pollution of the environment and its protection are the decades-long problem of
mankind. Every day, we have more and more forms in the field of environmental
crimes that disturb the environment and energy security. the need for
environmental protection and energy security, comes to the fore as the most
important global problem of modern society. therefore, the protection of the
environment in the EU has clearly stated objectives: environmental protection
and improvement of its quality, protection of human health, prudent and rational
use of natural resources, promote measures at international level to overcome the
regional and global environmental problems. the question of environmental
pollution is of great importance for the republic of Serbia. It is necessary to bear
in mind that the environmental protection and security is a very important
investment in the European future.
Keywords: Environmental crimes, Environmental protection, Environmental
policy, European Union, the republic of Serbia
Energetska bezbednost, privredni razvoj i efikasnost zaštite životne sredine već
dugo su osnovni i uzajamno povezani ciljevi zbog kojih danas nijedna nacionalna
ekonomija ne može konstatovati da je ‘energetski bezbedna’. Energetske krize i ratovi
nisu iza nas. Oni traju i direktno utiču na energetsku i nacionalnu bezbednost.
Nesumnjivo da su u poslednje vreme pitanja energije izbila u prvi plan prioritetnih
tema Evropske unije, sa intenzivnim naporima u formiranju zajedničke evropske
energetske politike.
Pravni fakultet za privredu i pravosuđe, Univerzitet Privredna akademija iz Novog Sada.
Jelena Matijašević
razvoj čistog, efikasnog i sigurnog snabdevanja energijom, promocija načina
korišćenja energije koja manje zagađuje životnu sredinu, upravljanje prirodnim
resursima i stvaranje industrije, usluga i društva koje manje utiče na životnu sredinu,
sve su to važne investicije u evropsku budućnost. S obzirom da je poslednjih godina
došlo do intenzivnog razvoja ekološke svesti, zaštita životne sredine mora biti prioritet
i sastavni deo ukupne nacionalne bezbednosti država (Anonimni, 2012).
Vrednost životne sredine uslovljena je nizom elemenata koji su nastali prirodnim
razvojem i delovanjem čoveka, uslovima za život, stanovanje, rad i odmor u prirodnoj
i izgrađenoj sredini. Životna sredina podrazumeva ukupnost prirodnih faktora i
društvenih činilaca koji obrazuju čovekov okvir života kao prirodno–kulturno–
sociopsihološkog bića. U skladu sa rečenim jasno je da je čovek osnovni faktor životne
sredine. razvojem tehnologije čovek je uspeo da mnoge odnose i procese u sredini
prilagodi, stvori ili usmeri u korist zadovoljenja sopstvenih potreba i želja.
Upravo iz tih razloga, Arsić et al. (2011) naglašavaju da se savremeno društvo
suočava sa velikim ekološkim problemima u poslednjih deset godina. Problem
ispuštanja zagađujućih gasova uticao je na klimatske promene koje danas uveliko
pokazuju sve negativne posledice po životnu sredinu. Isto tako, rast cena radne snage,
energenata za pokretanje proizvodnih pogona, poreskih obaveza i ekoloških propisa
u razvijenim zemljama podstaklo je transnacionalane kompanije da izvoze svoj kapital
u manje i nerazvijene zemlje. U tim državama koje vape za kapitalom, proizvodnja
se danas obavlja u nekontrolisanim uslovima i prouzrokuje takođe velika zagađenja.
Pored rešavanja brojnih pitanja i problema vezanih za vrste i izvore električne
energije, nafte i gasa, i postepeno usredsređivanje na druge vrste, poput nuklearne
energije, kao i energijom iz obnovljivih izvora, sve se češće pojavljuju pretnje usmerene
na remećenje energetske bezbednosti. Pretnje energetskom snabdevanju mogu doći
sa raznovrsnih strana: teroristički napadi, prirodne nepogode, političke ucene i potresi
kao rezultati regionalnih konflikata ili napetosti samo su neke od njih. to ukazuje da
energetska bezbednost implicira brojna ekonomska, ali i politička dešavanja na
međunarodnom nivou. U tom smislu, neophodno je konstantno unapređivati
elemente energetske bezbednosti, a sve negativne uticaje u privredi i društvu, poput
npr. političkih previranja, svesti na minimum.
Kada se razmatraju pitanja vezana za energetsku bezbednost, u prvi plan se mora
staviti važnost činjenice da je razvoj energetike isključivo prihvatljiv samo uz očuvanje
životne sredine i to je civilizacijska obaveza celokupnog društva radi očuvanja
budućnosti. Značaj zaštite životne sredine sve više se nameće kao pitanje
prvorazrednog značaja i imperativ. Potreba očuvanja zdrave i kvalitetne životne
sredine izbija u prvi plan kao najvažniji globalni problem modernog društva.
rešavanje tog problema povezuje se između ostalog i sa iznalaženjem načina za
racionalno i plansko korišćenje prirodnih resursa unapređenjem i razvijanjem
međunarodne saradnje, posebno u oblastima naučnih istraživanja, preobražajem
duha savremene sfere rada, te afirmisanjem ekološke svesti. Upravo iz ovih razloga
namera je da se u radu predstavi značaj zaštite životne sredine, uz poseban osvrt na
aspekte ugrožavanja životne sredine i energetske bezbednosti ekspanzijom ekološkog
Jelena Matijašević
kriminala, a zatim da se prikažu osnovne postavke ekološke politike EU. Poseban
odeljak rada posvećen je situaciji u Srbiji.
1. ugrožavanje životne sredine i energetske bezbednosti ekspanzijom
ekološkog kriminala
Naučno-tehnološki razvoj dostigao je kulminaciju poslednjih decenija prošlog
veka. te revolucionarne promene, s jedne strane, unapredile su sve aspekte života i
rada savremenog čoveka, a s druge strane, stvorile su brojne i raznovrsne izvore
opasnosti za životnu sredinu. Konstantnim ugrožavanjem čovekove životne i radne
sredine, nanosi se ogromna šteta ljudima, njihovom životu i zdravlju, telesnom
integritetu, imovini i mnogim drugim vrednostima.
Prirodna dešavanja u odnosima činilaca životne sredine (voda, vazduh, zemlja i dr.)
u dužem vremenskom periodu ostavljaju vidnog traga na samu životnu sredinu. Ona
se manifestuju promenama u klimatskim karakteristikama, promenama konfiguracije
i strukture tla, vodenim tokovima i vodenim površinama, izmenama u karakteristikama
i sastavu biljnog i životinjskog sveta i dr. Međutim u kraćem vremenskom intervalu
(životnom veku čoveka) one su doskora bile neznatno vidljive. Danas, čovek i u intervalu
od samo desetak godina uočava vidne, čak i drastične klimatske promene, izmene
režima vode, čistoće vazduha, demografske promene, itd.
Ono što skreće pažnju na promene u uslovima životne sredine jesu direktne ili
indirektne, posledice ljudskih aktivnosti u prirodi i to uglavnom kao posledica
prilagođavanja prirode sopstvenim potrebama koje sve češće gube obeležje
zadovoljavanja potreba ljudske prirode. Pospešenju ovog prilagođavanja pogodovala
je snažna industrijalizacija krajem prošlog i tokom ovog veka, kao i tehnološka i
naučna revolucija koje su u toku. One su mogućnost čovjeka da utiče na prirodne
procese (seča šuma, izgradnja saobraćajnica, izgradnja infrastrukture, i dr.) podigle
na veoma visok nivo.
Savremeni privredni razvoj odvija se u uslovima prostorne disperzije zagađujućih
materijala kroz bilo koji element životne sredine, a ako se on odvija izvan kontrole,
onda čovek više nije u stanju da utiče na zakonitosti razvoja prirode.
Putevi ugrožavanja životne sredine su višestruki. Moguća podela je na direktne i
indirektne. Direktno, bacanjem štetnih materija i otpadaka u neki od faktora životne
sredine (vazduh, voda, zemlju i dr.) ili indirektno kada štetne materije, zbog kruženja
vode u prirodi, kretanja materije i dr. prelaze iz jednog stanja u drugi ili jednog faktora
u drugi. Prvi oblik ugrožavanja životne sredine čoveka predstavlja svestan čin, dok
drugi oblik (kruženje materije, neuništivosti materije i dr.) gdje se štetnost ovakvog
odnosa vraća i samom čoveku, ubrajamo u kategoriju nedovoljno svesnih, odnosno
nesvesnih radnji. Ugrožavanje činilaca životne sredine iz kategorije svesnog čina sa
neprijateljskim pobudama, odnosno namerama, spada u domen specijalnog rata,
meteo rata ili klasičnog rata kad se intervencijama u meteo uslovima (suša, padavine,
vetrovi, zemljotresi, požari, razaranja i dr.) želi destabilizovati određeni politički
sistem, učiniti zavisnim od drugih sistema ili ekonomija i sl (Kadrić, 2004).
Jelena Matijašević
Oslanjajući se na prethodno rečeno, dolazimo do pojma ekološkog kriminala. Pa
tako, ekološki kriminal predstavlja poseban vid kriminala koji ima za posledicu
zagađenje okoline u većem obimu ili na širem području, čime se dovodi u opasnost
i zdravlje ljudi ili uzrokuje uništenje biljnog ili životinjskog sveta većih razmera. Ovaj
kriminal je zadnjih godina posebno aktuelan usled naglog razvoja nauke i tehnike i
uvođenja novih tehnologija, korišćenja novih i moćnih izvora energije, te izgradnja
velikog broja industrijskih postrojenja i razvoj velikih urbanih sredina.
Ekološki kriminal se odnosi na sve radnje kojima se krše odredbe ekoloških
propisa i kojima se pričinjava značajna šteta ili ugrožava životna sredina i zdravlje
ljudi. Najpoznatije manifestacije ove vrste kriminala javljaju se kao nelagalne emisije
ili ispuštanja supstanci u vazduh, vodu ili zemljište, nelegalna trgovina životinjama i
biljkama, nelegalna trgovina supstancama koje uništavaju ozonski omotač ili pak
opasnim otpadom i sl (centar za bezbjednosna, sociološka i kriminološka istraživanja,
2012). Po mišljenju autorke Kostić (2009), ekološki kriminal donosi veoma visoke
profite njegovim počiniocima, teško se otkriva i prouzrokuje izuzetno ozbiljne
negativne posledice po životnu sredinu. Danas se on smatra ozbiljnim i široko
rasprostranjenim problemom sa kojim se mora boriti na evropskom nivou.
Ekološki kriminal je, pored negativnih uticaja na životnu sredinu povezan i sa
bezbednosti u oblasti energetike, što je na ovom mestu veoma bitno razmotriti.
Naime, razvoj energetike je isključivo prihvatljiv samo uz očuvanje životne sredine.
Kada su u pitanju ekološke štete, obično se podrazumevaju kvantitativni problemi:
iscrpljivanje prirodnih resursa i destrukcija ekoloških sistema i kvalitativni problemi:
toksičnost proizvoda, proces proizvodnje i otpada, što dovodi do zagađenja tla, vode
i vazduha i povećanja zdravstvenih rizika. Energetika (proizvodnja energije, prerada
i potrošnja energije) je najveći zagađivač životne sredine. Kako potrošnja energije
raste tako se razvijaju propisi koji povezuju uticaj razvoja energetike i zaštitu životne
sredine i razvoj sa time povezanih oblasti energetske efikasnosti i korišćenja
obnovljivih izvora energije (Lepotić-Kovačević i Kovačević, 2010).
Evropska unija je donela veliki broj propisa o energetskoj bezbednosti, zaštiti
životne sredine i prevenciji uticaja zagađenja na životnu sredinu. Očito je da su
energetska bezbednost, ekonomski razvoj i zaštita životne sredine međusobno
povezani ciljevi.
S obzirom da smo u kratkim crtama predstavili šta to podrazumeva životna
sredina, kao i pojam ekološkog kriminala, razmotrićemo i koje su to radnje i
aktivnosti koje dovode do ugrožavanja čovekovog prava na zdravu životnu sredinu.
Svako prisustvo u atmosferi dima, prašine, gasova, čađi, mirisa ili pare, kao i
značajno povećanje ugljendioksida kao produkta sagorevanja zagađuje vazduh, čime
se menjaju njegove fizičke, biološke i hemijske osobine. Najviše zagađuju vazduh
rafinierije nafte, termoelektrane i druga energetska postrojenja, hemijska industrija,
metaloprerađivačka preduzeća, cementare, rudnici, prehrambena industrija itd.
Zatim, svaka aktivnost, ma koliko bila zakonita, koja dovodi do zagađenja i u velikim
količinama prožima atmosferu neprihvatljivim, nezdravim ili agresivnim materijama,
Jelena Matijašević
može predstavljati ometanje za susedno imanje, a kontaminirana atmosfera će kvariti
udubnost i uživanje suseda. Kao smetanje se može tumačiti i postavljanje recimo
dimnjaka ili odvoda dima na tako maloj visini da dim ulazi u susedne kuće ili zagađuje
vazduh u susednim objektima. Isparenja i gasovi iz topionica koji uništavaju ili
oštećuju vegetaciju ili koji štetno deluju na zdravlje ljudi koji žive u blizini predstavlja
ometanje poseda. Odlaganje otpada ili ispuštanje otpadnih voda na zemljište ukoliko
dovede do zagađenja zemljišta ili možda bunara sa vodom takođe predstavlja
ometanje poseda. Pojava podzemnih voda koje uništavaju poljoprivredne useve
takođe može predstavljati ometanje pogotovo ukoliko se plaća naknada za
odvodnjavanje. Nesnosna buka koju proizvode razna industrijska postrojenja ili
pojedinci takođe ugrožava mirno uživanje poseda i predstavlja ugrožavanje životne
sredine (Stupar, 2012). Postoji još mnogo primera ugrožavanja životne sredine.
Mesto ekoloških katastrofa u prostornom pogledu odlikuje se velikom površinom.
Vrlo često se radi o velikim razaranjima, prisutnosti otrovnih materija i sl., što zahteva
posebnu tehničku opremljenost i posebnu obuku uviđajne ekipe. Nezamislivo je
sprovođenje uviđaja bez prisustva stručnih lica raznih stručnih profila.
Široko je prihvaćen stav da je suzbijanje ekološkog kriminala izazov kako za
razvijene, tako i za zemlje u razvoju (Siegel i Nelen, 2008) Koncepcijski temelji borbe
protiv ekoloških krivičnih dela predstavljeni su mnogo šire nego kod krivičnih dela
tzv. klasičnog, odnosno tradicionalnog kriminala. Pored klasičnih organa represije,
u suzbijanju ovog kriminala veliku ulogu imaju razne inspekcije, zavodi i druge
ustanove. Moderne forenzičke metode znatno su olakšale otkrivanje kriminalaca koji
tragaju ugroženim vrstama ili zagađuju i uništavaju prirodnu sredinu. Ali zbog
činjenice da mnoga od tih dela nisu ograničena samo na jednu državu, ali i drugih
razloga, poput političkih, finansijskih, pa čak i usled nedostatka dovoljnog stepena
ekološke svesti, takvi slučajevi retko završavaju na sudu.
Uticaj nelegalnih aktivnosti koje se podvode pod pojam ekološkog kriminala
daleko prevazilazi granicu ugrožavanja same životne sredine i biodiverziteta i često
dovodi do posledica šireg društvenog i ekonomskog karaktera koje se negativno
odražavaju na sveukupni razvoj. Zbog toga se u država članicama EU velika pažnja
posvećuje rašavanju ovog problema (Kostić, 2009).
2. ekološka politika evropske unije
Ekološko pravo Evropske unije je staro više od 30 godina. Za to vreme je stupilo
na snagu preko 200 direktiva koje regulišu pitanja zaštite životne sredine koje,
međutim, još uvek nisu pravno zaštitile sve postojeće oblasti u domenu pomenute
problematike.Više od dvadeset godina kriminolozi, pravnici i sociolozi ukazuju na
neophodnost intenzivnog sprečavanja, suzbijanja i sankcionisanja ekološkog
kriminala. Istraživači, političari, ekolozi i različite grupe građana izražavaju
zabrinutost zbog delatnosti i aktivnosti koje suštinski štete prirodi i životnoj sredini.
Građani jasno iskazuju svoju želju za većim stepenom zaštite u domenu problema
promene klime ili zagađenja vazduha i vode, što znači da žele usvajanje i sprovođenje
Jelena Matijašević
zakona koji će im garantovati zdrav i bezbedan život u svom prirodnom okruženju.
Dakle, svaki vid zagađenja životne sredine je neželjena društvena pojava koja u svojim
ekstremnim oblicima postaje krajnje opasna ili pogubna. Kada pređe granicu
društvene tolerancije zalazi u zonu opšte društveno opasnih radnji i više ne može biti
sankcionisana društvenom osudom, već iziskuje intervenciju države na teritoriji
Evrope i same Evropske unije. Ova intervencija se ogleda u stvaranju pravnog okvira
(na nacionalnom i nadnacionalnom nivou) za zaštitu životne sredine i sankcionisanju
svih akata koji su u suprotnosti sa tom vrstom pozitivnopravnih normi.
Danas je nesporno da različita pitanja iz oblasti životne sredine ili u vezi sa njom,
zauzimaju značajan deo aktivnosti EU. Međutim, tek početkom sedamdesetih godina
prošlog veka, Evropska zajednica je počela da preduzima sveobuhvatnije i ujedno
intenzivnije političke akcije u ovom domenu. One koincidiraju sa naglašenim
trendovima jačanja svesti o značaju životne sredine i planetarnim razmerama
ugrožavanja iste.
Posmatrajući razvoj pravne strukture Evropske unije, po mišljenju Matijašević i
Alavuk (2011), uviđa se da su sve odluke i procedure utemeljene na ugovorima koji
predstavlju primarni izvor prava Evropske unije i čine ustavnu osnovu država članica.
Njima se definišu principi, pravni i institucionalni temelji Evropske unije, kao i odnosi
sa državama članicama i međunarodnim organizacijama .
U rimskim ugovorima (1958.) nije predviđena nadležnost za ekološku politiku.
Na ekološke probleme države članice reagovale su na nacionalnom nivou. Kao
međunarodni problem, zagađenje životne sredine se, svakako, nije moglo efikasno
rešiti na nacionalnom nivou. Kako su se, uz to, različite nacionalne mere i norme
proizvodnje, relevantne za životnu sredinu, sve više javljale kao prepreka za trgovinu
unutar i van Zajedničkog tržišta, sve glasniji je bivao poziv na vođenje ekološke
politike na nivou Zajednice. Neposredno nakon prve Konferencije Ujedinjenih nacija
o čovekovoj životnoj sredini, održane u junu 1972. godine, na Samitu EZ održanom
u Parizu od Komisije je zatraženo da razradi akcioni program zaštite životne sredine.
Neophodnost zajedničke ekološke politike priznata je, dakle, već početkom
sedamdesetih godina. Nastala je opsežna regulativa EZ o životnoj sredini, koja je
sadržala normativne naloge i zabrane (Volf-Nidermajer, 2004).
razvoj ekološke politike i uopšte prava životne sredine EU može se pratiti i kroz
razvoj mesta i uloge ovih pitanja u osnivačkim aktima EZ, odnosno EU. Politika u
oblasti životne sredine ugrađena je u ugovornu strukturu Zajednice tek Jedinstvenim
evropskim aktom 1987.godine, da bi njen okvir bio dalje proširivan, ili samo na
izvestan način makar posredno menjan kasnijim ugovorima (todić, 2010).
1.) Izričitu nadležnost za životnu sredinu EZ je dobila tek revizijom ugovora kroz
jedinstven evropski akt (JEA,1987.), uvodeći posebnu glavu naslovljenu sa ‘životna
sredina’ (članovi 130 s-t). Komisija je imala mogućnost da predlaže na osnovu tih
odredbi donošenje propisa u različitim oblastima u cilju obezbeđenja zaštite i
unapređenja kvaliteta životne sredine, racionalnog korišćenja prirodnih resursa i
zaštite ljudskog zdravlja.
Jelena Matijašević
2.) Dalje jačanje mesta i uloge politike Zajednice u oblasti zaštite životne sredine,
obezbeđuje Ugovor iz Mastrihta (1992. god.) uključivanjem među svoje osnovne
ciljeve i unapređivanje ‘održivog i ne-inflatornog rasta’ uz poštovanje životne
sredine (član 2).
3.) Odredbama Amsterdamskog ugovora (1997.god.) sadržan je princip postojanog
privrednog razvoja, gde je EZ obavezna da uopšte uzevši stremi visokoj meri
zaštite i poboljšanja kvaliteta životne sredine (čl.2 UoEZ) i da kod svih mera uzme
u obzir njene interese (čl. 6 UoEZ).
4.) Ugovorom iz Nice (2003. god.) u suštini nisu učinjene izmene osnovnih, već ranije
definisanih odredbi koje se odnose na pitanja životne sredine. Međutim,
određenim doprinosom promene politike u oblasti životne sredine, mogu se
smatrati i promene u sistemu glasanja (odnose se na sistem kvalifikovane većine)
(Pavlović et. al, 2011).
Koncept evropskog ekološkog krivičnog prava čvrsto je ustanovljen usvajanjem
Direktive 2008/99/Ec o zaštiti životne sredine kroz okvire krivičnog prava. Evropska
komisija je, vođena idejom o nužnosti uspostavljanja minimuma standarda u
prevenciji i sprečavanju ekološkog kriminala, još u martu 2001 godine podnela
predlog pomenute direktive na razmatranje i usvajanje Evropskom savetu. Suština
predloga se sastojala u nameri da se države članice obavežu da će ozbiljne, namerne
ili nehatne, povrede ekoloških pravnih propisa Evropske unije tretirati kao krivična
dela, jer se jedino primenom krivičnog prava može uticati na efikasniju primenu
ekološkopravnih normi. Ovakav pristup je iz korena menjao tradicionalni model
sprovođenja i primene Evropskog ekološkog prava, koji je počivao na principu da
evropske ekološka regulativa stvara pravne norme ali države članice zadržavaju
slobodu izbora načina kako će ih na svojim teritorijama implementirati, odnosno na
koji način će sankcionisati povrede tih normi (centar za bezbjednosna, sociološka i
kriminološka istraživanja, 2012).
U ovom trenutku, ciljevi evropske politike zaštite životne sredine odnose se na
sledeća pitanja: očuvanje, zaštita i poboljšanje kvaliteta životne sredine, zaštita zdravlja
ljudi, racionalizacija korišćenja prirodnih resursa, promovisanje mera na
međunarodnom nivou za bavljenje regionalnim ili svetskim problemima zaštite
životne sredine i borbu protiv klimatskih promena. Međutim, sprovođenje utvrđenih
standarda Evropske politike u oblasti zaštite životne sredine i ponašanje država
članica, igraće ključnu ulogu u rešavanju problema zaštite životne sredine (Alavuk i
Matijašević, 2011).
3. osvrt na stanje u srbiji
U radu su predstavljeni najznačajniji aspekti ugrožavanja životne sredine, kao i
odnos sa energetskom bezbednošću. Na prostoru Srbije usvojen je set zakonskih odredbi
koje regulišu navedenu materiju, i ti pravni aspekti su veoma obimni. Uopšteno bi se
mogli podeliti na krivično-pravnu zaštitu i građansko-pravnu zaštitu, a broje preko 20
osnovnih zakonskih tekstova koji regulišu materiju prava životne sredine. Postoji još
Jelena Matijašević
čitav niz zakona, podzakonskih akata i ratifikovanih međunarodnih konvencija koje
regulišu ovu oblast.
Da bi se stekla najbolja predstava o tome koliko je razvijena ekološka svest, i do
koje mere su zakonske odredbe iz sfere ekološkog kriminala zaista našle svoj praktičnu
primenu, u nastavku rada će biti prikazano stanje u Srbiji u ovom domenu.
Procenat podnetih prijava u Srbiji za krivična dela u oblasti životne sredine i
podizanja optužnice za ekološke prekršaje je zanemarljiv u odnosu na ostala krivična
dela, a najčešće su prijave u vezi seče šuma i ribolova. Znatno je manje prijava koja
imaju veze sa zagađenjem vazduha i drugih oblasti životne sredine. Zamenik šefa Misije
OEBS u Srbiji, tomas Mur, izjavio je prilikom predstavljanja podataka da su istraživanja
doprinela da se stekne uvid u to kako se sprovodi primena zakona i kakvo je stanje na
terenu posle usvajanja seta ekoloških zakona, polovinom 2009. godine. Prema njegovim
rečima, istraživanje prekršaja iz oblasti zaštite životne sredine, u periodu od 1.1.2009.
do 31.12.2010. koje je sprovelo Udruženje sudija prekršajnih sudova i ‘Analize
statističkih podataka o kaznenopravnoj zaštiti životne sredine u Srbiji’ koju je realizovalo
Udruženje javnih tužilaca i zamenika javnih tužilaca Srbije, pokazalo je da se u 80 odsto
slučajeva u prekršajnim sudovima dela koja su u vezi sa zaštitom šuma i ribolova. Manje
je slučajeva koji su procesuirani protiv kompanija, budući da, kako je kazao, ne treba
zanemariti problem sa toksičnim otpadom i zagađenjem vazduha. Viši prekršajni sud,
Odeljenje u Kragujevcu, pružio je podatke istraživanja u ovoj oblasti koja su pokazala
da su, od početka 2009. do početka 2011. godine, ovlašćeni inspektori podneli 5.748
zahteva za pokretanje prekršajnog postupka, kojima je obuhvaćeno 6.393 osoba. Prema
njenim rečima, odbačeno je 168 zahteva ili 2,92% u odnosu na ukupan broj predmeta,
u 861 predmetu donete su oslobađajuće presude i rešenja o obustavi prekršajnog
postupka, a u 2.857 predmeta su donete osuđujuće presude, tačnije u 50, 01 odsto njih,
a ostalo je nerešeno 1.837 predmeta ili 31, 95 odsto. Istaknuto je i to da se najčešće izriču
minimalne kazne, da su one ublažene ili se izriču opomene. Isto istraživanje pokazalo
je da se najviše kažnjavaju fizička lica, potom odgovorna i pravna lica, a u najmanjem
broju preduzetnici. Iz Udruženja javnih tužilaca i zamenika javnih tužilaca Srbije stižu
podaci da u tužilaštvima nisu procesuirana prava krivična dela iz oblasti životne sredine
i da je jedan od razloga nedostatak saznanja o sistemskim propisima koji prate ekologiju.
Predsednik Višeg prekršajnog suda složio se da nije problem visina kazne, već izvesnost
kažnjavanja, jer građani unapred očekuju da će izbeći kaznu za neko delo koje se tiče
ugrožavanj aekologije. Analiza statističkih podataka o kaznenopravnoj zaštiti pokazala
je da je procenat podnetih prijava za krivična dela iz oblasti životne sredine i podizanja
optužnice i dalje zanemarljiv u odnosu na ostala krivična dela. Najčešće se sreću prijave
za krivična dela pustošenja šuma, šumske krađe, nezakonit lov i ribolov i ubijanje i
zlostavljanje životinja, dok je krivično gonjenje za prava krivična dela protiv životne
sredine zanemarljivo. Primetna je i blaga kaznena politika, što je, kako se navodi u
zaključcima, normalna posledica početne primene ekoloških zakona (Press online,
Jelena Matijašević
Ekonomski razvoj, uz očuvanje životne sredine i prirodnih resursa, predstavlja
uslov za prosperitet građana i države i zaštitu nacionalnih vrednosti. Ma koliko bile
značajne promene u svetu i Evropi, zatim našoj unutrašnjoj i spoljnoj politici, osnovni
faktor naše bezbednosti jeste naša unutrašnja politička i ekonomska stabilnost i razvoj.
Veoma bitna oblast jeste zaštita životne sredine. Ako problematiku zaštite životne
sredine sagledavamo kroz prizmu energetske bezbednosti, uviđamo da je ovo veoma
bitna i aktuelna oblast, s obzirom da je sektor energetike zapravo najveći zagađivač
čovekove životne sredine.
Zagađenje životne sredine predstavlja jedan od najzačajnijih problema sa kojima
se suočava današnje društvo. razvoj industrije koliko je dobra doneo čovečanstvu
toliko je i narušio prirodnu ravnotežu i balans. Ugrožavanje životne sredine je
permanentan proces sa dalekosežnim posledicama. Generator je kulturnocivilizacijskih, socijalnih, fizičkih, fizioloških, bezbedonosnih, zdravstvenih i
ekonomskih problema savremenog svijeta. Niko nije imun i pošteđen od ugrožavanja
ekosistema i čovekove životne sredine sa potencijalno katastrofalnim posledicama.
Zemlje sa prirodnim sirovinama i željne industrijskog razvoja, a siromašne kapitalom
usled prisustva prljavih tehnologija još su više ugrožene nego što su to ranije bile.
Pitanja ugrožavanja čovjekove životne sredine spadaju u najznačajnije probleme
savremenog čovečanstva, budući da se njihovim rešavanjima omogućuje ne samo
opstanak čoveka nego i opstanak Zemlje.
Efikasno sprovođenje pravne regulative u oblasti ekologije, od vitalnog je značaja
za suzbijanje i sprečavanje ove vrste kriminala, a time i za samo očuvanje zdrave
životne sredine. Svest na nivou pojedinaca, samog društva, država i nadnacionalnih
tvorevina znatno je uznapredovala i danas sa sigurnošću možemo reći da je ekološki
kriminal ozbiljan međunarodni problem.
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improvement of environment in European Union Law, XII International Ecoconference®, 21st-24th September 2011, Proceedings ‘Environmental protection of
urban and suburban settlements’, Novi Sad, EKOLOGIcAL MOVEMENt OF NOVI
SAD, pp. 189-195.
Arsić Nina, Matijašević Jelena i Berber Nemanja (2011), ‘Kriza životne sredine kao
problematika ljudskih prava i ekološke svesti’, Pravo-teorija i praksa 3(1): 23–35.
centar za bezbjednosna, sociološka i kriminološka istraživanja: ‘Ekološki kriminal’,
(2012), Internet:
(pristupljeno: 08.03.2012.)
Jelena Matijašević
Energy, Environment and Sustainable Development: ‘Environment, Energy, Europe
— an Investment for Now and the Future’, the European commission, (2012), (preuzeto: 07.03.2012.)
Kadrić, Ševko (2004), Ekologija – neodrživi razvoj, tuzla, Bosanska riječ.
Kostić, Miomira (2009), ‘Ekološki kriminal i njegovo suzbijanje’, Udruženje pravnika
Srbije, Pravni život, tematski broj Pravo i vreme 10: 175–182.
Lepotić-Kovačević, Branislava i Kovačević, Aleksandar (2010), Vodič kroz EU politike
– Energetika, Beograd, Evropski pokret u Srbiji.
Matijašević Jelena i Alavuk Marijana (2011), ‘Odgovornost država članica Evropske
unije u oblasti zaštite životne sredine’, Pravo-teorija i praksa 10(12): 42–54.
Pavlović, Zoran; Bjelajac, Željko i Spalević, Žaklina (2011), ‘Energy Security as a Basis
for Affirmation of Environmental Policy of the Euopean Union’, The Review of
International Affairs 62(1144): 78-97.
Press onilne: ‘Mali broj prijava za krivična dela u oblasti životne sredine’, (2011),
(preuzeto: 02. 12. 2011.)
Siegel, Dina i Hans, Nelen (2008), ‘Organized crime – culture’, Markets and Polices
8(7): 230.
Stupar, Boris (2012), Osnovni pravni aspekti zaštite životne sredine u Srbiji, (preuzeto: 09.03.2012.)
todić, Dragoljub (2010), Vodič kroz EU politiku – životna sredina, Beograd, Evropski
pokret Srbije.
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evropsku integraciju, Beograd, Fondacija Konrad Adenauer.
Marija Đorić
UDK: 316.624:796
Godina VI, 2012, str. 45–61
Izvorni naučni rad
hulIGanIzam Kao meĐunarodnI fenomen
Marija Đorić1
the aim of this paper is to show that the hooliganism as a kind of violence in
sport is an international phenomenon. Special attention was paid to the
etymology and conceptualizing the phenomenon of hooliganism. this paper
elaborates the most important theory about definition of hooliganism. the
method of comparative analysis explained the functioning of hooligan groups in
different parts of the world from the UK (to be considered as a ‘native soil’)
through Latin America and the Middle East. certain characteristics are most
relevant hooligan groups - their ideology, structure and links with organized
crime. the results that we obtained in this study indicate that each of these groups
is based on the extreme authoritarianism and hierarchy with a dominant role of
leader who is a typically charismatic personality.
Ključne reči: huliganizam, huligani, nasilje u sportu, međunarodni odnosi, fudbal,
1. Pojmovno određenje huliganizma
Danas se često u kolokvijalnom govoru i medijima koristi izraz huliganizam, pod
kojim se podrazumeva nasilno ponašanje publike na sportskim priredbama. Neretko
se huligani podvode pod pojam navijača što stvara dodatno otežavajuću okolnost u
proučavanju ovog fenomena. Prvo što treba naglasiti jeste da nisu svi navijači huligani,
iako su (u užem smislu reči) svi huligani navijači. Osim toga, treba imati u vidu da
huliganizam nije ekskluzivitet pojedinih zemalja (kao što se u zadnje vreme pripisuje
Srbiji), već se može okvalifikovati kao međunarodni fenomen koji je svojstven svakoj
državi koja poseduje tradiciju navijačke kulture u sportu, a takvih primera je mnogo.
Izraz navijač u sportskom svetu može imati vrlo široko značenje, pod kojim
podrazumevamo sve simpatizere, fanove određenog tima, ili jednostavno obične ljude
koji navijaju za reprezentaciju svoje zemlje. Na primer, navijač može biti i domaćica,
poštar, političar, naučnik, ali ih to ne čini huliganima. Poistovetiti sve navijače sa
Marija Đorić, asistent na Fakultetu za evropske pravno-političke studije, Univerzitet Singidunum, Beograd,
E-mail: mara. [email protected]
Marija Đorić
nasilnicima je kardinalna greška, ne samo u teorijskom promišljanju, već i u praksi.
Borba protiv huligana bi u tom konteksu, podrazumevala i borbu protiv svih onih
ljudi koji vole sport i uživaju u njemu ne koristeći silu. Iako su navijači u formi publike
postojali od kako postoje sportska takmičenja, prvi fudbalski navijači u modernom
značenju kao fenomen nastaju u devetnaestom veku 1863. godine kada je osnovana
fudbalska asocijacija (Dunning, Murphy, Williams, 1988: 32).
Huligani su posebna vrsta publike koja, motivisana sportskim dešavanjima, koristi
nasilje kao osnovni metod delovanja. Huliganizam je pojava koja implicira eskalaciju
nasilja i to ne samo za vreme sportskih dešavanja, već i pre i posle njih. Vidimo da
fenomen huliganizma uvek korespondira sa nasiljem, te stoga možemo ovu pojavu
okvalifikovati kao društveno nepoželjnu i opasnu (Simeunović, 1989: 12).
Etimologija reči huligan tj. huliganizam, vodi poreklo iz engleskog jezika i u vezi
sa nastankom postoje mnogobrojna objašnjenja. Po prvoj verziji, na osnovu
policijskih izveštaja iz 1898. u Engleskoj, reč huligan se vezuje za ime jednog od
kriminalaca iz ozloglašene tročlane bande Huligan-Hudlum-Larkin (Liberman, 2005:
120). Po drugoj verziji, ovaj naziv potiče od prezimena irske imigrantske porodice
koja je živela u Londonu i terorisala ‘Ist End’ (Kontos, Brotherton 2008: 22). U svakom
slučaju, huliganizam je ponašanje koje podrazumeva upotrebu nasilja što i samo
poreklo reči eksplicitno pokazuje.
Huliganizam se ne odnosi samo na nasilje sportskih navijača. Njegovo značenje
može biti mnogo šire. U našem kolokvijalnom govoru huligan može biti naziv za
propalicu, ‘lošeg momka’ ili nasilnika, ali ne podrazumeva nužno nasilje koje
korespondira sa sportskim događajima. U tom kontekstu možemo reći da se
huliganizam shvata u širem i užem smislu reči. Šire shvatanje huliganizma ukazuje
na ponašanje koje je nedolično, obično vezano za uličarski stil i koje implicira nasilje.
Međutim, u užem smislu reči, huliganizam je određen kao nasilno ponašanje
sportskih fanova, tj. ekstremnih navijača, koje se poklapa sa određenim sportskim
događajem, najćešće fudbalskim utakmicama.
rodno mesto fudbalskog huliganizma je Velika Britanija, a ričard Giljanoti
(richard Guilianotti) engleski sociolog sporta, smatra da je početak modernog
engleskog huliganizma vezan za televizijski prenos utakmice 1961. godine između
‘totenhama’ (Tottenham) i ‘Sanderlenda’ (Sunderland). ‘Nasilje između suparničkih
navijača, vandalizam, provokacija policije i rivalitet između fanova bili su prvi
pokazatelji ovog fenomena’ (Guilianotti, 2000: 41). smatra Giljanoti. Veliki doprinos
u popularizaciji huliganizma ostvarili su mediji, koji su prenosili scene nasilja i na taj
način davali problematičnim navijačima na važnosti. Iako je nasilje sportskih navijača
univerzalni fenomen i javlja se na teritoriji svih zemalja, ‘nasilno i anti-socijalno
ponašanje kod fudbalskih fanova često se označava kao fudbalski huliganizam ili
ponekad kao britanska bolest’ (Frosdick, Marsh, 2005: 3). Povezivanje huliganizma
sa Engleskom nije nimalo slučajno, jer se fudbal kao igra najpre razvija u ovoj zemlji,
a sa njom i nasilje publike. takođe treba naglasiti da su i prve drakonske kazne za
nasilno ponašanje na sportskim priredbama donete baš u ovoj zemlji i to nakon
čuvenog Hejsela, kada je država počela ozbiljno da rešava problem nasilja u sportu.
Marija Đorić
Postoje razne definicije huliganizma, ali ono što im je zajedničko je pojam nasilja
u korelaciji sa pojmom sporta, u okviru čega se prepliću ideološko-politički elementi.
Jedna od takvih definicija huliganizma je data u ‘Enciklopediji britanskog fudbala’
(Encyclopedia of British Football): ‘Huliganizam je povezan sa osećajem identiteta
sa fudbalskim klubom ili nacionalnim timom i manifestuje se kroz rasizam i
ksenofobiju predstavljajući osnovnu tačku za periodično učestvovanje desničarskih
političkih grupa poput ‘Nacionalnog fronta i Britanskog pokreta’ (cox, Vamplew,
russell 2002: 176). Nedostatak ove definicije je u tome, što iako relativno dobro i
opširno objašnjava kako se huliganizam manifestuje, ne određuje samu pojavu. Ono
što je takođe njena slabost je to što je prilagođena samo britanskom pojmu
huliganizma, mada joj se ne može osporiti korelacija sa političkom desnicom. U Srbiji
se svakako može govoriti o huliganizmu, kao o varijetetu ekstremne desnice.
Huliganizam se još može odrediti kao ‘takmičarsko nasilje socijalno
organizovanih grupa koje prate fudbal, protiv suparničkih grupa’ (Spaaij 2006: 11).
Nedostatak ove, inače vrlo pojednostavljene definicije jeste što se huliganizam
isključivo vezuje za fudbal, dok u praksi imamo razne primere huliganskih napada
koji korespondiraju sa drugim sportovima, poput ragbija, hokeja na ledu, košarke i
sl. Huliganizam je fenomen koji se pretežno javlja kod muške populacije, tako da
Dejvid Mekardl (David McArdle) određuje huliganizam kao pojavu koja
podrazumeva ‘antisocijalno, kriminalno ponašanje muškaraca koje se javlja na
fudbalskim stadionima’ (McArdle 2000: 69).
Sledeća definicija se bavi određenjem pojma huligan koji zapravo predstavlja
‘mladog Engleza koji ima problema sa prilagođavanjem u društvu, koji je delinkvent
u svakodnevnom životu, koji konzumira alkohol u velikim količinama i koristi
sportske događaje kao izgovor za nasilno ponašanje’ (Bodin, robenè, Heas 2004: 19).
Iako ćemo se složiti sa svim karakteristikama koje opisuju jednog tipičnog navijačahuligana, ipak treba naglasiti da je kao i prethodna i ova definicija pre svega
prilagođena britanskom društvu i da joj ne možemo pripisati univerzalno-opšti
karakter. recimo, u Srbiji se pod pojmom huliganizma podrazumeva prvenstveno
nasilje sportskih navijača, ali se u okviru njega može podrazumevati i obično nasilje
na ulici, koje ne korespondira uvek sa sportom.
Evropska Unija je u svom ‘Izveštaju o fudbalskom huliganizmu’ istakla da
huliganizam uključuje ‘nasilje protiv ljudi, uništavanje imovine, krivične prekršaje
pod dejstvom alkohola i droge, narušavanje mira, krađu i preprodavanje karata’
(Spaaij, 2006: 11). Interesantno je da EU i preprodaju karata smatra huliganizmom,
ili bar podsticajem za huligansko ponašanje. U neku ruku, ovakvo shvatanje i nije
nelogično iz razloga što huliganske grupe odlaze organizovano na sportska dešavanja,
pa tako često postoji ograničeni broj karata koje klubovi sami distribuiraju svojim
fanovima, a sve sa ciljem bolje kontrole publike.
U velikom broju naučnih radova navodi se veza između radničke klase i
huliganizma: ‘Huliganizam je uobičajena forma nasilja mladih ljudi koji pripadaju
radničkoj klasi’ (Bodin, robenè, Heas 2004: 33). Iako veliki broj huligana pripada
Marija Đorić
‘nižim’ društvenim slojevima, nasilje na stadionima nije samo posledica materijalne
krize, već i političke krize kao i krize sistema vrednosti.
razlog zašto je najviše huligana među mladim ljudima, objašnjavamo između
ostalog i viškom energije, koja analogno ide sa mladošću. Iako energija često
predstavlja volju za životom, problem nastaje kad ona postane destruktivna i preraste
u nasilje. Stoga je bitan način kanalisanja date energije — neki vrše njenu sublimaciju
kroz rad, stvaralaštvo, sportske rezultate, dok negativno sublimiranje podrazumeva
forme poput huliganizma kao oblika nasilnog ponašanja. Sa druge strane, mladi ljudi
obično tragaju za svojim identitetom i u skladu sa time traže grupu koja će ih prihvatiti
i u kojoj mogu potvrditi svoje Ja. Ukoliko porodica i socijalno okruženje ne sprovedu
zdravu socijalizaciju omladine, onda se često traži nova alternativa, a to može biti
kriminalna ili navijačka grupa.
Na osnovu priloženog možemo oformiti definiciju huliganizma:
Huliganizam je nasilno ponašanje kojim deo publike inspirisan sportskim
događajima kroz pripadanje navijačkoj grupi izgrađuje svoj personalni identitet koji
iskazuje frustracijsku agresiju destrukcijom materijalnih stvari ili povređivanjem
U biti svakog nasilnog ponašanja na sportskim događajima nalazi se obično
frustracijska agresija, koje huligani često nisu ni svesni. Nezadovoljstvo u privatnim
životima se projektuje na utakmicama koje huligani doživljavaju kao izduvni ventil
zahvaljujući nasilju. Nekada se u staroj Grčkoj katarza obično doživljavala kroz
pozorišne predstave (najpre kroz tragedije, a potom i komedije), a da paradoks bude
veći, savremeno društvo danas to čini na mnogo primitivniji način – kroz nasilje.
Huliganizam je obojen izrazitim emocijama, što prelazi granicu racionalnog, a
poznato je da su granice kao horizont – čim se približimo nedozvoljenoj granici onda
težimo da dosegnemo novu koja se nazire i tako u nedogled. tu se rađa osnova
ekstremizma koja je najčešće desničarske ideološke provenijencije.
Statistika pokazuje da su huligani, pretežno mladi ljudi, uzrasta od dvanaest do
trideset godina i obično sa kriminalnim dosijeom. tako recimo, u Belgiji prema
statističkim podacima ‘40% huligana je nižeg obrazovanja, samo 16% njih je redovno
pohađalo školu, mnogi od njih imaju socijalno-finansijske probleme i odbacuju
klasične građanske vrednosti (učtivost, disciplinu, poštovanje zakona), dok 75%
huligana ima policijske dosijee’ (Bodin, robenè, Heas 2004: 41). Pored navedenih
podataka treba reći još i to da je skoro 100 % huligana muškog pola što ukazuje na
‘mačo’ karakter ove supkulture.
2. Klasifikacija navijačko-huliganskih grupa
Uglavnom, svaka navijačka grupa ima svoje ekstremno krilo koje sebe naziva
huliganima. Naziv huligan i ne predstavlja uvredljiv izraz za same huligane, pa se
shodno tome i oni međusobno tako oslovljavaju sa ponosom. Mi ćemo klasifikovati
navijačko-huliganske grupe na osnovu relevantnih kriterijuma, oslanjajući se pretežno
Marija Đorić
na teorijsko stanovište Dragana Simeunovića, da bismo u nastavku rada objasnili
strukturu i način njihovog funkcionisanja.
Od Simeunovića ćemo preuzeti klasifikaciju prema ciljevima i prema subjektimaakterima huliganizma (Simeunović 2009: 82).
Prema programsko-ciljnoj orijentaciji, tj. prema njihovim ciljevima, huliganske
grupe se mogu podeliti na:
1. Ideološki motivisane grupe, koje se dalje mogu deliti na levičarske i desničarske
grupe. Iako je većina huliganskih gupa desničarski motivisana, postoje i one
koje za svoj ideološki osnov uzimaju komunizam tj. levičarsku ideologiju, kao
što je to slučaj sa pojedinim grupama u Italiji (npr. navijačka grupa Brigate
Autonome Livornesi).
2. Nacionalistički motivisane grupe. Većina huligana u naciji pronalazi bazu za
izgradnju grupnog identiteta. to je posebno izraženo kod huligana sa prostora
bivših komunističkih zemalja. Nakon pada komunističkih režima, svaka nacija
je dobila pravo na samoopredeljenje što je uticalo i na jačanje nacionalizma u
politici, pa i na sportskim stadionima.
3. Religijski motivisane grupe. Neretko se dešava da se u navijačko-huliganskom
svetu grupe identifikuju, pa često i bratime, na osnovu religijske pripadnosti.
Primer za to je bratimljenje između navijača ‘Spartaka’ iz Moskve poznatijih
pod nazivom ‘Fratrija’, navijača ‘crvene Zvezde’, tj. ‘Delija’ i navijača grčkog
‘Olimpijakosa’ koji se nazivaju ‘Gejt seven’ (Gate seven). U više navrata, ‘Delije’
su odlazile na fudbalske utakmice između ‘Spartaka’ i hrvatskog kluba ‘Dinama’,
kako bi podržali svoju ‘pravoslavnu braću’.
Kada je reč o akterima, tj. subjektima, u huligansko-navijačkom svetu, možemo
izdvojiti tri vrste. to su najpre akteri-izvršioci kao subjekti huliganizma, zatim žrtve,
kao nevoljni akteri ili objekti huliganizma i na kraju, akteri kojima se poruka nasiljem
upućuje (mogu biti državni organi, uprav kluba, politička partija itd.). U
hijerarhijskom smislu reči, aktere možemo deliti na ‘pripadnike rukovodstva (akciono
jezgro), aktiviste, sledbenike i simpatizere’ (Simeunović, 2009, 85).
Postoje još nekoliko bitnih kriterijuma na osnovu kojih možemo klasifikovati
navijačko-huliganske grupe. Na osnovu kriterijuma masovnosti, možemo ih podeliti
na male i velike grupe. Često se događa da se više malih grupa ujedine u jednu veliku,
kao što je i moguće da se iz jedne velike navijačke grupe izdvoji nekoliko manjih.
Pogrešno je trpati sve navijače u isti koš. Kada je naša država pokrenula akciju
zabranjivanja nekih navijačkih grupa na udaru su se našli navijači ‘crvene Zvezde’,
‘Partizana’ i ‘rada’, ali to nisu bili svi navijači, već ekstremne grupe koje su poznate
po nasilnom ponašanju i koje se često dovode u vezu sa kriminalnim podzemljem.
Nije retkost da postoje i one grupe koje predstavljaju gromobran koji štiti i organizuje
ostale navijače, iako su fanovi različitih klubova. recimo, trenutno je u Srbiji veliki
uticaj ‘Grobara’ na ‘United force’ grupu koju čine vatreni navijači FK ‘rad’, ali i na
mnoge druge grupe. Navijači ‘Partizana’ imaju neformalan uticaj na ostale grupe i
koordiniraju njima u velikom broju ‘akcija’. Mnogi im pripisuju povezanost sa
Marija Đorić
policijom, tako da se ‘Partizanova’ grupa poznata pod nazivom Alkatraz, zbog
navodne saradnje sa MUP-om ironično naziva od strane protivnika – Značkatraz.
Prema kriterijumu nasilnosti navijačke grupe možemo podeliti na nenasilne
(karakteriše ih pevanje, koreografija, članstvo u omiljenom klubu, i sl.) i one koje su
nasilne (kojima je primarni cilj nasilje, a ne podrška sportskom klubu u vidu
navijanja) i koje zovemo – huligani.
Sledeći kriterijum na osnovu kojeg možemo klasifikovati navijače jeste teritorija,
pa ih shodno tome možemo deliti na one koje navijaju za lokalni klub, nacionalni iliti
pak neki inostrani klub. Dalje možemo prema navedenom kriterijumu navijačke
grupe deliti na regionalnom nivou (npr. Balkan, Zapadna Evropa itd.), ali i na
međunarodnom nivou (tako razlikujemo latinoameričke navijačke grupe baras brava,
Postoje razne vrste huliganskih grupa koje su dobro organizovane na
međunarodnom nivou. Huligani koji se često nalaze u redovima ultras-a u Portugaliji,
Francuskoj, Španiji i Italiji su organizovani sa ciljem da pomognu timu za koji navijaju,
a oni najekstremniji se organizuju u militantne grupacije. Sa druge strane, huligani u
Latinskoj Americi, koji se obično nazivaju barras-bravas, su mnogo više politički
aktivniji i vrlo često organizovani u opasne paravojne formacije, čiji članovi pretežno
imaju debele kriminalne dosijee, zbog čega su često korišćeni od strane političara za
obračun sa protivnicima.
U Evropi imamo podelu na ‘kontinentalne’ i ‘ostrvske’ navijače u okviru čega pod
‘ostrvskim’ podrazumevamo englesku navijačku scenu. Nekada se huliganizam
nazivao ‘engleskom bolešću’, dok danas možemo govoriti o ‘pandemiji’ huliganizma,
s obzirom da nije samo ekskluzivitet Velike Britanije. Huliganizam egzistira u svim
zemljama gde postoji razvijena navijačka kultura i to pretežno u sportovima poput
fudbala i hokeja na ledu.
Po ričardu Giljanotiju treba razlikovati spontani relativno izolovani incident
nekog gledaoca, od organizovanog, namerno izazvanog nasilja, koje predstavlja
socijalni model ponašanja huliganskih grupa (Perryman 2001: 141). Ovde je Giljanoti
dobro uočio jednu bitnu karakteristiku huliganizma, a to je – namera. Huligan, za
razliku od ostalih navijača, na utakmicu prvenstveno ide sa namerom, ne da bi bodrio
tim za koji navija, već da bi nekoga ili nešto uništio.
3. huliganizam kao međunarodni fenomen
Huliganizam je aktuelan gotovo u svim zemljama u kojima je prisutna navijačka
kultura, te ga stoga možemo smatrati međunarodnim fenomenom. Evidentno je da
postoje sličnosti i razlike među određenim huliganskim grupama na međunarodnom
nivou, ali je njihov metod delovanja identičan jer implicira razne oblike nasilja.
Huliganizam kao socijalna i politička pojava crpe energiju iz desničarskog
ekstremizma oslanjajući se prvenstveno na ideologiju naci-fašizma. Ksenofobija,
rasizam, nacionalizam i homofobija su njegovi prateći elementi. Na primer, iako
Marija Đorić
postoji netrpeljivost među različitim navijačkim grupama u Srbiji, sve one su se
trenutno ujedinile oko dva pitanja, a to je:
1. Stav po pitanju Kosova – da je ova pokrajina neizostavni deo Srbije
2. Stav po pitanju homofobije, tj. animoziteta prema homoseksualcima, što je u
skladu sa ‘mačo-principom’ koji forsiraju navijači.
Kod navijača postoji precizna hijerarhija po kojoj se na vrhu pramide nalazi vođa,
potom njegovi najbliži saradnici i na kraju ostali članovi grupe. Da bi neko postao
vođa navijača mora zaslužiti to mesto. U huliganskim grupama se ovaj čin ‘inicijacije’
pretežno odnosi na dokazivanje kroz tuče sa ostalim huliganima i policijom. Obično
ovo mesto pripada harizmatskom tipu ličnosti sa liderskim sposobnostima. Španija
je, recimo, tipičan primer zemlje u kojoj vođe navijača čak utiču na donošenje važnih
odluka u fudbalskim klubovima uključujući i odabir uprave kluba.
Da bi bila prepoznatljiva, svaka navijačka grupa poseduje simbole po kojima će je
ostali pamtiti. ti simboli su kod dobro organizovanih grupa vidljivi na njihovim
zastavama i grbovima. Otimanje zastave protivničkoj grupi navijača je ‘dobar’ razlog
za nasilje u navijačko-huliganskom svetu. Poznato je da zastava ima sakralni karakter
(doživljava se kao svetinja) i da se stoga mora dobro čuvati, jer je nepisano pravilo da
se gasi ona navijačka grupa kojoj se otme zastava. Osim zastave veoma značajan
simbol identiteta u navijačkom svetu predstavlja šal. Oteti šal protivniku znači poniziti
ga, pa se zbog toga ovaj simbol grupe veoma pažljivo čuva.
Navijačka himna je značajno obeležje identiteta jedne navijačke grupe. Osim
uobičajenog repertoara pesama koje se ponavljaju na sportskim priredbama i koje su
često lascivnog karaktera, navijači imaju posebnu pesmu po kojoj se prepoznaju i koja
za njih predstavlja navijačku himnu. Mnoge od navijačkih pesama su uvredljivog
karaktera i tiču se rasne, nacionalne ili rodne diskriminacije što se može oceniti kao
vrsta ‘govora mržnje’. cilj takvih pesama jeste demotivacija, tj. motivacija igrača u
zavisnosti da li su namenjene svom ili suparničkom timu i njegovim navijačima. Jedna
od učestalih pojava na sportskim stadionima jeste zviždanje državne himne
protivničkoj reprezentaciji čime se pokazuje nepoštovanje sportskom rivalu.
Navijači imaju posebne koreografije koje iziskuju dosta truda i organizacije, kako
bi se masa sinhronizovala. Posebno je imponzantna tzv ‘šetalica’, veliki transparent
koji se sinhronizovano razvlači preko celih tribina. U tim okolnostima, veliku ulogu
igra vođa navijača koji koordinira celim događajem. Italijanski navijači su među
prvima počeli sa vizuelnim i auditivnim efektima koji su inkorporirani u navijačke
koreografije. Čak među samim navijačima postoji neka vrsta takmičenja koja grupa
će biti kreativnija u pesmi, transparentima, vizuelnim i auditivnim efektima.
rodno tle huliganizma je Velika Britanija. Zbog toga se čak i danas, kada je
huliganizam kao pojava rasprostranjen u svim delovima sveta, naziva ‘britanskom
bolešću’. ‘Zlatno doba’ engleskog huliganizma je period između sedamdesetih i
osamdesetih godina dvadesetog veka, nakon čega se država ozbiljno obračunala sa
najekstremnijim fudbalskim navijačima. Prema Džonu Kingu (John King) postoje
dva glavna uzroka engleskog huliganizma: prvi je uticaj fašističke ideologije, a kao
Marija Đorić
drugi razlog možemo navesti uticaj rasizma i društvenog nasilja (King, 2001: 684).
Osim navedenih, postoje mnogobrojni uzroci nasilja počevši od uticaja droge,
alkohola, psihičkih problema, frustracijske agresije, pa sve do ponašanja koje je
predisponirano ‘psihologijom gomile’.
Prelomni događaj koji je uticao da se Velika Britanija pozabavi pitanjem
huliganizma i njegovim suzbijanjem je bila utakmica na Hejselu u Belgiji između
‘Juventusa’ (Juventus) i ‘Liverpula’ (Liverpool). Nasilje na Hejselu, koje se i danas smatra
jednom od najvećih sportskih tragedija svih vremena, dogodilo se 29. maja 1985.
godine i imalo je bilans od 400 povređenih i 39 mrtvih navijača, od čega su njih 38
bili Italijani i jedan Belgijanac.
Nakon nasilja na Hejselu sledile su višestruke sankcije za engleske fudbalske
klubove. Belgija je već 30. maja zabranila da engleski klubovi igraju na njihovoj
teritoriji, dok im je sveukupno bilo zabranjeno da se takmiče u evropskim
šampionatima u narednih pet godina, a ‘Liverpulu’ čak u narednih deset. tadašnja
britanska premijerka Margaret tačer (Margaret Thacher) se surovo obračunala sa
navijačima-huliganima posle stravičnih događaja na Hejselu, tvrdeći da su oni ‘uništili
fudbal kao sport’ (Darby, Johnes, Mellor 2005: 86). Uvedene su kazne zatvora za
nedolično ponašanje koje su iznosile od tri do pet godina, zabranjeno je stajanje na
stadionima, praktikovala se numeracija sedišta, a prodaja i konzumiranje alkohola je
bilo takođe zabranjeno. Od nekadašnje razularene gomile engleskih navijača,
Margaret tačer je uspela da napravi skoro ‘pozorišnu publiku’.
Od mnoštva britanskih navijačkih grupa koje su se organizovale u formacije tzv.
‘firmi’, danas su najokoreliji navijači ‘Milvola’ (Millwal), ‘Njukasla’ (Newcastle), ‘Lutona’
(Luton) i ‘Vest Hama’ (Vest Ham). Danas je u Velikoj Britaniji veoma poznata
huliganska grupa ‘Hedhanters’ (Headhunters) koja se najviše sukobljava sa grupama
‘Millwall’, ‘Queens Park rangers’, ‘tottenham Hotspur’. Ideologija ‘Hedhantersa’ je
pretežno rasistički orijentisana, te stoga nije ni neuobičajena njihova saradnja sa
ekstremnim desničarima kao što su ‘combat 18’ i ‘National Front’. Osim što je
prepoznatljiva po ekstremnim fudbalskim navijačima, grupa ‘Hedhanters’ je poznata
i kao tipična ulična banda, koja se često dovodi u vezu sa svetom podzemlja.
IcF – ‘Inter city Firm’, huliganska grupa koja navija za ‘Vest Ham’ (West Ham) je
harala osamdesetih godina navijačkom scenom Velike Britanije, ali je takođe
popularna i danas. Članovi IcF su posebno bili prepoznatljivi po nasilju u vozovima,
koje su obično koristili kao prevozno sredstvo kada bi organizovano odlazili na
utakmice, ali i po tome što bi posle napada pored tela žrtava ostavljali cedulju sa
natpisom: ‘Čestitamo, upravo ste sreli IcF’.
Što se tiče imidža britanskih huligana možemo konstatovati da je njihov casual
stil počeo da se uobličuje osamdesetih godina dvadesetog veka, što je činilo njihovu
supkulturu specifičnom, pa se opredeljuju za nošenje sledećih brendova: ‘Pringle’,
‘Fred Perry’, ‘Le coq Sportif ’, ‘Aquascutum’, ‘Burberry’, ‘Lacoste’, ‘timberland’,
‘Lonsdale’, ‘Sergio tacchini’, ‘Ben Sherman’, ‘ralph Lauren’. Casual stil se dovodi u vezu
sa fudbalskim navijačima koji se odlučuju da obeležja svojih klubova na majicama,
kačketima i ostalim delovima garderobe, zamene markiranom sportskom
Marija Đorić
garderobom koja će ih učiniti manje vidljivim policiji, a koja će usput služiti kao
simbol i znak prepoznavanja njihove supkulture. Naime, policija je bila navikla da se
obračunava sa huliganima među kojima je bilo dosta skinhedsa, sa prepoznatljivim
‘vojničkim’ stilom odevanja, tako da su sa markiranom, skupom garderobom huligani
bili manje primetni. U ovome se britanski huligani u velikoj meri razlikuju od
italijanskih, jer dok prvi žele da budu neprimećeni od strane policije, drugi, pak,
prkose policiji.
Kaznena politika se znatno pooštrila u Velikoj Britaniji, tako da se ova država bori
protiv nasilja na sportskim priredbama, uz pomoć drakonskih kazni. U Engleskoj ne
postoji ograda između terena i publike, ali se ulazak na teren kažnjava sa godinu i po
dana zatvora i istražni sudija prisustvuje fudbalskim utakmicama, tako da se
procesuiranje vrši na licu mesta ukoliko dođe do nasilja. Huliganima koji su poznati
po nasilnom ponašanju se zabranjuje ulazak na stadione i oduzima pasoš četiri nedelje
pre gostovanja reprezentacije u inostranstvo.
U Nemačkoj su huligani pretežno povezani sa neo-nacističkim desničarskim
grupama među kojima su najdominantniji skinhedsi. Kako se povećavao broj
imigranata u Nemačkoj, tako je i rastao broj huliganskih grupa i njihovih članova.
Međutim, Nemačka je poput Velike Britanije ozbiljno pristupila suzbijanju ovog
fenomena, angažujući Fudbalski savez Nemačke, fudbalske klubove i policiju. Nakon
1998. godine kada je došlo do žestokih obračuna na Svetskom prvenstvu u Francuskoj
u kojima su nemački huligani za vreme utakmice između Nemačke i Jugoslavije,
pretukli francuskog policajca Danijela Nivela (Daniel Nivel) koji je ostao težak invalid,
Nemačka započinje ozbiljnu borbu protiv huliganizma. Nakon toga je osnovana
posebna fondacija (po imenu pretučenog policajca), koja ulaže velike napore u
sprečavanje nasilja na sportskim priredbama, a danas u ovoj zemlji postoji pedesetak
projekata u vezi sa sprečavanjem nasilja na sportskim stadionima. Jedna od mera
sprečavanja nasilja je i zabrana udaljavanja od kuća nemačkim huliganima u vreme
velikih utakmica ili obaveza javljanja policiji. U ovom trenutku preko 3.000 huligana
ima zabranu odlaska na sportske stadione.
FIFA i Fudbalski savez Nemačke su organizovali timove stručnjaka među kojima
su pedagozi, psiholozi, sociolozi koji rade na suzbijanju nasilja. Nemci su uspeli da
smanje nasilje na stadionima, no ono je sada počelo da se prenosi izvan sportskih
stadiona. Naime, huligani zakazuju tuče pre utakmica i to na poljanama u
predgrađima, ili u zavučenim ulicama. Prema neformalnim podacima, danas u
Nemačkoj ima oko 14 000 huligana od čega je znatan broj unutar neo-nacističkih
grupa. Spoj ekstremnih desničara i huliganskih grupa ne iznenađuje, ukoliko se zna
da se i jedni i drugi služe nasiljem kao osnovnim metodom delovanja.
Pa ipak, huliganizam u Nemačkoj je u opadanju što se vidi po tzv. ‘vikendašima’
koji koriste samo vikende za nasilničko ponašanje i to ne na stadionima (zbog strogih
zakona), već van njih, što im dođe kao neka vrsta katarze. Navijačko nasilje postaje
sve više karakteristika nižih liga, dok se broj navijačkih incidenata smanjuje u prvoj
fudbalskoj ligi. Nemci su dosta novca uložili u tehnička sredstva nadzora i redarsku
službu, kako bi utakmice obezbedili na što bolji način. Inače, najveći protivnici
Marija Đorić
nemačkih huligana jesu engleski i holandski huligani, pa možemo govoriti o nekoj
vrsti rivalstva među njima. Nemački huliganizam je posebno ojačao nakon rušenja
Berlinskog zida, kada su se Zapadna i Istočna Nemačka ujedinile. Navijačima iz
istočnog dela Nemačke je za vreme uticaja komunizma bilo zabranjeno slobodno
kretanje, tako da su oni nakon ujedinjenja postali još violentniji, jer im se pružila
prilika da ‘odmere snage’ i van zemlje sa ostalim navijačima. Posebno su nasilni fanovi
fudbalskog kluba ‘Dinamo Drezden’ (Dynamo Dresden), ‘Lajpcig’ (Leipzig) i ‘Dinamo
Berlin’ (Dynamo Berlin). Smatra se da su najokoreliji huligani stacionirani u Berlinu,
a jedna od takvih ozloglašenih grupa nosi naziv ‘Asoziale randgruppe of Alemania
Aachen’. Kada je reč o socijalnom statusu nemačkih huligana, interesantno je reći da
potiču iz različitih klasa, mada ih je procentualno najviše iz radničke klase. Najmlađi
huligani pripadaju ultras-grupama koje okupljaju tinejdžere, dok ostale grupe imaju
i znatno starije članove između 25 i 40 godina. Među nemačkim navijačkim grupama
su česta ‘bratimljenja’. takve primere možemo naći između ‘Schalke 04’ i ‘1.Fc
Nürnberg’, ‘1860 München’ i ‘Kaiserslautern’, ‘Bochum’ i ‘Bayern München’. Osim što
se ‘bratime’ na državnom nivou, poznata su i internacionalna prijateljstva između
‘Schalke 04’ i ‘twente Enschede’ iz Holandije.
U Italiji je zakonom je zabranjena prodaja blok ulaznica gostujućem timu, a
sportski klubovi mogu platiti kaznu u iznosu od 20 do 100 hiljada evra ukoliko se
dokaže da sarađuju sa ozloglašenim navijačkim grupama, poznatijim kao ultras.
Zabranjeni su i zakonom kažnjivi transparenti u kojima se nalaze elementi govora
mržnje i koji pozivaju na nasilje, dok su zatvorske kazne predviđene za one koji bace
baklju i ostale zapaljive rekvizite na teren i time dovedu do prekida utakmice. Jedna
od stimulativnih mera jeste davanje besplatnih ulaznica mlađim osobama od 14
godina, kako bi se motivisalo porodično gledanje utakmica. Iako je za svaku pohvalu
napor italijanske vlade da ponovo uvede porodicu na fudbalski stadion, složićemo se
sa mišljenjem da to i nisu najsigurnija mesta za decu, s obzirom na količinu nasilja
koja se desi upravo na fudbalskim utakmicama. U ovoj zemlji je posebno izražena
veza između mafije i huliganskih grupa. Ovakva saradnja je naročito karakteristična
za Napulj, koji je danas poznat kao ne baš siguran grad sa velikim brojem imigranata,
u kojem ‘Kamora’ kao kriminalna organizacija drži primat. Napuljski huligani su
poznati po otvorenim napadima na policiju i po demoliranju vozova iz kojih su u
više navrata izbacivali nedužne putnike.
Kada je reč o ideološkoj opredeljenosti italijanskih navijača, interesantno je da su
se fanovi fudbalskog kluba ‘roma’ inače, levičarski orijentisani i mahom poreklom
iz radničke klase, sa otvaranjem granica i dolaskom imigracije iz raznih krajeva sveta
takođe povezali sa vanparlamentarnom ekstremnom desnicom. Fudbalski klub ‘Lacio’
(Lazio) ima pretežno fašistički i anti-semitski orijentisane huligane, što je neka vrsta
nasleđa iz prošlosti jer je Benito Musolini bio vatreni navijač ovog kluba. Povezanost
ultra-desničara sa huliganima iz redova navijača ovog kluba je i danas prisutna, a u
prošlosti su ekstremističke partije poput ‘Alleanza Nazionale’ regrutovale svoje članove
u velikoj meri iz redova huliganskih fudbalskih grupa. Navijači FK ‘Lacio’ su izuzetno
rasistički orijentisani čak i prema svojim igračima ukoliko nisu bele puti. Poznat je
Marija Đorić
slučaj fudbalera iz Holandije Arona Vintera (Aron Winter), kojem su huligani
skandirali ‘jevrejski crnja’, nakon čega je on ubrzo napustio tim.
Ultras navijači iliti ultraši su italijanski proizvod. Oni predstavljaju sinonim za
najokorelije, ‘tvrde’ navijače koji se koriste nasiljem i imaju fanatičan odnos prema
fudbalu. Poznati su po osmišljenoj navijačkoj koreografiji, pesmama i simbolima.
Jednom rečju, ultraši predstavljaju dobro organizovanu i sinhronizovanu grupu, koja
posebno obraća pažnju na auditivni i vizuelni identitet. Neretko je izraz ultras sinonim
za huliganizam.
Nekoliko bitnih karakteristika čine ‘ultraše’ posebnom grupom navijača: sve
vreme utakmice pevaju navijačke pesme, nikada ne sede tokom utakmice,
pasionirano prate svaku utakmicu kluba za koji navijaju, lojalni su grupi kojoj
pripadaju, obraćaju dosta pažnje na koreografiju, vizuelni i auditivni identitet. Jedna
od najpoznatijih ultras grupa koja navija za ‘Lacio’ je ‘Irriducibili’, koja se oformila
krajem 80-ih godina dvadesetog veka pod vođstvom Antonija Grinta (Antonio
Grinta). Pa ipak, koreni ultras scene su vezani za grupe koje su se oformile još
šesdesetih godina — ‘tuparamos’, ‘Eagles’, ‘Ultras’, ‘Vigilantes’, ‘NAB’, ‘cASt’, ‘Marines’
su samo neke od grupa koje su podržavale FK ‘Lacio’.
U Italiji su navijači ‘Lacia’ i ‘rome’ najveći suparnici. Derbi koji podseća na susrete
‘Partizana’ i ‘crvene Zvezde’ je uvek pod nadzorom velikog broja karabinjera iz
bezbednosnih razloga. Osim ovog derbija, u sportske priredbe visokog rizika se mogu
svrstati i susreti između FK ‘roma’ i FK ‘Napoli’ koji je poznat pod nazivom kao
‘Derby del Sole’.
Italijanska navijačka scena je interesantna u pogledu ideološke orijentacije. Osim
naklonosti ekstremnoj desnici i neo-fašističkim strujama, pojedine huliganske grupe
uzimaju levicu kao bazu svoje ideologije. takav slučaj je sa navijačima ‘Livorna’ koji
ne kriju oduševljenje komunizmom i njegovim ‘ikonama’ — Če Gevarom, Fidelom
Kastrom, Mao ce Dungom, Lenjinom. ‘Za nas je 150 godina komunističkog pokreta
nešto najvrednije i najpozitivnije’,3 ističu fanovi FK ‘Livorno’. U favorizovanju levice
se krije potreba za originalnošću, što se jasno ističe na sajtovima navijača ovog
fudbalskog kluba, ali i potreba za šokiranjem, buntom i privlačenjem pažnje. Krajem
1999. godine se rađa ultras grupa od fanova kluba ‘Livorno’, pod nazivom Brigate
Autonome Livornesi, koja je nastala integracijom pređašnjih grupa ‘Magenta’, ‘Fedayn’,
‘Sbandat’ i ‘Gruppo Autonomo’, čija je ideologija levičarskog karaktera: ‘Naša tribina
je redovno kolo fudbalskih utakmica nazvana ‘nedeljom proleterijata’, dok stadion
posmatramo kao mesto gde se razvijaju antikapitalističke i antifašističke ideje. Na
stadionu započinje borba protiv kapitalističkog biznisa koji je nažalost prisutan i u
fudbalu’.4 Ovi ultraši se sukobljavaju sa huliganima koji su desničarski orijentisani,
što ukazuje da navijačko-huliganska scena, iako je pretežno desničarski orijentisana,
ima u svojim redovima i levičarske ekstremiste. Ultras grupa ‘Brigate Autonome
Livornesi’ javno za sebe kaže da je ekstremna i to iz više razloga: ‘Naš projekat je
3, 11.10.2010.
Marija Đorić
namerno ekstreman, jer sem što predlažemo ljudima kako da se ponašaju, mi u isto
vreme jasno iznosimo svoj stav: ovde se govori o potpunoj eliminaciji fašista i
njihovom odstranjivanju sa stadiona!’5
Huliganizam se posebno intenzivirao u bivšim komunističkim zemljama što se
vidi po primeru Poljske. Ova zemlja je je od 2007. godine uvela nove mere u
sankcionisanju huliganstva tako što je organizovala ekspresne 24-časovne sudove.
Najveće sukobe Poljaci imaju sa nemačkim huliganima, što je u vezi sa političkim
dešavanjima iz prošlosti. Animozitet između Poljaka i Nemaca datira još iz perioda
Drugog svetskog rata, a blizina ovih dvaju zemalja samo olakšava sukobe navijača
koji lako mogu preći iz jedne države u drugu. Najpoznatija huliganska grupa nosi
naziv ‘Wisla Sharks’ koja navija za fudbalski tim ‘Visla Krakov’ (Wisla Krakow). Oni
su poznati po tome što na utakmicama nose noževe i palice, kako bi se obračunali sa
ostalim huliganima. Krakov se često naziva u svetu navijača ‘gradom noževa’, iz razloga
što su česti incidenti između neprijateljskih huliganskih grupa u kojima se pretežno
koristi ovo oružje.
Najveći oponenti grupe ‘Wisla Sharks’ su ‘Anty Wisla’ huligani koji navijaju za
fudbalski klub ‘Krakovija’ (cracovi), koji je takođe iz Visle, ali je manje uspešniji od
FK ‘Visla Krakov’. Ova dva suparnička kluba ne samo da su u istom gradu, već su
udaljena 500 metara jedan od drugog i odvojena gradskim parkom. Koliku
netrpeljivost ‘Anty Wisla’ oseća prema grupi ‘Wisla Sharks’, vidimo po njihovom
nazivu koji negira protivničku grupu prefiksom ‘anti’. Osim što ‘Anty Wisla’ huligani
negiraju FK ‘Visla’, (to se najeksplicitnije vidi po nazivu), oni u velikoj meri negiraju
levičarsku ideologiju i komunizam, što možemo zaključiti iz njihovog simbola kojim
se predstavljaju širokom auditorijumu, a to je precrtana petokraka. Inače, FK ‘Visla’
u svom amblemu ima crvenu petokraku iz vremena komunizma, čime se potvrđuje
simboličku negaciju ovog kluba od strane navijača ‘Krakovije’.tradicionalni susret
ovih suparničkih klubova, pozanatiji kao derbi, ima dugu tradiciju i uvek je praćen
velikom bujicom nasilja u kojoj obavezno neko strada.
Kada je reč o huliganskoj sceni van Evrope, ona je posebno violentna u Latinskoj
Americi i na Bliskom Istoku. Što se tiče huliganizma u Latinskoj Americi, treba
napomenuti da najviše problema sa nasiljem fudbalskih navijača imaju Argentina i
Brazil, no kako postoji mogućnost prelivanja nasilja sa jedne države u drugu, tako su
danas ‘huliganskom bolešću’ zaražene i ostale zemlje Latinske Amerike, poput
Kolumbije i Meksika. U latinoameričkim zemljama je huliganizam u direktnoj sprezi
sa organizovanim kriminalom i paravojnim formacijama što dodatno otežava njegovo
suzbijanje od strane državnih institucija. Posebno opasne navijačke grupe se u ovom
delu sveta nazivaju baras-brava (barras-brava) i predstavljaju vrlo kompleksan
fenomen za izučavanje, jer se u njemu sintetišu kriminal, politika, vojska i fudbal.
Baras-bravas grupe su u Latinskoj Americi ono što su ultraši na teritoriji Evrope, dok
ih u Brazilu zovu i torcida. Inače u slobodnijem prevodu izraz baras-bravas bi
označavao ‘divlje bande’ ili huligane.
5, 12.10.2010.
Marija Đorić
Fenomen baras-brava je počeo da se razvija osamdesetih godina dvadesetog veka,
pa tako danas svaki profesionalni klub ima ovu vrstu navijača, koji su ništa drugo nego
huliganski tip bandi. Veliki broj ubistava prati skoro svaki fudbalski meč koji posećuju
ovi huligani. Ubistva se izvršavaju najčešće noževima, a pošto često u takvim sukobima
učestvuje rulja, uglavnom se krivac i ne može odrediti in concretum. Princip ‘kad su svi
krivi niko nije kriv’ je u ovim slučajevima i te kako primenljiv. Najpoznatije huliganske
grupe su: ‘Boca Juniors’, ‘Independiente’, ‘Newell’s Old Boys’, ‘river Plate’ i druge. Navijači
‘Boka Juniors’ (Boca Juniors) kluba potiču uglavnom iz radničke klase, za razliku od
navijača ‘Atlético river Plate’ koji uglavnom pripadaju višim društvenim slojevima.
Ministar unutrašnjih poslova Argentine Havijer Alberto Kastrili (Javier Alberto
castrilli), je 2007. godine istakao da se baras-bravas huliganizam proširio i na ostale
zemlje u regionu, aludirajući pre svega na Meksiko.6 Neretko argentinski huligani svoje
metode prenose i na huligane iz Kolumbije i Meksika, pogotovo kada se radi o
iznuđivanju novca iz fudbalskih klubova.
‘Boka’ (La Boca) je jedan od glavnih fudbalskih klubova u Argentini, pa samim
tim ima i najveću grupu huligana La Doce. Jedan od vođa, rafael Di Zeo, je tvrdio da
njegova grupa ima najmanje 2000 članova što predstavlja ozbiljan problem po
bezbednosni sistem Argentine. Osim toga, ovoliki broj huligana može biti politički i
te kako upotrebljiv u obračunu sa političkim neistomišljenicima. Dodatno
zabrinjavajuća činjenica je i to što je većina huligana neposredno povezana sa
kriminalnim podzemljem. Slučaj Argentine je poseban kada su u pitanju navijači jer
je doveo do državne krize (mada je bilo još sličnih slučajeva na latinoameričkom
kontinentu) - jedna fudbalska utakmica je bila dovoljna da izazove rat poznatiji pod
nazivom kao ‘fudbalski rat’ 1969. godine između El Salvadora i Hondurasa.
Kao Argentina, tako je i Brazil poznat po izuzetno violentnim navijačkim
grupama. tokom šezdesetih godina dvadesetog veka stvaraju se prve torcidaorganizacije koje su predstavljale mnogo nasilniju varijantu od prethodinh navijačkih
grupa, koje su pod nazivom Charangas bile oformljene još četrdesetih godina prošlog
veka. Osamdesetih godina dvadesetog veka huliganizam poprima značajne dimenzije
jer je većina tih grupa bila gangsterskog karaktera. Iako je huliganizam okvalifikovan
kao ‘britanska bolest’, mnogi istraživači smatraju da je sasvim opravdano reći da je to
podjednako evropski i latinoamerički fenomen (Spaaij, 2006: 88).
Navijači brazilskog fudbalskog kluba ‘Atletiko Minero’ (Atlético Mineiro) koji ima
zaista dugu tradiciju sebe nazivaju ‘Movimento 105 Minutos’. Fudbalski klub ‘Vasko
de Gama’ (Vasco da Gama) je osnovan 1915. godine zahvaljujući portugalskim
imigrantima, te su i danas njegovi najvatreniji navijači (uglavnom portugalskog
etničkog porekla), okupljeni oko grupe Guerreiros do Almirante. Osim navedenih,
danas su aktuelne i druge grupe poput ‘raça rubro Negra’, ‘Geral do Grêmio’, ‘camisa
12’, ‘Mancha Verde’, ‘Gaviões da fiel’.
6, 20. jun
Marija Đorić
U međusobnim sukobima neprijateljske brazilske huliganske grupe koriste vatreno
oružje, ali i ručno pravljene bombe. Zbog narušavanja opšte-bezbednosne situacije u
zemlji, brazilske vlasti su odlučile da sprovedu opsežnu akciju u kojoj će biti uhvaćeni
svi huligani sa kriminalnim dosijeima i vođe navijača koje su obično povezane sa
kriminalnim gangovima. Najveći razlog za konačan obračun sa huliganskim grupama
je činjenica da će Brazil biti domaćin svetskog prvenstva u fudbalu 2014. godine, te u
skladu sa ulogom koja mu pripada, mora voditi računa o bezbednosti gostujućih
reprezentacija, što će biti teško ukoliko ne sankcioniše domaće huligane.
Pošto je Kolumbija jedna od zemalja Latinske Amerike koja ima velikih problema
sa nasiljem baras-bravas navijača, usvojene su mere po kojima navijači mlađi od
osamnaest godina ne mogu ući u deo stadiona koji je rezervisan za baras-bravas grupe,
a oni koji imaju mogućnost da tamo uđu moraju dati lične isprave zbog legitimacije i
baze podataka koju o njima pravi policija. Prvi slučaj masovnog nasilja na stadionima
u Kolumbiji bio je 1989. za vreme kupa ‘Libertadores de Amreica’ između ‘Milonariosa’
(Millonarios) i ‘Atletiko Nacionala’ (Atletico Nacional) u gradu Medelin. Zapravo, ovaj
događaj se i smatra rođenjem baras-bravas fenomena u Kolumbiji. Sam Pablo Eskobar
je bio glavni fan i finansijer kluba ‘Atletiko Nacional’, što eksplicitno ukazuje na vezu
između organizovanog kriminala i sporta. Bilo je to vreme kada su sukobi između
kartela Kali i Medelin predstavljali socijalno-kriminalnu sliku kolumbijskog društva što
još jednom potvrđuje tezu da je sport uvek ogledalo društva.
Pošto je uticaj katoličke crkve dominantan u latino zemljama, pokrenuta je
kampanja protiv nasilja na sportskim priredbama na čijem čelu se našao katolički
sveštenik otac Alirio koji je imao značajnu podršku gradonačelnika Bogote, Antanasa
Mokusa (Antanas Mockus). Ovoj kampanji je prethodila inicijativa sportskih
komentatora 1998. da i oni utiču kao važan deo sporta i društva na suzbijanje nasilja
u sportu. Huliganizam na latinoameričkom podneblju korespondira sa lošim
materijalnim statusom većine stanovništva iz radničke klase, koje u nasilju vidi
katarzu i rešenje svih svojih životnih problema. No, kako je organizovani kriminal u
nekim državama jači i od same vlasti, a uz to i povezan sa baras-bravas navijačima,
možemo zaključiti da huligani predstavljaju direktnu pretnju državnim institucijama.
Njihov položaj je često zaštićen od strane fudbalskih klubova ali i pojedinih političkih
struktura koje iz huliganskog nasilja ubiru političke poene. Stoga možemo reći da se
na ovom kontinentu događa ne samo politizacija huliganizma već i direktna upotreba
huligana u kriminalne svrhe.
Huliganizam je rasprostranjen i na Bliskom Istoku što je došlo do izražaja nakon
tzv. ‘arapskog proleća’, koje je potresalo nekolicinu arapskih zemalja. Kako rat i nasilje
probude najgore osobine kod čoveka, destrukcija se iz polja politike prenosi i na ostale
segmente društvenog života. Egipat je interesantan primer zemlje koja je nakon
tridesetogodišnjeg režima Hosnija Mubaraka (Muhammad Husnī Sayyid Mubārak)
otvorila vrata demokratiji, da bi joj se nasilje koje je upotrebila u svrgavanju ovog
predsednika vratilo poput bumeranga. Zapravo, nedugo po rušenju Mubaraka, Egipat
ulazi u period konsolidacije koji nije dugo trajao. Neredi koji će izbiti 1. februara 2012.
Marija Đorić
godine nakon fudbalske utakmice u Port Saidu između navijača FK ‘Al Masri’ i FK ‘Al
Ahli’ će ostati zapamćeni kao jedna od najvećih tragedija na sportskim priredbama.
razlog ovakve eskalacije nasilja u sportu se može pronaći u političkoj situaciji
koja potresa Egipat već godinu dana. Nakon Mubarakovog odlaska, vlast u zemlji je
preuzeo Vrhovni savet oružanih snaga, što nije bilo po volji većine građana. Svi su se
nadali zori nove demokratije, a ustvari su dobili samo još jedan autoritarni režim u
drugom ruhu. Na prvim parlamentarnim izborima ubedljivu pobedu su odnela
‘Muslimanska braća’, što označava povratak proislamističkih snaga. Društvenopolitičke tenzije i borba za prevlast su se ispoljile i na fudbalskim stadionima o čemu
svedoči sukob u Port Saidu.
Nakon pomenute fudbalske utakmice u kojoj je pobedio ‘Al Masri’ rezultatom
3:1, navijačke strasti fanova ‘Al Ahli’ poznatih pod nazivom kao Ultras Ahlavi su
dostigle tačku ključanja. Huligani su neposredno po završetku utakmice izašli na
fudbalski teren i počeli sa međusobnim obračunom. Ultras Ahlavi su ne samo navijači
kluba ‘Al Ahli’, već su i odigrali glavnu ulogu u rušenju Mubarskovog režima. Sa druge
strane, navijači ‘Al Masrija’ (poznati kao Zeleni orlovi i Gazde kanala) su pristalice
Mubarakove politike. Vidimo da su ove navijačke grupe ne samo sportski, već i
politički protivnici.
U nasilju izazvanom na fudbalskoj utakmici u Port Saidu su poginule najmanje
74 osobe dok je preko 1000 ljudi povređeno. Partija slobode i pravde iza koje stoji
dobro poznata organizacija Muslimanska braća, optužila je za nasilje na fudbalskom
stadionu Vrhovni savet koji je još uvek pod ingerencijom bivšeg predsednika
Mubaraka. Ovo je bio samo okidač da se u več ionako ranjivom društvu raspiri mržnja
i netrpeljivost. Građani su bili ojađeni dešavanjima na stadionu za šta su krivili
prelaznu vojnu upravu, tražeći da se smesta povuče s vlasti. Osim Muslimanske braće,
i Grupa mladih 6. april (koja je aktivno učestvovala u svrgavanju Mubaraka) je tvrdila
kako su neredi na fudbalskoj utakmici između ‘Al Masrija’ i ‘Al Ahlija’ iscenirani od
strane Vrhovnog saveta kako bi isti pod izgovorom neophodnosti vanrednog stanja
nastavio i dalje da vlada Egiptom. Smatra se da je Vrhovni savet oružanih snaga ustvari,
produžena ruka Hosnija Mubaraka. Mnoge međunarodne organizacije koje se bave
zaštitom ljudskih prava poput ‘Amnesti internešnal’ (Amnesty International) smatraju
da je vojna vlast nastavila Mubarakov put jer nije ukinula represivne zakone iz
Mubarakove vladavine. Posebno se vojnoj vladi zamera to što ne dozvoljava kritiku
vladajućih snaga u javnosti, što se nasilnim putem obračunava sa demonstrantima i
što pribegava mučenju demonstranata.
Nakon incidenta koji se dogodio na stadionu u Port Saidu, podignuta je optužnica
protiv 54 osobe. Mnogi pak, spekulišu da je nasilje bilo namerno izazvano i
orkestrirano od strane navijača ‘Al Ahlija’ koji su uzeli otvoreno učešće u prethodnoj
revoluciji koja je dovela do smene predsednika Mubaraka. Dosta se kritika mogu
uputiti organizatorima ove utakmice jer na ulazu nije bila kontrola oružja, a izlazna
vrata su bila zabravljena što je dodatno uticalo na stvaranje panike i nasilja među
navijačima. Mnogi nedužni gledaoci koji su se zatekli na utakmici su stradali u
stampedu, koji je nastao usled panike jer su izlazi na stadionu bili zabravljeni.
Marija Đorić
Nakon sukoba huligana u Port Saidu, egipatski sud je doneo odluku o suspenziji
kluba ‘Al Masri’ na dve godine, dok se u naredne tri godine neće uopšte održavati
utakmice na stadionu u Port Saidu. Ovakva odluka je samo još više razjarila huligane
u već ionako nestabilnom egipatskom društvu, koje je skoro izašlo iz konfliktnog
perioda. Ubrzo nakon sudske odluke, huligani su izašli na ulice protestujući što je
dovelo do sukoba sa policijom u kojima je poginuo trinaestogodišnji dečak. Sukobi
u Port Saidu su kao posledicu imali i podnošenje ostavke gradonačelnika tog grada,
dok je vlada smenila šefa službe bezbednosti u Port Saidu i rukovodstvo fudbalskog
Inače, egipatska navijačka fudbalska scena je poznata u poslednje vreme kao jedna
od najviolentnijih što datira od 2006. godine kada su se sukobili navijači reprezentacije
Libije i reprezentacije Egipta kada su se koristila razna zapaljiva sredstva, poput raketa.
Kao najozloglašenije huliganske grupe koje su i dale značajan doprinos u rušenju
prethodnog režima, se navode ‘Ultras Ahlavi’ i ‘Ultras vajt najts’, navijači ‘Zamaleka’.
Oni imaju običaj da tuku fudbalere što su pokazali tokom meča Afričke lige šampiona
sa tunižanskim ‘Klub Afrikanom’ 2011. godine. Smatra se da su egipatski huligani
ukupno uzev napravili veći broj incidenata na utakmicama nego li svi evropski
navijači od 2007. godine pa sve do danas7.
Događaji iz Egipta su šokirali celu međunarodnu zajednicu, te je Evropska Unija
zatražila sprovođenje nezavisne istrage o ovom nemilom događaju. Mnogi nazivaju
događaje iz Port Saida ‘fudbalskim ustankom’, a ono što je neosporiva činjenica jeste
da je nasilje na sportskim terenima veoma lako isprovocirati u politički nestabilnom
društvu, kakvo je u ovom slučaju egipatsko.
Na osnovu komparativne analize huliganizma u različitim krajevima sveta
možemo konstatovati kako huliganizam nije ekskluzivitet Velike Britanije u kojoj je
ponikao, ili Srbije koja je imala nekoliko incidenata sa huliganima poslednjih par
godina, već da se može sagledavati kao međunarodni fenomen koji uvek rezultira
nasiljem. Problem sa nasiljem publike na sportskim priredbama nije pitanje kojim bi
samo trebalo da se bave države na nacionalnom nivou već je potrebna koordinirana
zajednička međunarodna saradnja koja bi radila na suzbijanju huliganizma.
Bodin Dominique, robenè Luc, Heas Stephane (2004), Sport and violence in Europe,
Strasbourg, council of Europe.
cox richard, Vamplew Wray, russell Dave (2002), Encyclopedia of British Football,
London, routledge.
Darby Paul , Johnes Martin , Mellor Gavin (2005), Soccer and Disaster, New York
and London, routledge.
Izvor:, 26.03.2012.
Marija Đorić
Dunning Eric, Murphy Patrick, Williams John (1988), The Roots of football
hooliganism, London and New York, routledge and Kegan Paul.
Frosdick Steve and Marsh Peter (2005), Footbal hooliganism, cullompton, Willan,
London .
Perryman, Mark (2001), Hooligan wars, Causes and effects of football violence,
Guilianotti, richard (2000), Footbal – a socioloy of the global game, London, Policy
King, John (2001), ‘the sound and the fury’, New Statesman, pp. 26:84.
Kontos Louis, Brotherton David (2008), Encyclopedia of gangs, Grenwood Press,
Liberman, Anatoly (2005), Word origins – and how we know them: etimology for
everyone, Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press.
McArdle, David (2000), Football Society & The Law, London, routledge-cavendish.
Simeunović, Dragan (1989), Političko nasilje, Beograd, radnička štampa.
Simeunović, Dragan (2009), Terorizam, Beograd, Pravni fakultet.
Spaaij ramon, Fredrik Johan (2006), Understanding football hooliganism: a
comparison of six Western European football clubs, Amsterdam, Vossiuspers UvA –
Amsterdam, University Press.
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović
UDK: 005.334:334.72
Godina VI, 2012, str. 62–74
Izvorni naučni rad
neKa shVaTanja menadŽmenTa od znaČaja
za InoVIranje KorPoraTIVne bezbednosTI
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović1
there is a need for radical innovations in the area of corporate security in very
serious and profound sense. Specifically, in the actual time of restructuring and/or
privatising our economy, firstly corporations, in the conditions of world and
regional crisis, there is a strong need and a great challenge expressed towards the
creative potentials of our society in order to approach the radical innovation of
the corporate security. that need arises from problems within the organisation
as well as from the functioning of corporate security. result has to be directed to
the /1/ real challenges, risks and threats (effectivity); organisation and security
/2/ better performance of its employees with decreased costing (efficiency). the
basics of corporate security innovations represent: /1/ rights (in terms of making
rules, regulations and other acts and their efficient implementation), /2/ examples
of good (local and world) practice as well as /3/ adequate scientific and theoretical
Key words: corporate security, science of management, security management,
human resources management.
uvodne napomene
U aktuelnom vremenu restrukturiranja i/ili privatizacije naše privrede, a u prvom
redu korporacija, izražena je snažna potreba, te i veliki izazov stvaralačkim
potencijalima našeg društva, da pristupe inoviranju korporativne bezbednosti.2
Prof. dr Momčilo talijan, Institut za kriminološka i sociološka istraživanja u Beogradu. Elektronska adresa:
[email protected]
Mr Svetlana ristović, Kriminalističko-policijska akademija u Beogradu. Elektronska adresa: svetlana.
[email protected]
O shvatanju, organizaciji i poslovima korporativne bezbednosti u: Momčilo talijan, Miroslav M. talijan,
‘Osnove za inoviranje korporativne bezbednosti’, Zbornik radova sa naučnog skupa: Korporativna
bezbjednost-rizici, prijetnje i mjere zaštite, Univerzitet Sinergija, Fakultet bezbjednost i I zaštite, Banja Luka,
2010, str.14–18.
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović
Za ostvarivanje ovog poduhvata moguće je u prvom redu koristiti /1/ pravo (u
smislu donošenja i/ili inoviranja propisa i drugih akata, te njihovo efikasno
sprovođenje), zatim /2/ primere dobre (domaće i svetske) prakse, kao i /3/
odgovarajuće naučno-teorijske osnove.
U ovom radu težište se daje sagledavanju mogućnosti korišćenja nauke o
menadžmentu (i organizaciji) u inoviranom osmišljavanju korporativne bezbednosti.
rad nema ambiciju da izloži sveukupnost naučne misli o menadžmentu (i
organizaciji) sa aspekta mogućnosti njene implementacije u aktuelan tranzicioni
proces promene korporativne bezbednosti, već samo da ukaže na tu nezaobilaznu
potrebu i nova izvorišta ideja.
Konkretno, u radu se, pored uvodnih i zaključnih napomena, te navođenja
korišćene literature, izlažu: /1/ Naučno–teorijske osnove menadžmenta od značaja
za unapređenje organizacije i funkcionisanja korporativne bezbednosti i /2/
Savremene paradigme menadžmenta i njihova primenljivost u korporativnoj
1. naučno-teorijske osnove menadžmenta od značaja
za unapređenje organizacije i funkcionisanja korporativne bezbednosti
Hronološki pregled teorija u nauci o menadžmentu ukazuje da iako menadžment
datira još od nastanka ljudske civilizacije, on je u fokus ljudi ušao tek u vreme
industrijalizacije. Onoga trenutka kada vlasnik nije više bio u stanju da lično prati
aktivnost svakog radnika, bio je prinuđen da najbolje, istaknute radnike zaduži za te
poslove, odnosno, da im ustupi pojedina ovlašćenja upravljanja.
U isto vreme menadžment postaje i predmet istraživanja—misaona veština čemu
se ljudi uče. Pojavilo se više teorija od tog doba o tome kako menadžeri treba da
obavljaju svoj posao. Pri kraju 19. Veka osnovane su prve poslovne škole u SAD, a
nešto kasnije i u Francuskoj. Čini se da su saznanja još iz tog perioda vredno,
nezaobilazno izvorište i danas neophodno za inoviranje korporativne bezbednosti.
to, naravno implicira i isti odnos prema kasnije nastalim teorijama sve do savremenih
paradigmi menadžmenta. Zato, u narednim izlaganjima, sledi predočavanje i
promišljanje tih ključnih izvorišta.
1.1. osnovno polazište anri fajola
Anri Fajol (Henry Fayol), jedan od utemeljivača nauke menadžmenta, pored
Federika tejlora, (Frederik teylor) u svojoj knjizi Opšti i industrijski menadžment
izlaže shvatanja koja su i dan danas validna, a u najmanju ruku inspirativna za
rešavanje savremenih problema menadžmenta i organizacije preduzeća uključujući i
njegovu bezbednosnu strukturu.3 Konkretno, on je: /1/ definisao i opisao glavne
Ova knjiga je objavljena 1916. godine, a na srpski jezik je prevedena 1920. godine od strane poznatog
nastavnika i mašinskog inženjera Živojina Dimitrijevića iz Kragujevca. Izdavač je bilo Ministarstvo trgovine
i rudarstva Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca. reprint ovog prevoda objavio je Adizes, Novi Sad, 2006.
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović
funkcije u preduzeću; /2/ prepoznao i opisao sadržaj administrativne (menadžment)
funkcije; /3/ odredio potrebne sposobnosti menadžera, i /4/ utvrdio i opisao četrnaest
principa (načela) u oblikovanju i ostvarivanju menadžmenta.
Sve navedene grupacije saznanja zavređuju stvaralačko propitivanje na zadatu
temu ovog rada, ali iz razloga ograničenog obima rezimiraju se:
– Jedna od pet glavnih funkcija preduzeća, pa tako i korporacije je bezbednosna
funkcija i
– Nema funkcionisanja korporacije pa i njene bezbednosti bez menadžmenta,
ostvarivanog na odgovarajućim načelima od strane sposobnih menadžera.
Iz napred naglašenog iskaza nedvosmisleno proizilazi glavna premisa za
inoviranje korporativne bezbednosti: ne mogu se svi poslovi korporativne
bezbednosti, po principu autsorsinga ili na drugi način, poveriti, ustupiti uz naknadu,
ili pak sve bezbednosne usluge uslovljene izazovima rizicima i pretnjama
korporativnoj bezbednosti kupiti na tržistu industrije bezbednosti. Jer, u pitanju su
osnovni poslovi bez kojih ne može da postoji preduzeće - korporacija. Neminovno
je da ‘uz’ i/ili ‘u’ top menadžmentu korporacije postoji bar bezbednosni menadžment.
1.2. Pouke iz bihejviorističkih shvatanja
Bihejvioristička škola bavi se više radnikom nego njegovim radnim zadatkom.
Početkom 20. veka, bihejvioristi su bili zainteresovani za poboljšanje produktivnosti
isto koliko i pripadnici klasične škole (Amerikanac Federik tejlor, Francuz Anri Fajol
i njihovi sledbenici). Međutim, bihejvioristi su smatrali da je ključ povećane
produktivnosti u samom radniku, a ne u radnom mestu. Posvećujući se sociološkim,
psihološkim i organizacionim istraživanjima, tražili su način da bolje motivišu
radnika i tako povećaju produktivnost. Verovali su da je čovek takozvana ‘vitalna
mašina’ i da rukovodstvo treba da se brine za svakog pojedinog radnika.
Ova škola menadžmenta i njena tzv. teorija humanih odnosa, Humanističke
teorije menadžmenta roberta Ovena (robert Owen) i Eltona Meja (Elton Mayo),
doprinela je razvoju humanijih odnosa I boljoj motivaciji u radnom procesu znatnom
poboljšanju produktivnosti rada. Iz klasične i neoklasične teorije menadžmenta javilo
se niz teorija radne motivacije koje težišno proučavaju radnike i njihove individualne
teorije hijerarhije motiva i potreba čiji je rodonačelnik Abraham Maslov
(Abraham Maslow, 1908 1970), istaknuti američki psiholog, mislilac i glavni
zastupnik humanističke psihologije. Po ovoj teoriji čovek radi da bi zadovoljio neku
od svojih potreba, dakle, potreba ga motiviše da radi. Maslov je čak utvrdio strukturu
i hijerarhiju čovekovih potreba i rangirao ih po značaju tj. prioritetu njihovog
zadovoljenja i to na:
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović
Slika1. Piramida potreba (Maslov 2004: 24)
Značaj potrebe sigurnosti, njen sadržaj i rang snažno potenciraju nephodnost da
kvalitet radnog života korporacije bude ispunjen sigurnošću, to jest da korporacija
bude mesto gde nema strahova na poslu. to će uticati na učinak zaposlenih, pa tako
i na ostvarenje profita.
Indikativno je na ovom mestu ukazati na napred izloženo viđenje Anri Fajola da
bezbednost ulazi u osnovni skup aktivnosti, te time i neophodnu aktivnost svakog
preduzeća (ustanove), i na shvatanje Abrahama Maslova da je bezbednost osnovna
potreba čoveka, pa time i radnika svakog preduzeća (ustanove). Očigledno, da je
ovako uočeno prožimanje, vredno ne samo zapažanja već i dubljih istraživanja nauke
bezbednosti, posebno bezbednosnog menadžmenta i njegove aplikacije u ostvarivanje
organizacije i funkcionisanje korporativne bezbednosti.
Motivacionu teoriju dva faktora postavio je Frederik Hercberg (Frederick Herzberg).
On je sve faktore radne motivacije i zadovoljstva poslom svrstao u dve grupe.
Prvu grupu čine svi oni faktori koji ne izazivaju postojanje nezadovoljstva i
obuhvataju sve one faktore do onih (i njih) koji izazivaju zadovoljstvo. U te faktore
spadaju: posao, priznanje, mogućnost napredovanja i usavršavanja i sl. Nazvao ih je
motivatornim faktorima sadržaja rada.
Druga grupa obuhvata skup faktora između onih koji izazivaju nezadovoljstvo pa
sve do onih koji ne izazivaju nezadovoljstvo. U tu grupu faktora spadaju: fizički I
društveni uslovi radne sredine (sistem upravljanja, međuljudski odnosi i sl.),
bezbednost na poslu, distribucija plata, poslovna politika i dr. Nazvao ih je
kontekstualnim faktorima (faktori radnog okruženja i sredine).
Na pozitivnu motivaciju (i povećanje produktivnosti) može uticati samo prva
grupa faktora, dok se regulisanjem druge grupe faktora može samo eliminisati i
smanjiti nezadovoljstvo, ali se ne može povećati zadovoljstvo.
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović
Instrumentalne teorije motivacije sadrže jedinstvo mnogih varijacija prethodnih.
One potvrđuju da je svaki pojedinac motivisan da se zalaže na radu do one mere koja
mu, prema sopstvenom mišljenju, omogućava postizanje ciljeva koje očekuje, a koji
su za njega privlačni i za koje je zainteresovan. Definisano je 14 različitih modela ovih
teorija. Najpotpunija i najuverljivija je teorija iščekivanja Viktora Vruma (Victor
teorija X, u osnovi, zastupa stav da je čovek po svojoj prirodi nezainteresovan za
posao, da radi koliko mora, da je neambiciozan i neodgovoran. Zato upravljanjem
treba uspostaviti takvu organizaciju u kojoj zaposlene treba stalno kontrolisati, a
prinuda je osnov da bi se uspostavilo željeno ponašanje radnika. Nauka, a sve više i
praksa, negiraju ovu teoriju ističući da ona meša uzroke i posledice.
teorija Y uzroke loše radne motivacije nalazi u slabostima organizacije u kojoj je
menadžment sveden na kontrolu i kažnjavanje. Zaposlenima treba omogućiti da
razviju svoje sposobnosti, pa će biti motivisani, odgovorni i podrediće svoje ponašanje
ciljevima organizacije, a individualno kolektivnom.
teorija Z pripada osamdesetim godinama 20. veka. Vilijam Ouči (William Ouchi)
postavio je ovu teoriju. Ona ne pridaje veliki značaj menadžmentu, ali ističe značaj
globalnog organizacionog sistema. Zadovoljstvo radnika poslom ne zavisi samo od
demokratizacije stila menadžmenta, ono zavisi (iznad svega) od celokupnog sistema
industrijskih odnosa. Suština teorije Z je u tome što ona pokušava da integriše
japansku i američku menadžersku praksu.
Tabela 1. Karakteristike Z tipa organizacije
Glavne karakteristike
Karakteristike japanske
praktičnog delovanja
prakse su:
američkog menadžmenta su:
Kratkoročno zadržavanje
zaposlenih u jednoj
kompaniji (česta
Individualizam u
Individualna odgovornost.
Brzo napredovanje u službi.
Direktni mehanizmi
profesionalna karijera.
Selektivna briga o
Z tip organizacije –
Doživotno zaposlenje.
Dugoročno zaposlenje.
Kolektivno odlučivanje.
Kolektivno odlučivanje.
Kolektivna odgovornost.
Individualna odgovornost.
Postupno napredovanje na Sistem postupnog
napredovanja zaposlenih.
Mehanizam indirektne
Indirektna kontrola.
Umereno specijalizovana
profesionalna karijera.
profesionalna karijera.
Briga o svim ljudima
Briga za sve zaposlene u
kompanije u kontekstu
kompaniji uključujući i
njihove ličnosti.
njihove porodice.
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović
Osim već istaknutog u vezi Maslovljeve piramide potreba (konkretno o
sigurnosti), o potrebama i mogućnostima primenljivosti bihejviorističkih teorija u
aktuelnom inoviranju korporativne bezbednosti najbolje govore primeri dobre prakse.
rezultati jednog empirijskog istraživanja, to nedvosmisleno dokazuju. Konkretno, u
funkciji kvalitetnog i adekvatnog okončanja postupka restrukturiranja i privatizacije
Službe bezbednosti ‘Goša’, iz Smederevske Palanke izrađen je materijal studijskoanalitičke osnove—preporuke organizacija i funkcionisanje Službe bezbednosti ‘Goša’
(talijan, talijan, Nedeljković, 2009).
Za izradu ove studije korišćeni su pisani izvori (izveštaji, informacije, pravilnici,
uputstva i dr.) u vezi organizacije i funkcionisanja Službe bezbednosti ‘Goša’,
instruktivno-konsultativni razgovori sa menadžmentom ‘Goša’ HK, kao I intervju
rukovodećeg sastava u d.o.o. i anketiranje zaposlenih u Službi bezbednosti ‘Goša’.
Među najznačajnijim saznanjima nalaze se sledeći iskazi:
/1/ Mada ne zanemaruju važnost tehničkih sredstava i tehničkog opremanja
Službe, za bolje i lakše obavljanje poslova, anketirani naglašavaju ambijentalne uslove
rada Službe.
/2/ Nesumnjivo se zaključuje da su ispunjeni osnovni uslovi za adekvatnu
socijalizaciju i ponašanje u radu. Anketirani vole svoj posao, spremni su da stiču nova
funkcionalna znanja. Manji broj njih koristi bolovanje i ne ispunjava obaveze do nivoa
da zbog toga budu kažnjavani. Doduše, od anketiranih, tek manje od jedne trećine
bili su nagrađivani tokom, prilično duge radne karijere. Nije bio ustaljen običaj da se
zaposleni nagrađuju, a retkost je bila i da se disciplinski kažnjavaju.
/3/ U predlaganju mera za smanjenje ugroženosti imovine, lica i poslovanja
intervjuisani ne zanemaruju potrebu modernizacije tehničkih sredstava zaštite, ali
ipak u prvi plan stavljaju ljudske resurse. Oni naglašavaju potrebu ispoljavanja većeg
profesionalizma u radu, te u tom cilju i bolju obučenost, kao i veće zalaganje
zaposlenih. U sklopu ljudskih mogućnosti za smanjenje ugroženosti, vide I poboljšano
ostvarivanje pojedinih funkcija menadžmenta (kontrole, harmonizacije rada i dr.).
/4/ Kao mogućnost za unapređenje i poboljšanja rada Službe bezbednosti,
intervjuisani ističu ljudske resurse, tj. prijem novih kadrova, a zatim i sprovođenje
aktivnosti kojima se razvijaju postojeći ljudski potencijali i motivišu na veći učinak.
Naravno, nije bila zaboravljena ni bolja tehnička opremljenost.
1.3. Potrebe i mogućnosti implementacije
savremenih teorija menadžmenta
Sistemski pristup. Uvođenjem u organizaciju pojedinih zakonitosti iz opšte teorije
sistema došlo se do novih rezultata u oblasti upravljanja i produbljivanja znanja o
teoriji organizacije. Sistemski pristup podrazumeva svestrano posmatranje
organizacijskih sistema i njegovih strukturalnih elemenata iznutra, ali i uticaj
okruženja na posmatrani sistem. Proučava se struktura sistema u organizaciji, veze i
odnosi između elemenata u sistemu, njihova međusobna povezanost i uslovljenost,
kao i interakcija sistema sa okruženjem. Ovakvo sistemsko sagledavanje organizacije,
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović
gde se sistem ne posmatra sam zasebe, nego se posmatra delovanje i okruženja na
sistem, poboljšalo je upravljanje, tj. znatnije unapredilo funkcionisanje, kretanje i
razvoj organizacije.
Kibernetski pristup. Naučna oblast kibernetika je uveliko doprinela unapređenju
menadžmenta, njegovoj optimizaciji u složenim organizacijskim sistemima, kakve
su upravo korporacije.
Proučavajući pre svega sisteme i njihovu složenost i stalnu dinamičnost, a na bazi
matematičkih i logičkih postulata, kibernetski pristup je u očio neke opšte zakonitosti
u procesu upravljanja. Po ovom pristupu, upravljanje treba da obezbedi da se ostvare
postavljeni ciljevi organizacije, ostvari stabilnost organizacije i, u uslovima dinamičkih
promena, spreči njegova dezorganizacija. U uslovima dinamičnosti i stalnih promena
u okruženju, informacije su najbitnije za upravljačko akciono delovanje na
unutrašnjem i spoljašnjem planu, one su bitne za funkcinisanje, razvoj, pa i opstanak
organizacije. Upravljanje se obavlja na bazi dobijenih informacija o objektu kojim se
upravlja i okruženju, na osnovu kojih se donose i sprovode odluke.
Situacioni pristupu organizaciji nastao je sredinom 20 veka. Ova teorija uvodi
fenomen situacije kao bitan faktor za funcionisanje buduće organizacione prakse i
upravljanja u konkretnoj organizaciji. Ona naglašava da nema idealne organizacije,
te da metodi i principi organizovanja jedne organizacije nisu univerzalni za sve
organizacije, već zavise od situacije koju nameću konkretni uslovi.
rezimirajući izloženo o savremenim teorijama menadžmenta u odnosu na
korporativnu bezbednost može se zaključiti da:
/1/ Sistemskim pristupom mogu se poboljšati sposobnosti čitave korporacije pa
i njene organizacije bezbednosti, tako što bi se složeniji organizacioni problemi
rešavali modelovanjem, simulacijama i uz upotrebu računarske tehnike. Sistemski
pristup omogućava menadžmentu da odabere pravu akciju za dostizanje ciljeva
organizacije. Problemi se rešavaju uz pomoć konstruisanih matematičkih modela,
koji sadrže sve faktore problema.
/2/ Kibernetskim pristupom, korišćenjem kompjutera, menjanjem vrednosti
varijabli i kroz kompjutersku aplikaciju, može se utvrditi efekat određene promene
te formulisati rešenja koja vode do povoljnog stanja korporacijske bezbednosti.
/3/ Situacioni pristup zahteva reakcije menadžmenta zavisno od situacije, koje su
uvek nove i razlikuju se od slučaja do slučaja. Očekuje se fleksibilan pristup od strane
menadžera, uz istovremen zahtev da on poseduje aktivan, sistematičan i promišljen stav
u svakoj situaciji. Osnovno geslo u situacionom pristupuje ‘sve zavisi’. Zato, kada se ovaj
prikladan pristup koristi za oblikovanje organizacije i fukcionisanje korporativne
bezbednosti, menadžeri bezbednosti treba prvo da sagledaju sve uslovljavajuće faktore
situacije i tek onda donesu odluku o kursevima bezbednosnih akcija u korporaciji. Samo
odgovoran i kompetentan bezbednosni menadžment korporacije može primenjivati
teoriju situacionog pristupa u ostvarivanju korporativne bezbednosti, jer prate se faktori
okruženja koji su, kao i pojave ugrožavanja bezbednosti, ne samo složeni nego i
dinamični i mogu se menjati iz dana u dan.
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović
2. savremene paradigme menadžmenta i njihova primenljivost
u Korporativnoj bezbednosti
teorija upravljanja u Novom društvu (Managing in the Next Society). Novo
društvo, kako ga poima Piter Draker (Piter Drucker), jeste ‘društvo promena’. U
pitanju su dinamičke i dramatične promene ‘savremenog’, ‘novog’ društva, u svim
sferama. Dominantan faktor u Novom društvu biće naglo povećanje broja starije
populacije i naglo smanjenje mladih. ‘Osnovni poremećaj’ 21. Veka biće demografski
izazov, koji se ogleda u smanjenju mlade populacije. U narednih 20-30 godina biće
dominantna socijalna pitanja. Efekti informatičke revolucije tek su pred nama.
Autsorsing zaposlenih je već postao međunarodni trend.
Novo društvo biće društvo znanja. Znanje će biti njegov ključni resurs, a radnici
znanja biće dominantna grupa u okviru radne snage. Osnovne karakteristike znanja
biće: /1/ nekontrolisano širenje (znanje se prostire i putuje lakše od novca), /2/
vertikalna pokretljivost (znanje je dostupno svima preko formalnog obrazovanja koje
se relativno lako stiče) i /3/ potencijal za neuspeh kao i za uspeh (znanje je neophodno
za posao i gotovo svako može da ga pribavi i koristi kao ‘sredstvo rada’, ali ono ne
garantuje svakom uspeh). cena obrazovanih i inteligentnih ljudi brzo skače. tehnički
tj. stručno potkovani i inovativni ljudi su postali neverovatno skupi. radnik znanja
podrazumeva da sistem mora da uslužuje radnika. Oni nisu radna snaga, oni su
kapital. U znanju nema hijerarhije, ili je relevantno u datoj situaciji ili nije. radnici
znanja vide sebe kao profesionalce i očekuju takav tretman. Oni na svoj posao gledaju
kao na svoj život. Privlačenje i zadržavanje radnika znanja biće centralni zadatak
rukovođenja ljudima. Oni su potrebni organizaciji više nego što je organizacija
potrebna njima. radnike znanja zanima lično napredovanje i lična odgovornost.
Očekuju neprekidno učenje i usavršavanje, kao i da donose odluke u svojoj oblasti.
Najvažnije društvene promene koje dovode do stvaranja Novog društva biće
najveći problemi sa kojima će se suočiti menadžeri. tOP menadžment će morati da
shvati realnost Novog društva i da upravo na tome zasniva svoje politike i strategije.
Da bi opstala i uspela, svaka organizacija će morati da postane ključni subjekt
promena. Najefektivniji način da se uspešno upravlja promenama je da se promene
same iniciraju. Umesto da se promene posmatraju kao pretnja, moraju početi da se
doživljavaju kao šansa.
Kada su socijalne tenzije velike, potrebna je samo kap da se neke stvari aktiviraju.
cilj ratovanja je uništenje potencijala neprijatelja tj. uništenje njegove privrede. Sa
projektilima, satelitima i nuklearnim oružjem nema povratka na verovanje iz 19. Veka
da je prvi zadatak vojske da se drži dalje od civila. U modernom ratu civili ne postoje.
teroristički napadi na Ameriku, odnosno, teroristi i reakcija Amerike na njih su
iz temelja promenili svetsku politiku. Jasno je da su pred nama godine nemira u svetu,
posebno na Srednjem istoku.
Ako postoji jedna stvar koju je moguće sa sigurnošću predvideti, to je da će
budućnost biti itekako neizvesna.
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović
teorija upravljanja promenama (Mastering change). Ova teorija ističe da je za
menadžment bitno uočiti uticaj promena, bilo da su one fizičke, društvene ili neke
druge prirode, predvideti probleme koji nastaju iz promena i rešavati ih. Isak Adižes
(Ishac Adizes) u svojoj teoriji ističe da se problemi ne mogu zauvek rešiti.
Upravljanje promenama uključuje dva procesa: /1/ brzo donošenje dobrih odluka
i /2/ efikasno sprovođenje odluka. Neodlučnost ili odlaganje donošenja odluke, je
takođe vrsta odluke, koja najčešće vodi zamrzavanju problema, te neretko i putu u
krizu. Prilikom odlučivanja i sprovođenja odluka javljaju se konflikti. Postoje dva
glavna izvora konflikata: /1/ nemogućnost komuniciranja i /2/ interesi koji se razilaze.
Konflikt treba staviti u funkciju, a ne pokušavati da se eliminiše. Da bi se potencijalno
rušilački konflikt preobrazio u konstruktivni, treba stvoriti sredinu koja neguje
simbiozu. Uzajamno poverenje i poštovanje je ono što čini konflikt konstruktivnim
ili destruktivnim.
Suština menadžmenta je timski proces donošenja i sprovođenja odluka kojima
rešavamo probleme izazvane promenama. Svet je i suviše složen da bi iko mogao da
zna sve o svemu. Ako menadžeri žele da dođu do prave definicije problema i njegovog
pravog rešenja, moraju ga dati pravom timu ljudi na rešavanje. Moraju da stvore
okruženje koje će tim ljudima omogućiti pravilnu identifikaciju problema i
pronalaženje pravog rešenja.
Po Isaku Adižesu, odluka je dobra ako se njom izvršavaju četiri uloge
menadžmenta i to: proizvođenja (P); administriranja (A); preduzetništva (E) i
integracije (I). Zato se sve P–A–E–I uloge moraju istovremeno ostvarivati, ali tako da
će ih vršiti nekoliko ljudi koji čine komplementarnitim.
Dobro sprovođenje odluke podrazumeva da ona bude dobro definisana i
omeđena i da se obezbedi menadžerska energija za njeno sprovođenje, odnosno
autoritet, moć i uticaj.
Može se konstatovati da se navedeni stavovi Isaka Adižesa o upravljanju
promenama moraju imati u vidu kao postulati u ostvarivanju korporativne
bezbednosti i, u tom cilju, u kreiranju validnog modela bezbednosnog menadžmenta
teorija haosa (chaos theory) ili Nauka o kompleksnosti (Sciences of complexity)
predstavlja savremenu teoriju ili naučnu disciplinu u razvoju koja se bavi
proučavanjem kompleksnih nelinearnih sistema i istraživanjem njihove unutrašnje
logike. teorija haosa ima primarni cilj (svrhu) da u naizgled anarhičnim sistemima,
koji ne poseduju jasnu strukturu i dinamiku funkcionisanja, pronađe skriveni poredak
elemenata, odnosno obrasce funkcionisanja sistema. Ova naučna disciplina nastaje
šezdesetih godina 20. veka na osnovama matematike, fizike i sistemske dinamike.
U novije vreme teoriju haosa sve više proučavaju društveno-humanističke nauke,
organizacione, političke, bezbednosne, vojne i dr. Osnovne postavke teorije haosa
nastale su na bazi istraživanja i dokazivanja premisa i pretpostavki (hipoteza) da je
svet u kome živimo, izuzetno kompleksan te da u njemu promene na određenom
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović
kraju planete mogu da izazovu promene potpuno druge vrste na suprotnom kraju
planete (tzv. ‘efekat leptira’).
teorija haosa teži da pronikne u kompleksnost. Kompleksnost je oblast koja se
nalazi između potpunog reda sa jedne strane, i totalnog haosa sa druge strane.
Ova teorija može biti potpora procesima organizacionog razvoja i strategijskog
menadžmenta u korporacijama budućnosti te i njene bezbednosti, koja ima izgled
anarhičnog sistema. Konkretno ona može doprineti razumevanju naizgled haotične
situacije, koja vlada u okruženju, kao i poboljšanju kvaliteta prognoza budućih
promena, pa i samom obrazovanju adekvatnijih planova funkcionisanja. Za potrebe
menadžmenta ova teorija omogućava da se donekle utvrdi određena logika, koja
pomaže da se lakše sagleda i razume vreme diskontinuiteta, čak i da se pronikne u
obrasce uzročno-posledičnih veza na osnovu kojih dolazi do promena.
Menadžment totalnog kvaliteta (total Quality Management-tQM) ima kao
osnovni cilj postizanje totalne poslovne izvrsnosti organizacije. Poslovnu izvrsnost
možemo razumeti kao izraz vrhunskog kvaliteta i pouzdanosti.
Organizacije koje streme ka ovom cilju moraju kontinuirano da unapređuju svoje
poslovanje, da se prilagođavaju promenama u okruženju, ali istovremeno i sami da
iniciraju promene. Pored toga što postižu vrhunske rezultate organizacije moraju
imati aktivnu svest o široj društvenoj odgovornosti. tako, pojam poslovne izvrsnosti
možemo smatrati kao viši oblik menadžmenta totalnog kvaliteta.
Osnovne paradigme poslovne izvrsnosti su: /1/ posvećenost rezultatima —
postizanje rezultata koji su u osnovi zadovoljstva svih interesnih strana u organizaciji;
/2/ svrsishodno upravljanje — koje podrazumeva inspirativno upravljanje sa jasnom
vizijom i raspoloživim ciljevima; /3/ upravljanje procesima — koje zahteva
menadžment sa nizom povezanih sistema, procesa i činjenica; /4/ razvoj i uključivanje
zaposlenih — podrazumeva razvoj i uključivanje zaposlenih da bi povećali njihov
doprinos; /5/ kontinuirano unapređivanje — podrazumeva kritičko proveravanje
postojećeg stanja i uvođenje promena putem učenja i inovacija; /6/ razvoj partnerskih
odnosa — ostvaruje se razvojem i održavanjem partnerskih odnosa koji dodaju
vrednost, i /7/ društvena odgovornost — što podrazumeva prevazilaženje užeg
zakonskog okvira u kojem deluje organizacija i aktivan odnos prema očekivanjima
interesnih grupa kao i društva u celini.
reinžinjering poslovnih procesa (Business Process reengineering-BPr) ima za
cilj da obezbedi optimalnu efektivnost i efikasnost organizacije u savremenim,
odnosno novim uslovima privređivanja. On predstavlja temelj i transformacioni
proces koji omogućava prevazilaženje postojeće poslovne inercije i zastarelih i
nesvrsishodnih metoda rada.
reinžinjering pretpostavlja, pre svega, spremnost za promene, ali ne za parcijalne
i površne promene, već za dubinske (korenite) promene koje, nakon implementacije,
menjaju čitavu organizaciju, način rada i razmišljanja svih zaposlenih.
reinžinjering čoveku pristupa kao subjektu i ključnom resursu koji je jedini u
stanju da obdari ekonomskom vrednošću ostale resurse.
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović
reinžinjering kao nova poslovna filozofija uvažava velike promene nastale u nivou
obrazovanja, povišen standard i izmenjen sistem vrednosti znanja i stalno učenje i
menjanje svakog pojedinca.
Menadžment znanja (Knowledge Management) fokusira se na znanje kao kapital
koji se nalazi unutar same organizacije. Koncept menadžmenta znanja obezbeđuje
jedinstvo tri podjednako važne komponente organizacije: /1/ ljudi, /2/ procesa i /3/
Menadžment znanja predstavlja ciklus koji sadrži pet faza i to: prva faza, stvaranje
znanja (eng. creation); druga faza, osvajanje znanja (eng. capture); treća faza, čuvanje
znanja (eng. Storing); četvrta faza, podela znanja sa drugima (eng. Sharing); i peta
faza, primena znanja (eng. Application).
Menadžment znanja nužno stvara potrebu za postojanjem, a i on razvija
organizaciju koja uči.
Učeća organizacija (Learning organisation) vodi računa o potrebi stalnog
obrazovanja i usavršavanja zaposlenih. Učeću organizaciju karakterišu sledeća
obeležja: /1/ stalno učenje i kontinuirano podizanje nivoa individualnih i ukupnih
organizacionih znanja; /2/ permanentna edukacija i neprekidni razvoj postaju sastavni
deo posla i prioritetne obaveze organizacije i zaposlenih; /3/ učenje se ne doživljava
kao zasebna, izdvojena i specijalna aktivnost, već je značajan segment organizacione
kulture i poslovne politike, te način ponašanja i uslov postojanja i opstanka
organizacije; /4/ kreiranje novih modela mišljenja, promena ponašanja i primena
naučenog u praksi; /5/ oslanjanje na znanja, veštine, sposobnosti, inovacije, promene
i prilagođavanje promenama i /6/ jačanje konkurentske sposobnosti i strategijske
prednosti putem uvećanog znanja, poboljšanih veština i unapređenih sposobnosti.
Uspešna edukacija i permanentno usavršavanje zaposlenih sve više postaje
najznačajnija konkurentska prednost korporacija, i ne samo to, već stalno obrazovanje
i obuka postaju najznačajniji preduslov za opstanak i razvoj istih, odnosno sigurnosti
posla inapredovanjazaposlenih.
Korporacija koja uči ima u svom fokusu znanje i poseduje takve karakteristike i
specifičnosti koje zahtevaju posebne, ka znanju okrenute, lidere—lidere znanja
(knowledge leader).
teorija kulturnog sklada ima za suštinu poštovanje različitosti. Njome se nadgrađuju
situacione teorije, s tom razlikom što njen tvorac, britanski autor Čarls Hendi (charles
Handy), načelo raznovrsnosti proširuje sa organizacionog nivoa na društveni nivo.
Naglašava da se, zbog razlika u sredini, nacionalnoj kulturi, i profesionalnoj sredini u
samim organizacijama, način na koji se radi u jednoj zemlji mora razlikovati od načina
na koji se radi u drugoj zemlji. Ova teorija je donekle bila odgovorna tzv. ‘univerzalne’
teorije, zato što se u osnovi jedne takve teorije nalaze pretpostavke, koje imaju osnova
u jednoj kulturi za koju su rešenja kreirana, dok u drugoj kulturi mogu biti neosnovane
i besmislene. Ne postoji ‘najbolje’ rešenje za uspešno vođenje korporacije.
Preslikavanjem tuđih rešenja i organizovanjem po ‘proverenom’ modelu nekih uspešnih
što podrazumeva i dobro zaštićenih korporacija, može se nesvesno upasti u zamku
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović
kulturnih ograničenja, zbog čega će njihova primena biti ograničena ili čak nemoguća,
i umesto očekivanih koristi mogu proizvesti štetu. Kada je u pitanju korporativna
bezbednost, umesto željenog, to jest viđenog u primeru dobre prakse, može doći do
pogoršavanja korporativne bezbednosti pa i njenog ozbiljnog ugrožavanja.
Izloženo o savremenim paradigmama menadžmenta i njihovoj mogućoj
primenljivosti u korporativnoj bezbednosti, ilustrativno potvrđuje da je u toj funkciji
kao i u njenom razvoju neophodna implementacija postojećih teorija menadžmenta.
Neophodnost današnjeg vremena je da se pristupi njihovom korišćenju u procesu
inoviranja korporativne bezbednosti u nas, tim pre što se u Novom društvu—društvu
znanja ne mogu imati i sačuvati osnovni upravljački resursi, pa i druge vrednosti,
ukoliko ne posedujemo znanje. A, ‘ono što se nameće kao sine qua non ovih teorija
jeste usmerenost na značaj znanja koja organizacija poseduje, uvećanje intelektualnog
kapitala organizacije u funkciji kreiranja i očuvanja njihove konkurentske prednosti,
kao i potreba međusobnog dopunjavanja, spajanja, evoluiranja postojećih i nastajanja
novih teorija menadžmenta.’ (Mašić, Đorđević Boljanović 2009: 161)
zaključne napomene
tranzicija našeg društva, uslovljava i preobražaj korporacija pa u tom procesu i
njihove bezbednosti. Ovaj proces ne može da se odvija sam po sebi, a voluntaristički
dilentantizam, od koga nismo imuni, može proizvesti kobne posledice. Zato,
ostvarivanju aktuelne potrebe korporativne bezbednosti mora biti obezbeđeno
smišljen pristup inoviranja i funkcionisanja u skladu sa zahtevima vremena.
Put iz dobrih izvora i uzora vodi do dobrih odluka i njihovog efikasnog
sprovođenja, što će korporativnu bezbednost učiniti efektivnom i efikasnom (da radi
prave stvari na pravi način, i da nas i u budućnosti). Izvori iz nauke i uzori iz prakse
su delotvorni i bazični. Da ih ima i da se mogu primeniti u neophodnom inoviranju
korporativne bezbednosti, ovaj rad svojom sadržajnom analizom to ilustruje.
Bošković, Mićo (1995), Fizičko obezbeđenje i zaštita objekata, Beograd, Bodex, 1995.
Damjanović, Mijat (1990), Menadžerska revolucija, Zavod za udžbenike i nastavna
sredstva, Beograd, Prosveta.
Draker, Piter (2005), Upravljanje u novom društvu, Novi Sad, Adizes.
Fajol, Anri (2006), Opšti i industrijski menadžment, Novi Sad, Adižes.
Mala enciklopedija prosvete, opšta enciklopedija, drugo izdanje (1968), Beograd,
Izdavačko preduzeće Prosveta.
Maslov, Abraham (2004), Psihologija u menadžmentu, Novi Sad, Adižes.
Momčilo Talijan i Svetlana Ristović
Mašić, Branislav, Đorđević Boljanović, Jelena (2009), ‘Novi koncepti i pristupi u
menadžmentu: kuda ide teorija menadžmenta?’, Zbornik: 1. Naučni skup sa
međunarodnim učešćem Sinergija 2009, Bijeljina, Univerzitet Sinergija.
Napoleoni, Loreta (2009), Ološ ekonomija, Beograd, HESPErIAedu.
Petković, Mirjana (2008), ‘Organizaciono ponašanje’, centar za izdavačku delatnost,
Beograd, Ekonomskog fakulteta.
ristović, Svetlana (2006), Policijski menadžment u suzbijanju kriminaliteta, Beograd,
Zadužbina Andrejević.
talijan M. Miroslav (2008), Specifičnosti rukovođenja antiterorističkim snagama
(doktorska disertacija), Beograd, Vojna akademija.
talijan, Momčilo (2009), ‘Aplikativni model poslovne bezbednosti’, Zbornik radova
sa naučnog skupa: Savremeni oblici ugrožavanja bezbednosti i strategije suprostavljanja,
Banjaluka,Univerzitet Sinergija, Fakultet bezbjednosti i zaštite.
talijan, Momčilo, talijan M., Miroslav i Nedeljković, Miloš (2009), ‘Organizacija i
funkcionisanje Službe bezbednosti ‘Goša’ — studijsko-analitičke osnove i preporuke’,
Smed. Palanka, dokumentacija organa upravljanja Goša.
talijan, Momčilo, talijan, M. Miroslav (2011), Opšti i bezbednosni menadžment, Banja
Luka, Visoka škola unutrašnjih poslova.
Weihrich, Heinz, Koohtz, Xarold (1998), Menedžment, Zagreb, Mated.o.o.
Katja Eman and Bojan Dobovšek
UDK: 343.3/.7:504.9
Godina VI, 2012, str. 75–84
Izvorni naučni rad
TransnaTIonal enVIronmenTal CrIme In The
ConTemPorarY rIsK soCIeTY
Katja Eman and Bojan Dobovšek1
Environmental harm and destruction are connected with the functioning of
modern societies. the closer look — i.e. investigations of competent authorities,
stories of investigative journalists and surveys of researchers — reveal that a big
part of such behaviour is connected with organized crime groups and their
activities. the purpose of the present paper is to discuss the growing issue of
transnational environmental crime, especially to tackle the questions of causality
and responding to transnational environmental crime. A legitimacy theory
presumes that in general people have a strong predisposition toward following
the law (tyler 2006), but the obedience toward the law by specific social groups,
such as organised crime groups, seems questionable. the analysis shows that the
primary and main cause for committing crime against the environment is human
nature related to past anthropocentric attitude towards the environment.
Key words: organized/transnational environmental crime, profit theory, rational
polluter theory, legitimacy theory
In the contemporary society, man is confronted with the cognition that technological
development and progress have reached the critical limits of the environmental
exploration and destruction. It is now clear that the environmental harm is closely linked
to the structuring and functioning of modern societies. Environmental crime has become
attractive for organized crime groups especially due to the high incomes and lack of
environmental protection legislation in the global market.2 Environmental crime occurs
Dr Katja Eman, Faculty of criminal Justice and Security, University of Maribor, Slovenia.
Professor Bojan Dobovšek, Faculty of criminal Justice and Security, University of Maribor, Slovenia.
In the present work environmental crime is understood as every temporary or permanent act or resigned
activity, determined and defined as deviant by the (inter)national legislation, which causes any form of
harm (an artificial change, worsening, burden, degeneration or destruction) to one or more of eight
elements (air, water, soft soil, mineral materials, human species, animal species, plant species, and
microorganisms) that compound the natural environment or interrupt the environments’ natural changes.
Katja Eman and Bojan Dobovšek
when individuals or corporations intentionally violate environmental laws and regulations
because of profit and power. When these activities lead to cross-border or global
environmental impacts, they can be characterized as international or transnational
environmental crime (Brack 2002: 143). Just as in the last decade the scope of international
environmental crime has expanded, also the opposite to crime, international
environmental protection has expanded. Most endangered are the following categories
(Hayman and Brack 2002): biodiversity (destruction of flora and fauna and trade with
endangered plant and animal species); environmental crime related to natural resources
the problem of waste (illegal transfer of toxic waste, dumping waste into the sea and pits
or burying them (nuclear waste, waste oils, toxic wastes, etc.); environmental crime
associated with forbidden substances (illegal production and trade of ozone depleting
substances, organic pollutants, chlorofluorocarbon (cFc), etc.) (Hayman and Brack
2002). transnational environmental crime has developed from once a theoretical concept
due to the conditions offered by the modern society — the liberalization and globalization
of the world economy. the consequent abolition of borders, reduction of control and
easier flow of the financial assets have offered better opportunities for so-called money
laundering and for diversion into legitimate business (Elliot 2009).
Social changes have demanded changes and adaptation of the environmental
protection legislation. However, this situation has also influenced and caused the
modification of environmental crime. consequently transnational environmental crime
has become increasingly widespread and profitable. representatives of corporations and
businesses have transferred their own risk onto the organised criminal groups, which
instead of the owners take care waste. Furthermore, the only link between corporations
and criminal groups is a cash transaction for accomplished work and even that is often
hidden and fragmented. transnational environmental crime occurs when organized
crime groups infiltrate the economic sphere, or when they ‘merge’ with corporate
environmental crime with the sole purpose of creating income on both sides (Bačić, 1999).
transnational environmental crime enables very large profits. Interpol (Interpol, Internet
2010), Europol (Europol, Internet 2010) and other agencies rank it in the top of the most
profitable activities of organized crime, immediately after the human trafficking, drugs
and arms trafficking and prostitution. As such, transnational environmental crime is a
special type of business organization (called an organized criminal enterprise), which
penetrates various fields of entrepreneurship through corruption and intimidation, or by
offering opportunities for enrichment.
tyler (2006) tested the legitimacy theory and analysed peoples commitment to
obeying the law in his work ‘Why people obey the law’. He concluded that people
generally have a strong predisposition towards following the law, and accept the moral
obligation to obey laws (tyler 2006: 64-65). thereby, ‘personal views about the morality
of law breaking are important in shaping compliance with the law’ (tyler, 2006: 68).
the violator could be anyone or every one of us (corporations, companies, groups, individuals, the state,
etc). Environmental crimes’ special characteristics are victims, because besides directly through the
environment (biotic and abiotic natural elements) it harms people as well.
Katja Eman and Bojan Dobovšek
How strong is the moral obligation to obey laws at the members of organized
crime groups? tyler emphasized that ‘obligation to obey is based on trust to
authorities…rules and institutions’, but generally criminals feel very weak
commitment to acting and living in accordance with the rules and legislation.
this article consists of a review of the ongoing changes in the field of social values
and legal rules in the contemporary society, with the aim to address the issue of
transnational environmental crime. When addressing organized crime the root causes
need to be taken into account (Benedek 2012: 13). In discussing organized
environmental crime, we need to consider the characteristics of business organisations
and connected rules of market economy. In our attempt to answer the questions about
causality and social responses to transnational environmental crime, we give
consideration to aspects of three different criminological theories: 1) the rational
choice theory; 2) the profit theory; and 3) the legitimacy theory.
1. e contemporary risk society — a society of unforeseen
changes of social values
changes in economic and social fields and universal human values are facing
increasing by complex development, which changes in the criminal activities. crime
always reflects the general social situation (Pečar, 1996), which is especially clearly
and quickly reflected in the organized and white-collar environmental crime.
Sociologists Beck (1992; 1999), Giddens (1997) and Bauman (2005) theorized about
modernity and the society that is the result of modernity. Next to establishing the
positive consequences of modernization, they also dealt with anomalies, which are a
product of modernization. Ulrick Beck (1992) stressed that the modern society is a
risk society, in which distress is hierarchic and smog is democratic. the complexity
of societies widens and deepens social possibilities, but it does the same with the risks
(Beck, 1999). With the trend of globalization of the society, globalized risks develop
because the society is organized to respond to risks. Giddens (1997) believes the
society bears too many burdens and is too concerned about future (and safety), which
gives rise to the idea of danger.
Developing the theory of risk society, Beck (1992: 27−29) assigns different
characteristics to risks, which are produced by societies at the highest development
levels. Environmental harm and consequently the endangered (risk) society is on the
top of the scale of the modern risks:
1. risks completely avoid the direct perception capabilities of mankind (for instance
radioactivity or harmful substances in air, water and food). they can be detected
only by specific instruments. the consequences for the most part do not appear
2. Modern risks include a boomerang effect and sooner or later also endanger those
who create them. the transfer of heavy production to the third world over the
long-term will not protect developed countries from the consequence of pollution,
because the products make their way back to the developed world.
Katja Eman and Bojan Dobovšek
3. Modern risks represent big business for the economy. risks, which modern
societies create on their own, at the same time represent a store of infinite potential
of these same societies. risks represent the never satisfied needs and are ideal for
economic exploitation (we never live as healthy to attain the health ideal; we must
always do or buy more to get closer to this — always elusive — ideal).
4. risks are attributed to the post-modern man; they are almost always attributed
to society, as we simply cannot avoid them.
5. risks have considerable political potential. Due to possible disasters, considerable
changes in the structures of social power may occur.
throughout history, mankind constantly changed its living environment with the
assistance of different technologies. contrary to natural disasters, which according
to Beck (1999) one products of non-human or supernatural forces, environmental
pollution, environmental destruction and environmental devastation are caused by
mankind. Natural sciences confirm and prove connections between natural disasters
which take place due to a destroyed natural balance and destruction of the
environment. Giddens (1997) states that modern risks are the product of human
activities, they are thus called production risks. He connects them to human disasters,
like the accidents in tschernobyl, Love canal, Ajka or Fukušima, which shook the
social confidence in modern projects and raised doubts about the good intentions of
industry, government and individual experts. Not only legality, but also legitimacy of
the environmental protection legislation and authorities were put to the test.
Modern risks represent big business for the economy. they also make for a
considerable political potential. Beck (1992; 1999) and Giddens (1997), stress the
importance of knowledge as an antonym to wealth, because rich people have different
resources that enable them to divert risks, which poor people cannot do. they
emphasize that knowledge is unimportant only if the person is either unaware or
unacquainted with the risks. We can also relate their conclusions to the environmental
crime issues and the current social risk caused by enviromental crime. When averting
or overcoming such risks, knowledge and access to information is especially
important, but they also often depend on the economic circumstances. An individual
lives in societies of risks and decide daily what to do and how much to risk for it. the
economic status largely determines what an individual is able to do. the wish for
profit and comfort of violators and their accomplices often prevails to the detriment
of society and individuals.
Edelbacher and theil (2012) stress that western economic model of free market
depends on exogenous and endogenous factors, which serve as frame conditions for
the development of economics.3 From the aspect of the above described risk society
Exogenous factors are the factors that are very hard to predict and even harder (sometimes impossible) to
influence. these factors create tremendous challenges (Edelbacher and theil 2012: 84): 1) movements of
population; 2) causes of movements; 3) increases of crime rates; and 4) tendencies toward violence and
terrorism. Endogenous factors derive from the characteristics of or changes within the society itself, such
as 1) changes of critical values and 2) changing views of rule of law. (Edelbacher and theil 2012: 84).
Katja Eman and Bojan Dobovšek
and its characteristics, we will focus on endogenous factors. Our assumption is that
changes of ethical behaviour and changes of attitudes towards the rule of law in
contemporary society influence popular attitude towards the transnational
environmental crime.
Ethical values have changed in the modern society Edelbacher and theil (2012:
86), materialism, nepotism and egoism are more important in liberal democracies
than solidarity and common values. the general goal of the modern materialistic
world is ‘to become wealthy’; everything else is pushed to the background. the
community is loosing importance and social ties, social networks and support are
vanishing. For example, families and schools are recognized as ‘cornerstones of our
societies’ (Edelbacher and theil 2012: 86) but the percentage of violent crimes,
physical injuries, abuse and even murders committed in these social environments
has increased. Some parents neglect their children and schools are having problems,
which creates a general impression that society is out of control and rules, discipline,
values and laws are no longer followed. Along also come changes in the moral
concepts, caused by damaged family and educational structures, hidden economies
with fiscal, tax, and insurance fraud, assaults and other problems motivated by
selfishnes. All of this can have great influence on peoples’ attitudes towards the rule
of law. Views of rule of law have also changed: ‘Young people in particular care very
little about non-violent crimes’ (Edelbacher and theil 2012: 87). What is more,
nowadays shoplifting, insurance frauds and some other crimes acts are gaining a
degree of social acceptance. A similar perspective of ‘blurred’ rules and values is
detected in the field of environmental harm. For specific social groups, environmental
crime is not considered to be. On the contrary, it is an acceptable way to make profit.
Besides, even usually laud environmental protectors forget the values and rules if
there is an issue of organisational survival or the expected profit is high enough. Profit
remains the primary and mail goal of organized environmental crime.
For the contemporary society risk is something normal. Ethical values have
changed, together with the predominant attitude towards legal rules. Materialism,
nepotism and egoism are more important than social networks, common values,
environmental protection, solidarity, mutual help and support. these changes have
additionally influenced the weakening of the (moral) obligation to obey the law.
2. Conceptualizing transnational environmental crime
Organized crime is the most interesting among all forms of crime, as well as the
most dangerous and most sophisticated form of crime. With its skilful operation and
artful infiltratio, organized crime has been challenging the police and other law
enforcement and criminal justice agencies for several decades. One of the many areas
of organized crime is also environmental crime. Watson (2005: 207) notes that a large
part of environmental crime is a highly organized and high-profit activity. Since the
perpetrators of environmental crime can generate significant profits with minimal
risks, the area is definitely attractive to organized crime groups, which see an
exceptional business opportunities in it. Organized criminal groups pay particular
Katja Eman and Bojan Dobovšek
attention to specific activities within the scope of environmental crime, which include:
illegal disposal of waste, illegal advertising, and criminality associated with rare or
wild animal and plant species.4 Situ and Emmons (2000: 69) describe the typical
criminal organizations as corporations, that have infiltrated the multitude of
environmentally sensitive industries. Everywhere around the world the problem of
hazardous waste disposal controlled by the organized crime groups stands out.
International waste trafficking is one of the most profitable ‘businesses’ at the
moment.5 A prime example of such operation (and power) is the garbage disposal
problem in Naples, controlled by the Italian mafia camorra, and the illegal, hazardous
waste disposal in campania, controlled by the Italian mafia ‘Ndrangheta.6
At this point it is necessary to bring up the issue of two dimensions or forms of
environmental crime, which could be allocated according to the criteria of space and
modes of operation. these forms are international and organized environmental
crime, sometimes both called transnational environmental crime, or just organized
environmental crime.7 Both can occur together with different forms of environmental
crime: 1) environmental crime by an individual; 2) environmental crime by the rich
and powerful; 3) environmental crime by particular groups; and 4) environmental
crime by the state or the ruling authorities, presented in Figure 1 below. Generally,
both forms overlap, but organized environmental crime can be performed within and
international environmental crime must one or more border crossings.
When classifying a crime of smuggling of rare animal and plant species, one becomes entangled in
overlapping areas, because this crime was initially defined solely as an international crime, but over the
years it has become increasingly organized. If one would like to be completely accurate, this form of crime
should be classified as an international organized crime of trafficking in animal and plant species.
For example, illegal international trade in endangered species of fauna and flora is by type of execution
and earnings compared to the trade in drugs and arms, because it is a very well organized form of crime,
and often the same groups of perpetrators are involved. Dobovšek and Goršek (2007: 48) point out that
the crimes against the endangered plant and animal species belong to the hidden forms of criminality,
which are usually the domain of organized crime groups that operate near or inside. this type of crime
has a number of characteristics of white-collar crime, as well as traditional property crime.
In 1980, organized crime was deeply involved in the waste disposal business in New York and elsewhere
in the U.S. An extensive campaign by the authorities successfully identified and punished more than 500
involved members of the old Italian Mafia families (carter 1999: 5).
In recent years organized environmental crime has become increasingly widely present, since
environmental legislation has changed and organized environmental crime has adapted to thus. Organized
environmental crime occurs when it comes to the infiltration of organized crime groups into the economic
sphere, or when the organized crime ‘combines’ with the corporate environmental crime with purpose, to
generate profit on both sides (Bačić, 1999).
Katja Eman and Bojan Dobovšek
figure: form of environmental crime
‘transnational refers to transgression of regional and national boundaries.’
(Bisschop 2011: 157). Franko Aas (2007) describes the term ‘transference’ with
processes and trends, which include movements of offenders, victims or crime itself
from one place to another. the movements are close by connected with the
globalization of the contemporary society, which make the detection and tracing of
these movements even harder. thereby, transnational environmental crime is
(Bisschop 2011: 159): ‘any international or negligent activity or manipulation [by an
individual or a corporation] that entails avoidable and unnecessary, immediately
noticeable or indiscernible (only noticeable over time) environmental harm to biotic
[faunal/floral] or a-biotic [natural resource contamination] natural resources, which
transfers regional and national borders and is serious enough to warrant state
intervention and resembles other kinds of acts criminalized in the countries concerned
or international law.’
In the case of environmental crime, organized crime groups focus particular
attention on specific criminal activities, which include: 1) illegal trade in animal and
plant species; 2) illegal trade in ozone-depleting substances, hazardous chemicals and
harmful pesticides; 3) illegal transport and trading in various types of toxic,
radioactive and other hazardous waste; 4) illegal, uncontrolled and unreported fishing;
5) illegal logging and trade of wood, when it is harvested, transported, bought or sold
in contravention of national legislation; 6) biological piracy and transport of controlled
biologically or genetically modified materials; 7) illegal disposal of oil and other wastes
into the seas and oceans; and 8) illegal exploitation of mineral raw materials and fuelsmuggling in order to avoid paying taxes and to avoid the control of carbon
Katja Eman and Bojan Dobovšek
emissions.8 A specific and increasingly common form of environmental crime, which
involves large corporations and even states, is the so-called ‘migration of dirty
industries’ from their home countries where environmental standards have risen and
become stricter, to developing countries (this includes countries in transition), where
development of environmental protection legislation is still in progress (Hayman in
Brack 2002; Elliott 2009; Schmidt 2004; Watson 2005; Situ and Emmons 2000; Liddick
Environmental crime rapidly expanded and become transnational when
organized criminal groups took the advantage of economic liberalization and
globalization of the world economy. the result was an increase in frequency of
shipments and volume of cargo, reduced border controls and an easier transfer of
funds through the global financial and banking systems. this offered more
opportunities for money laundering and the transfer of the profits into legitimate
businesses and enterprises. As with any other ‘businesses’ of organized crime, the
criminal networks expanded to leaderships of large corporations, and political leaders.
criminologists (Vander Beken, 2007; croall, 2005; Bisschop, 2011; carrabine et
al., 2004; Liddick, 2011) have portrayed the market mechanisms of the modern society
as a source of opportunities, motivations and rationalizations for committing
environmental crime. ‘Not only it is profitable to be environmentally destructive (in the
sense of mining, manufacturing cars, clear-felling forests), it feels good (in the sense of
purchasing a gold necklace, driving on the open road, looking at a table, chair or house
constructed from redwood, mahogany, mountain ash or the like)’ (Halsey, 2004: 884).
thereby, Brack (2002) emphasizes that a low level of environmental ethics and
concerns contribute to the occurrence of transnational environmental crime. For
example, the consumers are provided with goods they desire, despite the fact of the
environmental restrictions while on the other hand, organized crime groups generate
a profit with minimal risk.
transnational enviromental crime is a particular form of organised crime with
particularly debilitating consequences for the society’s well-being. While the methods
at the disposal of the state that are well suited to combatting environmental crime are
more or less the same as those used to address any other form of organised crime,
the destructive effects of transnational environmental crime are such a challenge to
society that the policy to fight this crime should be re-prioritised substantially.
the most often detected and most profitable forms of organized environmental crime are: illegal logging
and timber smuggling, illegal trafficking in endangered animal and plant species; the black market
involving ozone-depleting substances and other prohibited or regulated chemicals; cross-border dumping
of toxic and hazardous waste; and poaching (Interpol 2010, Elliott 2009).
there are frequent relocations of heavy industries to third World countries and to Eastern Europe.
Katja Eman and Bojan Dobovšek
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